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ABSTRACT
This is a study on the reign of Hsiao-tsung, the second 
emperor of the Southern Sung dynasty (1127-1279). His rule from 
1162 to 1189 represents a crucial phase in Southern Sung history 
for it was during this period that the regime was greatly 
strengthened and the empire solidly built. By effectively 
consolidating the Southern Sung regime further, Hsiao-tsung not 
only succeeded in establishing an age of peace and order under his 
administration but also constructed a dynasty of long duration 
which successfully resisted foreign penetration for almost another 
century after his reign.
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter One, the 
Introduction, gives the historical setting and places the reign 
of Hsiao-tsung in a clearer perspective by highlighting the major 
political, socio-economic and military developments of the time. 
Chapter Two provides an account on the founding of Southern Sung. 
The political upheavals during the reign of the first emperor, 
Kao-tsung, represent a sharp contrast to the overall peaceful 
administration of his successor. Chapter Three deals with the 
early years of uncertainty during Hsiao-tsung's reign and gives 
us a better understanding of the tasks initially confronting the 
emperor.
In Chapters Four and Five, the significant role played 
by Hsiao-tsung in consolidating the Southern Sung empire is 
analysed through a detailed study of court politics during the
(iii)
Ch'ien-tao (1165-1173) and Ch'un-hsi (1174-1189) eras. It can be 
deduced that the emperor achieved consolidation by concentrating 
political, military and financial powers not only in the central 
government but also in his own hands. As a result, absolutism 
attained a new height, but this was not necessarily harmful as it 
had the positive effect of bringing about general order to the 
regime.
Finally, in the Conclusion in Chapter Six, we examine 
the far-reaching impact of Hsiao-tsung's contributions to Southern 
Sung China. His labours resulted in a lasting stability that held 
the empire together through the years of political decline and 
economic deterioration. The remarkable resilience demonstrated 
by the late Southern Sung dynasty undoubtedly attests the strength 
of Hsiao-tsung's consolidation.
(iv)
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL SETTING
The Sung Dynasty (960-1279)
In the two thousand years of Chinese imperial history, there
were many dynasties which rose and fell. Among these, the Sung
dynasty, which lasted from the mid-tenth to the late thirteenth
century, represents a significant era in many aspects. It has
generally been recognized as a time of widespread social, economic,
political and intellectual developments which shaped much of China
down to the twentieth century.* For this reason, it has been
variously called the "early modern" or "neo-traditional" period in 
2
Chinese history.
The Sung dynasty came into existence in 960 A.D. when its 
founder, T ’ai-tsu usurped the throne of the Later Chou
1. James T.C. Liu and Peter J. Golas, "Introduction", Change In 
Sung China: Innovation or Renovation (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. 
Heath & Company, 1969), p.vii.
2. For general assessments on the significance of this new era and 
the various terms used to describe it, see E.A. Kracke, Jr., 
"Sung Society: Change Within Tradition," Far Eastern Quarterly, 
Vol.14, No.4 (August 1955), pp.479-488; James T.C. Liu, "The 
Neo-Traditional Period (ca. 800-1900) in Chinese History," The 
Journal of Asian Studies (JAS) , Vol.24, No.l (November 1964), 
pp. 105-107; and E.O. Reischauer & J.K. Fairbank, East Asia:
The Great Tradition (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1968), 
pp.211-242.
3. The official biography,of Sung T'ai-tsu is found in T'o T'£o u .rapny. x o i iu uu i u l -wt-
), Sung Shih (SS) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu
^ / t ) ’ 1977>’ chs,1-3» PP-1-52-
2last of the regimes which had dominated North China during the period
(r. 960-976) succeeded in establishing the dynasty on a more perma­
nent basis than the rulers of the Five Dynasties had done, and helped 
to bring about the reunification of the Chinese empire by subjugating 
the southern states. This task of reunification was continued and 
brought to completion by T ’ai-tsu’s brother and immediate successor,
his descendants. A total of nine emperors ruled the Sung empire from
forces captured the city together with the last two emperors, Hui-
K'ang (K* ang-wang/jp ) managed to escape capture and continued 
the struggle against the enemy. He became the founder of the Southern 
Sung, so-called because from 1127 until the end of the dynasty in 
1279, Sung rule was limited to the central and southern parts of 
China. The term Northern Sung thus refers to the period 960-1127.
Sung government in overall perspective has usually been 
distinguished by three distinctive features, namely, centralization,
4. The Five Dynasties, namely, Later Liang/f^L > Later T'angYjL/^l, , 
Later Tsin^^i^* , Later H a n ^ ^ > ^  and Later Chou^_^J existed 
successively in North China from the fall of the T tang dynasty
in 907 to the founding of the Sung in 960. At the same time,
South China was fragmented into several separate states, so 
that this period of Chinese history is traditionally known as 
the age of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.
5. The official biography of T'ai-tsung is found in Si3, chs. 4 &
5, pp.53-102.
4
of disunion, known as the era of the Five Dynasties. T ’ai-tsu
5
(r.976-997), who then passed on the throne to
the imperial capital , until
disaster struck in 1126-27, when the invading Jurchen
A son of Hui-tsung, Prince
3absolutism and the supremacy of civilian rule over the military.
The trend towards absolutism and centralization was firmly set 
during the founding of the Sung when T'ai-tsu created an institu­
tional framework for absolute government that continued to function
6
for the last millenium of imperial history. Drawing a lesson from
his own usurpation, T'ai-tsu was eager to prevent another such
occurrence. Thus one of his first acts was to deprive the leading
generals of their military power by pensioning them off with suitable 
7
rewards. He then replaced his former comrades-in-arms with men who
were less influential and who would be more easily controlled, while
8
some positions in the Imperial Army were deliberately left vacant.
After consolidating his own position by curtailing the 
influence of the military, T'ai-tsu carried out a policy of centra­
lization by reducing regional power. He placed all newly-acquired
6. For a detailed study on the founding of the Sung dynasty, see 
Edmund H. Worthy, "The Founding of Sung China, 950-1000: 
Integrative Changes in Military and Political Institutions," 
Ph.D. dissertation (Princeton University, 1975).
7. For an account of the celebrated act of T'ai-tsu in gathering 
power from the military, or popularly known as "stripping the 
military authority (of the generals) with.one cup of win<hL r ner ^ 
(pei-chiu shih ping-ch'Uan , see ^  »
Hsu Tzu-chih t'ung-chien ch' ang-pi|k  p f  ?£ "
(Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chti , '*1961)7 ch. 2, pp. iDb-
11b. This celebrated act of T ’ ai-€si3rhas nevertheless been 
proven to be from legendary versions inadvertently adopted by 
the standard histories. The actual process of gathering military 
power from the generals was in fact more complicated than it 
appeared and took a much longer time to achieve. See Hs(f Kuei 
Fang C h i e n - h s i n t » VPei-chiu shih ping- 
ch'tian’ shuo hsien-i"^f^'^^|%r^ 'Zv s 7 ^ , ^  Wen-shih
3 £, No. 14 (Peking, 1982), p
H *. ••"Lun Sung T'ai-tsu shou/pii^-ch' iian,"
^ in Sun
(Peicing, 1979), pp.'”$70-271.
g-shih ts'ung-k'ao
4territories under the direct control of the central government by
appointing officials from the central bureaucracy to govern them.
He also transferred the best provincial military units to the 
9
capital. A further step in centralization involved the elimination 
of the military governors' (chieh-tu shih control over
the finance and administration of the various prefectures and the 
restoration of such powers to the central government.^ This policy 
of centralization which has been metaphorically described as 
"strengthening the trunk and weakening the branches" (ch'iang-kan 
jo-chih ! # »  was carried to conclusion by T'ai-tsu's
successor, T'ai-tsung. The latter, much more than T'ai-tsu himself, 
also gave the dynasty its distinctive feature as a strong bureau­
cratic regime where civilian officials and values overwhelmingly 
predominated over the m i l i t a r y . T h e s e  two emperors therefore set 
the pattern of government for future Sung emperors to follow.
In the realm of civil administration, the expansion of the
emperor's power was accompanied by a sharp decline in the influence
of the chief councillor (i.e. the prime minister). Even though the
-chief governmental organs of the Three Departments (san-sheng )
9. Li T'ao, op.cit., ch.6, p.lib.
10. An important measure taken by T'ai-tsu in this direction was 
the sending of officials from the central,government, known 
as "Exchange Intendants" (chuan-ytin s h i h to take 
charge of finance in the various prefectures. See Nieh 
Ch'ung-ch’i, op.cit., pp.278-79.
11. Edmund H. Worthy, op.cit., p.4. The author emphasizes the 
point that civilian government was established during the 
reign of T ’ai-tsung rather than during the time of T'ai-tsu, 
whose regime has been described as "militocratic absolutism", 
where the military factor was still of paramount importance. 
See Chapter VIII, pp.295-311.
5consisting of the Secretariat (chung-shu y  ), the Chancellery 
(men-hsia I'* ) and the Department of Ministries (shang-shu S*} )
had been inherited from the T'ang, the Sung system operated quite 
differently in that functions formerly performed by the Three Depart­
ments were separated and given to other organs of government. The 
civil and military administrations were headed by the Secretariat- 
Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs (shu-mi yuan
respectively, while the management of economic affairs was entrusted
^  S] 12
to the Economic Commission (san-ssu ). The heads of both
civil and military administration belonged to the Council of State,
the most important member of which was the chief councillor (tsai-
hsiang ), who was also the chief of the Secretariat-
Chancellery. Below him were a number of assistant councillors
(chih-cheng-^.-^Cl.. The assistant civil councillor, being next in
position to the chief councillor, was known as Second Privy
Councillor (ts'an-chih cheng-shih , while the assistant
military councillors held varying titles and were the chief officials
13
of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Under the Sung system, the
12. E.A. Eracke, Jr., Civil Service in Early Sung China.960-1067 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968 reprint), 
p.38.
13. The titles held by the military councillors differed from time 
to time. They might be Commissioner of Military Affairs (shu- 
mi shih Ay) , Administrator or Co-Administrator^, of the
Military Bureau (chih shu-mi-yuan shih j&T cm* or t'ung-
 /*) ____
titles in this thesis are rendered in accordance with E.A.
Eracke, Jr., Translations of Sung Civil Service Titles (Sung
Project, Paris: Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1957).
6chief councillor was only in charge of civil administration and had
no power over military and economic matters, a fact which has been
14
regarded as contributing to the decline of his authority. Another
indication of this decline was the fact that during the T ’ang
imperial decrees (chao-shu ) had been drafted in their final
version by the Secretariat and then submitted to the emperor for
approval; during the Sung, on the other hand, the chief councillor
had to submit several proposals to the emperor and only drafted the
15
decree once the latter had made his decision.
The power of the chief councillor was further reduced by 
changes which occurred in the censorial system during this period. 
There were two categories of censorial officials: the censors (yu- 
shih^ p  ) of the Censorate (yu-shih t * ai 4 ^  ^  &  ); and the 
policy-criticism officials (chien-kuan (£ ) of the Bureau of 
Policy Criticism (chien-yuan ^J), frequently referred to as
Ut * ai-chien cz Traditionally, the censors had been regarded as
the "ears and eyes" (erh-mu^  ) of the emperor because of their
responsibilities for surveillance; in constrast, the policy-
criticism officials were often called "lips and tongues" (ch*un-she
^  ) of the councillor because of their duty to remonstrate
16
with the emperor. The latter role was altered during the Sung as
14. See Fang*Hao , Sung_Shih (Taipei: Hua-kang chu-
pan s h e M ^ j  , 1966 reprint), Vol. 1 , d U f c
Ch'ien , "Lun Sun^-tai hsiang-,ch' uan
in Sung-shih ydn-chiu chi (SSYCC) , Vol.l (Taipei,
1958), pp.455-462. 1
15. Fang Hao, op.cit., j).33; C h ' i e n Chung-kuo li-tai cheng- 
chih te-shih vf? %  (CCTS) (Hong Kong: Ta-
chung-kuo yin -shua ch' an ^  reprint), p.66.
16. Ch'ien Mu, CCTS, p.69; Fang Hao, op.cit., p.33.
7the policy-criticism officials were made independent of control by
17
the chief councillor. Furthermore, the chief councillor was
prohibited from recommending either censors or policy-criticism
18 „
officials, who were appointed by the emperor himself. Consequently, 
the duties of the policy-criticism officials were no longer 
restricted to remonstrating with the emperor, for like the censors, 
they could also impeach officials, including the chief councillor.
In this way, both the censors and the policy-criticism officials 
served as the "ears and eyes’* of the emperor.
From the above, it might appear that the Sung chief councillor
was completely at the mercy of the emperor; yet this was not
necessarily the case in practice. As E.A. Kracke has pointed out,
"If one of several opposing groups within the government could pack
the Council of State with its adherents, and from there capture the
Censorate and the Bureau of Policy Criticism, appointing its leading
opponents to posts away from the capital, and keep others from access
to the imperial ears, the ruler was in fact (perhaps unconsciously)
19
a prisoner." From this, it is clear that there was no hard and 
fast rule with regard to the decline of councillor power; much 
depended on whether the chief councillor was able to manage the 
political situation to his own advantage.
17. During the Sung the Bureau of Policy Criticism became an 
independent body and was no longer under the direct control 
of the chief councillor. See Ch’ien Mu, CCTS, p.69.
18. Ibid.
19. E.A. Kracke, Jr., Civil Service in Early Sung China. 960-1067, 
p. 30.
8Nevertheless, the fact remains that the emperor possessed
the ultimate power and whatever authority the chief councillor had
was delegated to him by the sovereign. A look at Sung politics in
practice shows that whenever a chief councillor was dominant or
"powerful", it was largely because the emperor willingly delegated
his authority to the minister concerned. For example, during the
-7 J?Northern Sung, Emperor Shen-tsung/Tj iT-* (r. 1068-1085) expanded 
the executive power of his chief councillor, Wang An-shih
20
(1027-1086) to enable the latter to carry out major reforms.
Another dominant chief councillor was Ts'ai Ching ' (1047-1126),
who was the favourite minister of Emperor Hui-tsung (r. 1101-
1125). During his time the executive power of the chief councillor
was enlarged to such an extent that Ts’ai Ching was able to wield
tremendous influence over the censorial officials, so much so that
from their supposed function as "ears and eyes" of the emperor, they
21
became the "ears and eyes" of the chief councillor instead. Ts'ai 
set the precedent for the suppression and domination of censorial 
officials by Chfin Kuei 1100-1155) and other powerful
ministers of the Southern Sung.
20. Wang An-shih enjoyed the almost unreserved trust of Shen-tsung 
from the beginning of the reforms in 1069 to the time of his 
temporary resignation from the court in 1074. See James T.C. 
Liu, Reform In Sung China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1968 reprint), p.52.
21. For a brief account of the censorial role during the chief 
councillorship of Ts'ai Ching, see Gong Wei Ai, "The Partici­
pation of Censorial Officials in Politics During the Northern 
Sung Dynasty (960-1126 A.D.)," Chinese Culture, Vol.15, No.2 
(June, 1974), pp.30-41.
9Another important characteristic of Sung government was the
emphasis on the role of the scholar-officials which led to the rise
of a highly civilian and bureaucratized empire. The strong civilian
bureaucracy built up by T'ai-tsung remained a permanent institution
for the rest of the Sung dynasty. At the same time, what has been
called the respectful and benevolent accommodation of scholar-
officials by the emperor became a prominent feature in Sung 
22
politics. T'ai-tsu laid down an injunction which prohibited the
23
killing of scholar-officials. The image of the scholar-officials
was further enhanced by the founding emperor's comment that a chief
24
councillor should be a scholar, and, in comparison with previous 
and later times, officials were on the whole well-treated and 
respected during the Sung. Under such circumstances, it is there­
fore not surprising that the Sung witnessed a new height in the 
ideological authority of the Confucian scholar-officials. E.A.
Kracke is of the opinion that this ideological authority tends to
restrain the ruler's authority and enhance the bureaucrat’s power 
25
and prestige. Though this seems to contradict the rise in imperial 
authority discussed earlier, the irony is that these two seemingly 
contradictory developments took place along side of each other.
22. See James T.C. Liu, "An Administrative Cycle in Chinese 
History: The Case of the Northern Sung Emperors," Harvard 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No.2 (1962), p.139.
23. Wang Fu-chih ^  Sung Lun tf" (SL) (Taipei: Chiu-ssu 
ch'u-pan she , 1977), ch.l, p. 4.
24. Li T ’ao, op. cit. , p.7, p.6a.
25. E.A. Kracke, Jr., "The Chinese and the Art of Government," in
The Legacy of China, ed. by Raymond Dawson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p.315.
10
One can understand such an irony better if one takes into considera­
tion the fact that a significant aspect of the Chinese political
tradition is the co-existence and equilibrium of different political
26
forces and competing concepts. Such mutual accommodation of 
conflicting elements in the traditional Chinese state can be seen 
in the interdependence of the Confucian school and the imperial 
ruler. While the emperor derived his authority from Confucianism 
and was obliged to respect the Confucian scholars for their ideolo­
gical authority, the scholar-officials, on the other hand, had to 
work within the confines of Confucian norms and values, which 
sanctioned imperial power. An apt term, therefore, to describe
this interdependent governmental system of the Sung state is
27
"bureaucratic absolutism", whereby a strong or ingenious emperor 
could manipulate the civilian bureaucracy for autocratic purposes 
but at the same time, could be checked by it in some ways.
Corresponding with the rise in Confucian ideological autho-
28
rity was the promotion of education, and the civil service 
examination system came to play an extremely important role in 
political life. The increasing importance of the examinations in 
the recruitment of officials inevitably led to the further expansion
26. Ibid.
27. This term is suggested by James T.C. Liu in his article 
"Bureaucratic Politics of Accommodation in Southern Sung 
China," unpublished seminar paper, University Seminar on 
Traditional China, Columbia University (April 15, 1969); 
see also Edmund H. Worthy, op.cit., p.311.
28. For a detailed study on education in the Northern Sung period, 
see Thomas Lee, "Education in Northern Sung China," Ph.D. 
dissertation (Yale University, 1974).
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of Imperial power because whatever power held by the bureaucrat was
due to his appointment, and the power of appointment was ultimately
in the hands of the emperor, who exercised full control over the
civil service. Therefore, with the path of upward mobility being
largely restricted to taking the examinations, the elite became
closely allied with the emperor, who made the former into an integral
29
part of the imperial machinery. While contributing to the spread 
of education and the rise of scholar-officials in general, the 
civil service examinations also made the bureaucrats vulnerable to 
the arbitrariness of the imperial ruler. This forms another ambi­
valent feature of the '’bureaucratic-absolutist" empire.
It should also be mentioned that with the establishment of
civilian government and the rise of ideological authority, the
scholar-officials began to play a more active role in politics.
Their increasing participation in court politics nevertheless led
to negative results in that it was directly responsible for the
30
prevalence of factional disputes during the Sung dynasty.
Factionalism not only caused political instability but it also led 
to division among the scholar-officials that eventually weakened 
their own power. Such factional strife and power struggles remained 
a common phenomenon of the dynasty until the end of the Southern 
Sung.
Having discussed the major political traits of the Sung, we 
shall now turn to other significant developments. Economically, the
29. Ibid., p.20.
30. For an account of factional disputes during the Northern Sung, 
see Fang Hao, op.cit., Vol. l, ch.8, pp.104-133.
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Sung empire was perhaps the richest political entity In the world
at the time. Advances in agriculture led to great increase in the
31
productivity of the fields. The rise in agricultural productivity
was paralleled by similar advances in the industrial sector of the 
32
economy. It was a time of great commercial development and
urbanization, accompanied by the rise of a money economy, which was
33
replacing the old transactions in kind. For an agricultural 
society, the extent of economic diversification and the increasing 
importance of money were indeed remarkable and were unprecedented 
in Chinese history.
Nevertheless, despite the general prosperity experienced 
during the first century of its existence, the government began to 
face serious financial difficulties by the middle of the 11th 
century, caused by declining revenue from taxes, increasing expen­
ditures in maintaining the greatly expanded bureaucracy, and the 
heavy cost of military preparedness. The economic reforms of Wang 
An-shih led to some improvement in the sense that there was a 
substantial increase in state revenue, but the people's tax burden 
became much heavier than before. Heavy taxation remained the
31. One such agricultural advance which greatly increased 
productivity was the introduction of the early-ripening rice. 
See Ping-ti Ho, "Early Ripening Rice in Chinese History," in 
Economic History Review, 9 (1956), pp.200-218.
32. The upsurge in the coal and iron industries was particularly 
noteworthy. See Robert Hartwell, "A Revolution in the 
Chinese Iron and Coal Industries," JAS, Vol.21, No.2 
(February 1962), pp.153-162.
33. Lien-sheng Yang, Money and Credit in China: A Short History 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).
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government policy until the end of the Southern Sung dynasty. How­
ever, judging from the ability of the government to balance a large
state income and huge expenditure, we can conclude that the
34
financial situation of Sung China was not at all weak.
A very significant factor in Sung society was the empire's
relations with its neighbours. In traditional Chinese history, the
Sung has been regarded as one of the weakest dynasties because
throughout the three centuries of its existence, it was continually
threatened and humiliated by its nomadic neighbours. During the
10th century, even before the founding of the Sung, the Khitans
founded the Liao *2^ dynasty in the north, which lasted until 1125.
In addition to its original homeland further north, the Liao also
controlled a strategic portion of North China immediately below the
Great Wall. Repeated attempts were made to recapture this territory
but all proved unsuccessful. The inability of the Sung rulers to
recover this area of great strategic and historical importance led
to much national humiliation and resentment. Worse still, the Sung
had to sign unequal treaties and to make annual appeasement payments
35
in order to buy peace from the Liao. Such defeatist diplomacy 
adopted by the Chinese empire in foriegn relations was indeed a 
rare occurrence in the history of imperial China.
34. For a detailed study of Sung government finance, see Hon-chiu 
Wong, "Government Expenditures in Northern Sung China (906- 
1127)," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1975).
35. , see Chin Yii-
f u > Sung-Liao-^Chin shih ^
Lung-men s h u - t i e n fX" , 1966 'reprint) , 
pp. 20-38.
—  ^ < Hong Kong: 
, chs. 3 & 4,
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On Its north-western borders, the Sung was frequently
attacked by the Tanguts of the Hsi-Hsi state (1032-1227).
Wars between the Hsi-Hsla and Sung were fought from time to time
during the reign of T'ai-tsung. The Sung managed intermittently to
maintain a precarious peace by making annual payments to the Hsi-
Hsia. Finally, after the fall of the Northern Sung, contact with
36the Hsi-Hsia was broken off.
The last of the nomadic tribes to rise to power during the
Northern Sung were the Jurchen, whose homeland was in modern
Manchuria. During the early Sung period they lived beyond the
eastern borders of the Liao state and paid tribute to the latter.
In 1114 they rebelled against the Liao and founded the Chin
37
dynasty the following year. The Chin first defeated the Liao and 
then invaded the Sung in 1126. It occupied all the northern 
prefectures and drove the Sung to the south, where the surviving
- A
part of the empire maintained itself below the Huai River 
valley. An uneasy peace was maintained between the Southern Sung 
and the Chin until 1234, when the latter was conquered by the Mongols. 
The Sung survived for another few decades but eventually fell to the 
Mongols in 1279.
From the above account of Sung foreign relations, it is 
clear that the Sung had serious difficulties with the rising nomadic 
powers. Several factors had given rise to the military problem
36. For a brief account of Sung relations with the Hsi-Hsia, see 
ibid., pp.90-93.
37. For the rise of the Chin and its subsequent conquest of the 
Liao and invasions of the Sung, see ibid., ch.6, pp.59-71.
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faced by the Sung. The policy of centralization led to the concen­
tration of Sung military power in professional armies centred in 
the capital while defence was weak elsewhere. Furthermore, the 
division of military authority hampered operations in time of war.
The Chinese military was also handicapped because, possessing no 
steppe lands, the empire had difficulty acquiring horses for its 
cavalry. Moreover, despite heavy military expenses, the armies 
were poor in quality, in part because the soldiers were recruited
largely from among the unsavoury of vagrant elements, who would
38
hardly make good fighting men. In the final analysis, the overall 
Sung emphasis on the supremacy of the civilian government and 
values over the military (chung-wen ch'ing-wu i^l) and the
resulting change in attitude toward the military establishment was 
largely responsible for the weakening of the Sung military machine 
left by its founder. The Sung empire lacked the martial spirit of 
the T'ang, and the nation as a whole had little enthusiasm for war. 
Thus the military problem faced by the early Sung was inherited by 
succeeding generations, which until the very end of the dynasty, 
were plagued by powerful nomadic neighbours, heavy armament cost 
and dynastic humiliation.
Finally, in the intellectual realm, the Sung dynasty was 
noted for the development of Neo-Confucianism. This new intellectual 
growth came as direct response to the economic, social and political
38. The popular slang phrase tor ordinary soldiers was the "naked 
and old ones" (ch* ih-lao^h-^'. ) and the saying "Good men do 
not serve as soldiers, neither is good iron used to m^ke nails" 
(hao-nan pu tang-ping, hao-t'ieh pu ta-ting C^-^  ^
 ^ gained currency during the Sung. See Fang 
H a o / op. cix. , pp. 47-48.
16
changes which created a new awareness among the scholar-officials.
The Confucian revival was also stimulated by the increasing impor­
tance of the civil service examinations which fostered the learning 
of the Confucian classics. The progress of printing technology 
further promoted the spread of learning as books became more easily 
accessible. Dedicated to the task of restoring the true teachings 
of Confucius through correct interpretation of the ancient classics,
Neo-Confucianism was oriented towards the past, historic-minded and 
39
conservative. On the other hand, it also incorporated many 
elements which were innovative and forward-looking. However, with 
the passing of time, the original vigour and dynamism of the 
intellectual trends gradually gave way to a spirit of conservatism, 
which became the dominant note during the Southern Sung. Such a 
development was also closely related to the factor of foreign threat, 
as we shall see in the following sections.
The Southern Sung (1127-1279)
It has been mentioned earlier that the Jurchen invasion of 
1126 led to the occupation of North China by the enemy, while the 
Sung state continued to survive in a much smaller area south of the 
Huai River. Following the precedent of dynastic restoration or
after a major disaster was revived or restored by the same imperial 
family, the Southern Sung is therefore regarded as the revival or
resurgence (chung-hsing whereby the dynasty which had fallen
39. James T.C. Liu, "How did a Neo-Confucian school become the 
state orthodoxy?", Philosophy East and West, Vol.23, No.4 
(October 1973), pp.483-84.
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the restoration of the Northern Sung. The new regime not only 
survived further attacks from the enemy, but also consolidated it­
self from the Huai and Yang-tzu 'S' valleys southward. Externally, 
the empire consolidated its frontier towards the north, from the 
Huai River westward to the H s i a n g - y a n g ( i n  modern Hu-pei 
region and further west to the mountain ranges in Ssu-ch'uan^? . 
Internally, consolidation took place with the establishment of a 
stable political order and the maintenance of a tolerable socio­
economic order.
While it is true that after the fall of the Northern Sung, 
the dynastic line continued under the Southern Sung, and that the 
major political institutions underwent little change during the 
latter period, it should nevertheless be noted that the Southern 
Sung was by no means a mere continuation of the Northern Sung. The 
move of the seat of government to the south was to result in many 
developments which were unprecedented in Chinese history. First of 
all, the move to the south signifies a new phase in the socio­
economic development of South China. It represents the crucial 
stage when the south finally replaced the north as the economic 
centre of China. The process of this important shift from north to 
south had actually been taking place for several centuries. Southern 
China, especially the lower Yang-tzu region, became increasingly 
important since the 8th century, when political disorder in the 
north led to a steady flow of population to the south. The economic 
prosperity of the Yang-tzu delta was already quite noticeable during 
the era of the Five Dynasties, and by the time of the Northern Sung, 
the government became more and more reliant on the south as the main
18
granary of China and the chief source of its economic strength.
The shift of the key political area to South China after the fall of 
the Northern Sung therefore meant the retreat of the empire to its 
strongest economic base. It was here that the Southern Sung rulers 
were able to build up a sufficiently strong and stable empire. The 
favourable environment of the Yang-tzu region provided the state with 
rich resources which helped to maintain stability by supporting a 
growing population, an over-crowded bureaucracy and enormous military 
expenditures.
The reduction in the size of the empire after the loss of 
North China also had other socio-economic consequences. Since 
Southern Sung was a more crowded society, it naturally saw the 
intensification of the commercialization and urbanization which had 
been taking place during the Northern Sung. One interesting develop­
ment was the growth of maritime commerce, which was greatly 
stimulated by the spirit of competition, the limited living space 
and the proximity of the newly established government to the coast.
At the same time, naval skills developed rapidly, and Southern Sung
was noted for the creation of a strong and highly efficient navy
41
which made China into a strong sea-power.
Even more important than the shift of the key economic area 
to the south was the setting up of a geo-political empire in the
40. See Chang Chia-chUsTp- ^  t Liang-Sung ching-chi chung-hsin 
_ti nan-i ^ ^ j 7 1 (Hupei: Hupei Jen-min ch'u-
pan-she 195"') *
41. Jung-pang Lo, "The Rise of China as a Sea Power," in Far 
Eastern Quarterly, 14 (1955), pp.489-503.
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south-eastern coast of China. The building of a coastal empire
42
facing inland was unprecedented in the history of pre-modem China. 
The geographical location of its political centre had profound 
influences upon the politics of the time, which operated in a rather 
different mode from that of the Northern Sung. We shall now examine 
the major political traits inherited from the Northern Sung, and 
analyse the subtle changes which occurred during the Southern Sung, 
which gave the latter its distinctive characteristics in politics.
Having inherited its major political institutions from its 
predecessor, the Southern Sung was inevitably influenced by the 
trends of certain political developments which characterized the 
Northern Sung. The policy of centralization, the expansion and 
consolidation of imperial power, and the supremacy of civilian 
government remained the hallmarks of the Southern Sung dynasty. How­
ever, it should be pointed out that after the fall of Northern Sung, 
the political atmosphere was never quite the same during the Southern 
Sung.
As pointed out by Professor James T.C. Liu, the principle of
43
accommodation became the salient feature in Southern Sung politics.
It has been mentioned earlier that the traditional Chinese state was 
noted for the mutual accommodation of various political elements and
42 o Liu Tzu-chien/^i , "Pei-hai li-kuo yu pan-pjL. shan-ho ti
ch' ang-ch' i w e n - t i n g " ^ ^
Chung-kuo hsueh-jen ^  /_» No-4 (July 1972), pp. 1-14.
43. For the principle of accommodation and its effects on Southern 
Sung politics, see James T.C. Liu, "Bureaucratic Politics of 
Accommodation...," and a Chinese article bv the same author, 
"Pao-rong cheng-chih ti t'e-tien" ^  >
Chung-kuo hsueh-jen, No.5 (July 1973), pp.1-28.
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that the early Sung bureaucratic empire had started the tradition of 
accommodating the scholar-officials with care. Nevertheless, it 
may be noted that during the Southern Sung accommodation assumed 
even greater importance in politics because the precarious circum­
stances of the newly founded empire in its early years made many 
political elements realize that it was by mutual accommodation and 
by the use of such tactics as balancing and manipulation that they 
could survive and co-exist with other competing forces. It is 
therefore not surprising that during this period accommodation was 
readily accepted as the principal guideline of political operation 
by both the emperors and the ministers in general.
The Southern Sung emperors from the time of its founder,
Kao-tsung ^  (r. 1127-1162), had adopted the principle of
accommodation to consolidate their own power. In dealing with the
generals, Kao-tsung realized that it was important to keep them
satisfied, though he was always suspicious of them. Since he
required their service, he had to accommodate them as long as the
country was still at war externally and banditry was rampant
internally. In the suppression of banditry, a combination of force
and persuasion, based upon accommodative tactics, was used. Finally,
he gathered military power from the generals by rewarding them with
44
prestigious titles and great wealth. Also, in the treatment of 
ministers, the Southern Sung rulers chose to accommodate rather than 
suppress them. On the one hand, they kept these ministers under 
their tight control; on the other hand, they managed to keep a
44. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.
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good Confucian image for themselves by treating the officials with 
due respect and lenity.
It was not only the emperors who found it necessary to 
accommodate the officials; the chief councillors also found it 
expedient to apply the politics of accommodation in order to conso­
lidate their positions in court. Even the powerful chief councillor 
Ch'in Kuei realized the importance of pleasing the emperor by being 
absolutely loyal to him, yet satisfying the majority of the 
bureaucrats. Also, among the officials in general, although there 
might be a few idealists who managed to stay on in the bureaucracy 
without compromising their high Confucian standards, most of the 
scholar-officials were more concerned about their personal careers 
and advancement. Under pressure they would rather sacrifice their 
Confucian ideals in order to conform to the requirements of accommo­
dative politics.
It is undeniable that the politics of accommodation, being 
basically negative rather than positive in its approach, had an 
overall demoralizing influence upon the governmental system. It 
contained various faults such as conformity, regression, mutual 
deception and passivity, which on the whole not only led to 
stagnation but also eventual deterioration. On the other hand, it 
is interesting to note that accommodative politics, in spite of all 
its defects, may have contributed much to the consolidation of the 
Southern Sung regime by integrating the different political elements 
and maintaining the equilibrium by balancing the powers of the 
various political forces at court and elsewhere. Ironically, there­
fore, the lasting stability attained by the Southern Sung despite
22
its many difficulties and weaknesses, could well be attributed to 
the successful functioning of the politics of accommodation.
The adoption of accommodative politics by the Southern Sung 
rulers also signifies a new development in the nature of absolutism. 
The Northern Sung emperors started the tradition of "bureaucratic 
absolutism" by relying heavily upon the bureaucrats who were 
recruited through the civil service examinations and emphasizing 
the role of the civilian bureaucracy in politics. By the time of 
the Southern Sung, the emperors, after long exposure to bureaucratic 
politics and familiar with the ways of the bureaucrats and the 
tactics of bureaucratic operation, in turn made use of such 
bureaucratic techniques and methods in dealing with their ministers, 
the politics of accommodation being an obvious example. In this 
way, bureaucratic politics did to a certain extent shape the 
functioning of absolutism, which became "bureaucratized" in nature, 
being deeply influenced by the mode of bureaucratic politics in 
practice then. It can therefore be said that the Southern Sung 
witnessed a new phase in the development of bureaucratic absolutism, 
which set the pattern for future governments to follow.
Having witnessed the crucial changes in the mode of bureau- 
cratic politics and the nature of absolutism, we shall now look at 
another prominent feature in Southern Sung politics, namely, the 
prevalence of powerful or dominant chief councillors. It has been 
pointed out earlier that under the Sung system, the power of the 
chief councillor had been greatly reduced through various insti­
tutional measures such as the division of civil and military 
authority and the independence of the Bureau of Policy Criticism
23
from the chief councillor's control. However, during the Southern
Sung, the chief councillors were comparatively more powerful than
their Northern Sung counterparts because of several factors,
involving both institutional changes and the personality of the
rulers. First of all, through another step in centralization, the
three top administrative organs of the Secretariat, Chancellery and
the Department of Ministries were consolidated under the unified
45
control of the chief councillor. This means that in theory the
chief councillor more or less had a monopolistic control over the
civilian bureaucracy. Moreover, the powers which had formerly been
withdrawn from the chief councillor during the Northern Sung were
"restored" to a certain extent during the Southern Sung. In times
of war, the Southern Sung chief councillor regularly carried the
46
concurrent title of Military Commissioner or its equivalent. It
should, however, be noted that such a title did not really entail
military power as his authority was mainly supervisory in nature.
His responsibility was to supervise and coordinate the separate
military commands while actual military power still rested firmly
in the hands of the emperor. During the Northern Sung, the Finance
Commission was independent of the chief councillor. But in the
Southern Sung, because of war and defence expenditures, the chief
47
councillor also took over the control of state finance. Because
45. This took place in 4th/1129. See. Anonymous, Huang-Sung chung- 
hsing liang-ch'ao sheng-cheng ^ CHSC) 
(Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan-she jfi* , 1967), ch.5,
pp.6a-7a.
46. See footnote 17 in Chapter IV, p. 141.
47. This occurred during the reign of Hsiao-tsung; see Chapter IV, 
p. 141.
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of the above institutional factors, the executive power of the 
Southern Sung chief councillors was to some extent enlarged and as 
a result, they could become rather powerful.
While institutional developments did provide wider opportu­
nities for the Southern Sung chief councillors to acquire more power, 
it should nevertheless be noted that the personality of the emperors 
also had a major role to play in the rise of powerful ministers.
With the exception of the first two emperors, Kao-tsung and Hsiao- 
&  y#tsung-^- , the Southern Sung rulers generally belonged to the
"ineffectual-type" of emperors who preferred to delegate their
authority to some favourite ministers, so long as the latter kept
the situation under control and left them alone to enjoy their 
48
private lives. The failure of imperial leadership, combined with 
the enlarged executive power held by the chief councillor, were 
therefore contributory to the prevalence of dominant chief ministers 
during the Southern Sung.
Apart from major political institutions and prominent socio­
economic trends, Southern Sung also inherited from its predecessor 
the military problem of nomadic invasions. After the fall of 
Northern Sung, the Jurchen continued to constitute a great military 
threat to the Southern Sung empire, especially during the early 
years of its existence. While foreign relations stabilized into a 
pattern of uneasy co-existence since the peace settlement of 1141- 
42, the factor of foreign threat remained a perennial problem and
48. For a brief discussion on the "ineffectual-type" of emperors, 
see James T.C. Liu, "An Administrative Cycle....," p.145.
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continued to be the oustanding issue in political debates and court 
politics. The overall policy was still one of "defeatist diplomacy" 
which had been inherited from the Northern Sung. The military 
expenses were even heavier than before as 80% of the national income 
went to the army. Fortunately, despite its great financial burden, 
the prosperous and expanding economy of the Southern Sung was able 
to sustain the empire and keep it from falling.
Even more important than the economic burden was the impact
of foreign threat upon Southern Sung thinking. The Northern Sung
debacle was indeed a traumatic event which dealt a shattering blow
to the scholar-officials. The formal acknowledgement of Chin para-
mountcy and the loss of North China, the traditional homeland of
former great dynasties, put the very legitimacy of the Southern Sung
regime to question. To bridge the gap between theory and reality,
the ruling elite of the Southern Sung fostered the ideology of hui-
fu reconquest or recovery of lost territory) by rationalizing
that the current humiliation of the dynasty was but a temporary
49
aberration which would eventually pass away. The objective of 
hui-fu was constantly adhered to as a morale-booster, especially 
during the early years of Hsiao-tsung*s reign (1162-1189). However, with 
the passing of time and the non-achievement of this dynastic goal, 
it became little more than a myth to sustain the claim of legitimacy 
by the southern regime. Although this officially-sanctioned myth of 
hui-fu dramatised the inadequacy of the dynasty, it nevertheless had 
the positive effect of inspiring the creative minds of the age.
49. See Winston Wan Lo, The Life and Thought of Yeh Shih (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1974), pp.7-8.
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This is shown by the fact that many renowned philosophers, scholars
and poets of the Southern Sung were ardent supporters of the hui-fu 
50
ideology.
The Southern Sung dynasty also witnessed the crystallization
of the Neo-Confucian philosophy as one school known as Tao-hslieh
^ J ^ o r  the School of the True Way eventually rose to a position of
51
undisputed dominance and became the state orthodoxy. The school
proclaimed as the greatest synthesizer of Neo-Confucianism. However, 
it should be pointed out that despite its ascendancy during the 
Southern Sung, the long struggle for ideological supremacy which it 
underwent eventually sapped the school of the original vigour it
Southern Sung thinking appeared to be less innovative and dynamic, 
and was instead, characterized by a conservative and narrow outlook. 
One factor leading to the rise of this conservative attitude was the 
dynasty's relations with its nomadic neighbours. The sense of 
chagrin and insecurity caused by the dynastic humiliation on the one 
hand, combined with the sense of self-satisfaction due to their
50. See ibid., pp.39-40.
51. For an account of the ascendancy of the Jao-hgueh school during 
the Southern Sung, see Chjen Pang-chan/^-fy>^ ^  , Sung-shih 
chi-shih p e n - m o (SSPM) (Peking: Chung-hua, 
1977), ch.80, pp. 867-896? see also James T.C. Liu, "... A Neo- 
Confucian School....," pp.483-505.
52. James T.C. H u ,  Ou-yang Hsiu (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1967), p.22.
was (1130-1200), who has been generally
might once have possessed.
52
In comparison with the Northern Sung,
27
domestic achievements on the other, led them to look inward, into
their own civilization and past glory, and to stress the importance 
53
of "Chineseness." The psychological Impact of the loss of North 
China upon the Southern Sung mind was thus manifested in this 
inwardly-reflective, conservative outlook, which became more and 
more apparent in the course of the dynasty.
Another crucial factor responsible for the growth of conser­
vatism was of course the politics of accommodation, which was largely 
instrumental in the suppression or "taming" of the political thought 
of the time. For example, in late Southern Sung, the government 
greatly promoted the image of the Tao-hstieh (now called Li-hsueh 
it#. the School of Principles) school by drawing into its service a 
few of its renowned scholars and granting some honour to their 
teachings. However, apart from these, it did not make any attempt 
to reform or restructure the state power. By thus accommodating the 
Tao-hstfeh followers, the government succeeded in making the school 
into a state-sponsored Ideology. Its very connection with the 
state means that the latter had the power to manipulate it to its
own advantage and even distort its theories for the sake of imposing
54
repressive controls. As Professor James Liu aptly puts it, "The 
great paradox of neo-Confucianism is that having been a vigorous 
ideological guardian of state affairs during the Northern Sung, 
often in conflict with the emperors and the less ideologically 
oriented scholar-officials, it ended up as a state-sponsored system
53. See Thomas Lee, op.cit., pp.27-28.
54. James T.C. Liu, "... a Neo-Confucian School....," pp.504-5.
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of thought that stifled questioning and criticism." This unhealthy 
trend in the ideological and political realm is of great significance 
as it was chiefly responsible for the stagnation of Chinese society 
since the days of the late Southern Sung.
The Reign of Hsiao-tsung (1162-1189)
Having discussed the salient features of the Sung dynasty 
and the important developments which had taken place during the 
Southern Sung period, we shall now turn our attention to the reign 
of Hsiao-tsung and examine its major contributions to the Southern 
Sung regime. We shall attempt to analyse the significance of Hsiao- 
tsung' s reign in relation to the crucial changes which we have 
described in the first two sections of this chapter.
Hsiao-tsung was the second emperor of the Southern Sung 
dynasty and it was during his reign that the regime was consolidated 
and the empire placed on a firm footing. Taking the Southern Sung 
as a whole, Hsiao-tsung*s reign stands out as the most tranquil and 
prosperous period. Politically, it was free from the upheavals 
and intense power struggles which had characterized the reign of 
the previous emperor, Kao-tsung. Militarily, the empire was stronger 
than it had been for some time, and peace was maintained with the 
Chin state throughout Hsiao-tsung's reign following the peace 
settlement in 1165. With peace, there was economic recuperation and 
general prosperity. Hsiao-tsung’s frugal policy further increased 
the wealth of his state. In the field of civil administration, the
55. James T.C. Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu, p.22.
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emperor exercised strict control over both the central and provincial 
governments, and as a result, general order and stability prevailed. 
It was also a time of great intellectual development, noted for 
the emergence of large number of talented men in the various fields 
of philosophy, poetry and classical studies. For these reasons,
Hsiao-tsung is often singled out to be the best of the Southern Sung
56 57
monarchs and his reign depicted as the "golden age" of the
Southern Sung dynasty.
In overall perspective, the most outstanding achievement of 
Hsiao-tsung was the consolidation of the Southern Sung empire. From 
a study of Chinese dynastic history, we find that there seems to be 
a general pattern of development in which the founding of a dynasty 
was normally followed by a time of consolidation, gradual decline 
and final downfall. In the general dynastic pattern, the founder 
of the new dynasty was usually a capable and dynamic ruler who was 
mainly concerned with laying the foundations of his empire. Such a 
task in dynastic founding is generally referred to as ch*uang-yeh 
After the founding came a period of consolidation, which 
could be accomplished by the founders themselves, or, as in a great 
number of cases, by their immediate successors, who carried on the 
mission of dynasty-building by reinforcing the foundations of
56. See annals of Hsiao-tsung in j>S, ch.35, p.692.
57. See
s' i tC
 Wang Te-yi Sr > "Sung
%. %
> I Vftl O 1 (.Til
, kuo-li pien-i kuan kuan-k1 an 
No.1 (June 1974), p.4.
Hsiao-tsung chi ch’i shih-tai"
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58dynastic power. In carrying out their objectives, many of these
emperors tended to stress the consolidation of gains achieved
during the previous administration - in other words, preserving 
what had been accomplished by their predecessors and building upon 
these previous achievements. In the process they not only 
strengthened the dynasty's foundations but also solidified the 
empire by providing it with sufficient durability. An apt term to 
describe this task of consolidation is shou-ch'eng It should
be noted here that the emphasis is not only on preservation or
maintenance (shou ) but also on accomplishment, success and 
completion (ch'eng &  ) • We shall see that Hsiao-tsung rightly fits 
into this category of "consolidator" for it was during his reign 
that the task of dynasty-building was brought to a successful 
completion.
If we were to divide the history of the Southern Sung into 
two halves, there seems to be little doubt as to where the division 
should fall. Its first six decades, covering the reigns of Kao- 
tsung and Hsiao-tsung, were generally regarded as representing the 
better days of the regime, while the remaining nine decades were 
marked by decline. One important factor contributing to this
58. Examples of famous dynastic consolidators include Sui Yang-ti 
> T'ang T' ai-tsung^g jc- and Ming Ch'eng-tsu 
2^/?j£.For 811 account of the career of Sui Yang-ti, refer 
to A.F. Wright, "Sui Yang-ti: Personality and Stereotype," 
in Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, ed, by A.F, Wright 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp,158r-187; 
for T'ang T'ai-tsung, see relevant sections in Howard J, 
Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven: Wei Cheng at the Court 
of T'ang T'ai-tsung (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1974); and for an account on Ming T'ai-tsu, see Edward 
L. Farmer, Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Dual 
Capitals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 
in particular ch.IV.
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decline was the general deterioration in the quality of imperial 
leadership after the first two emperors. Both Kao-tsung and Hsiao- 
tsung, as founder and consolidator of the Southern Sung, had played 
an important role in building and revitalizing their war-shaken 
empire. They were both conscientious and responsible monarchs who 
worked diligently toward restoring and reviving the Sung regime 
after the fall of North China. Under their able leadership the 
regime was not only restored but was also consolidated. With conso­
lidation came a lasting stability which held the empire together 
until its fall in 1279. Thus, despite the political decline and 
economic deterioration during the later half of the Southern Sung, 
the empire survived stably until it was finally defeated by the 
Mongols. When and how did this stability come about? It is the 
contention of this thesis that it was largely attained during the 
reign of Hsiao-tsung.
While recognizing the fact that Hsiao-tsung's accomplishments 
were to a certain extent built upon the foundations laid by Kao- 
tsung, it should nevertheless be emphasized that there existed out­
standing differences between the reigns of these two emperors. One 
major distinction is that the reign of Kao-tsung was for most part 
a period of instability because of external threat and internal 
political struggles among court rivals. On the other hand, the 
overall picture of Hsiao-tsung's reign was one of peace and order, 
both in external relations and internal politics. Another 
distinguishing factor is the fact that the image of Kao-tsung as 
a good Confucian monarch was to some extent impaired by his appoint­
ment of Ch'in Kuei and his heavy reliance upon the highly unpopular
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chief councillor in carrying out the peace policy. However, there 
existed no such "villain" during the reign of Hsiao-tsung to weaken 
the emperor's image. In fact, the reign of Hsiao-tsung was the only 
period in Southern Sung history which was not noted for the presence 
of a powerful, notorious chief councillor. On the contrary, a 
notable feature in court politics during this period was the 
expansion of imperial power. Indeed, the emperor's control seems 
to have spread to all levels of the administration and his influence 
was felt in every corner of the empire.
In the central government, Hsiao-tsung effectively controlled 
the bureaucracy by keeping ministerial power subordinate to imperial 
power. Even though in theory the emperor raised the status of the 
chief councillors through several political and administrative 
reforms, in practice he greatly restricted their power by various 
manipulative measures. These include frequently changing his chief 
ministers by removing them from office after a short duration, and 
refusing to assign them proper responsibility. Therefore, despite 
the expansion of executive power, the chief councillors did not 
actually benefit from it since such power was rarely, if at all, 
delegated to them. By reserving for himself the rights to exercise 
the executive power and by his stringent control over the chief
59, For example, the great Ch'ing commentator on Sung history,
Wang Fu-chih, besides criticizing Kao-tsung for his policy of 
appeasement, also censured the emperor for his "reliance on 
evil men." See £L, ch.10, p.200. The compilers of the Sung 
Official History, while commending Kao-tsung for his frugality 
and benevolence, also lamented his lack of accomplishment in 
the task of restoration because of his confidence in 
treacherous ministers and his persecution of righteous 
ministers and generals. See SS^ ch. 32, p.612.
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councillors, Hsiao-tsung placed the entire bureaucracy under his 
personal leadership.
In his efforts to enhance imperial power, Hsiao-tsung also
resorted to using the Inner Court as a balance to the regular
bureaucracy of the Outer Court. From times of old, autocratic
rulers of imperial China frequently managed to weaken the minister's
power through a small, informal and controllable group stationed in
60
the palace and referred to as the Inner Court. They usually 
comprised several imperial favourites of different backgrounds and 
titles, who served the emperor as his personal attendants. Hsiao- 
tsung followed the same practice by granting special privileges to 
certain members of the Inner Court. The granting of imperial favours 
to these so-called "close attendants" (chin-hsi-gL/jq ) of the 
emperor led to vehement protests by the ministers on many occasions. 
Although Hsiao-tsung was regarded as one of the most enlightened 
monarchs in Chinese history, he was nevertheless augmenting the 
trend of concentrating power in imperial hands, even to the extent 
of allowing some minor court favourites to interfere with the proper 
functioning of the bureaucracy.61
An examination of the censorial role in court politics 
during this period further shows that Hsiao-tsung also made clever 
use of the censorial officials to bring about the dismissal of 
ministers who had either not come up to his standards or who had
60, See Pei Huang, Autocracy At Work (Bloomington & London:
Indiana University Press, 1974), p.5.
61. See the comments of the compilers of the Sung official history 
in SS, ch.470, p.13677.
34
displeased him in some way or other. On the other hand, unlike most 
other Sung rulers, he was extremely cautious that the censors did 
not become the instruments of the ministers to strengthen the 
latter's power. By restoring the censorial officials to their proper 
function of serving as his "ears and eyes", Hsiao-tsung greatly 
reduced their participation in factional politics, and the tranquil 
political atmosphere contributed in no small way to the stability 
of the government.
From the many declarations made by Hsiao-tsung, it appears 
that he was a rather broad-minded monarch who encouraged his 
ministers to speak up and was on the whole receptive to criticism.
As a result, court politics were generally characterized by the 
healthy spirit of open criticism and intense debates, especially in 
the early years of his reign. The courage and outspoken behaviour 
portrayed by some of the ministers in their confrontations with the 
emperor seem to indicate a general rise in the ideological authority 
of the scholar-officials. This is further shown by the fact that 
on many occasions, Hsiao-tsung was obliged to listen to the ministers 
and make a show of accepting their opinion or even commending them 
for their criticism. However, this was all part of accommodative 
politics for by so doing, the emperor projected a good Confucian 
image for himself, though in actual fact, he often paid only lip 
service to the admonitions of his ministers. More often than not, 
he acted according to his personal decisions; consequently, the 
effectiveness of ideological authority was frequently restricted 
by the autocratic exercise of imperial power.
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The expansion of imperial authority was not merely confined 
to the central government, but was even extended to the provincial 
administration through a policy of centralization and territorial 
consolidation. The centralized control of prefectural and local 
administration was also achieved by emphasizing the role of circuit 
intend ants (chien-ssu jSL \] ) in supervising prefectural administra­
tors (chun-shou ) through a system of merit-evaluation.^ By
taking a personal interest in provincial and prefectural adminis­
trations and by keeping a close watch upon the performance of the 
circuit intendants and prefectural administrators, the emperor 
succeeded in imposing an effective network of control throughout the 
land.
Where defence and military matters are concerned, Hsiao- 
tsung was no less vigorous in his efforts. Besides strengthening 
the empire's defence by the building and repairing of fortifications, 
the emperor also paid particular attention to the training and 
recruitment of army personnel and the maintenance of discipline among 
the troops. In the military realm, it could be noted that Hsiao- 
tsung was moving in the same direction of concentrating power in his 
own hands by keeping the armies under his personal control. Also, 
Hsiao-tsung appears to be more militarily inclined than his 
predecessor. Despite the conclusion of the peace settlement, he did
not relinquish his ambition to recapture the lost territory. In
contrast, the majority of the officials, while recognizing the 
importance of hui-fu and upholding it as the dynastic goal, were
62. See Chapter V, pp. 221-223.
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nevertheless generally in favour of self-preservation rather than 
63
expansion. Because of the overall attitude of the scholar-officials, 
Hsiao-tsung often found it difficult to share his cherished hope of 
reconquest with them and this led him to the belief that these 
Confucian scholar-officials were generally inflexible and impractical. 
The lack of support on the part of the scholar-officials for Hsiao- 
tsung's ambition in this area also explains why the emperor frequently 
made personal decisions on military matters in consultation with his 
Inner Court attendants rather than adhering to public opinion.
Hsiao-tsung's financial policy was also closely connected 
with his ambition to achieve hui-fu. This is shown by the fact that 
despite the stopping of war, 80% of the national income continued to 
be allotted to the army. Because of the extremely high cost of 
defence and military preparedness, various reforms were introduced 
to reduce expenditure, and the policy of frugality was frequently 
emphasized. Hsiao-tsung's careful management of the state's 
economy not only enabled the empire to recuperate financially but 
also greatly enriched it. In his management of the state's 
treasuries, it should again be noted that it was the emperor's 
policy to channel the empire's wealth into his private purse rather 
than into the government treasury. Although the funds were specially 
reserved for future military campaigns and earmarked for the mission 
of reconquest, the fact that the emperor kept these in his privy 
treasury reveals his intention of keeping financial power in his 
own hands.
63. For example, see the arguments of Liu Kung and Ch'en Liang-yu 
in Chapter IV, pp. 179-81 and those of Chang Shih on p. 184 of 
the same chapter.
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It can be deduced from the above that the primary objective 
in the consolidation programme of Hsiao-tsung seems to be the 
attainment of internal strength and stability through the enhancement 
of imperial power. This objective proved to be the governing factor 
in the formulation of his policies and the implementation of various 
reforms which were geared towards ensuring the supremacy of the 
emperor. It can be clearly seen that the emperor achieved consoli­
dation by concentrating political, military and financial powers not 
only in the central government but also in his own hands. As a 
result, it is not surprising that the ultimate power-of the emperor 
attained a new height, leading to a further ri3e in absolutism. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that such concentration of 
powers in the hands of a strong and capable monarch like Hsiao-tsung 
could function effectively for it had the positive effect of stabi­
lizing the regime and bringing about general order, through which 
he was able to maintain a reign of peace and tranquility.
The personal character of Hsiao-tsung undoubtedly played a 
decisive role in making him an outstanding consolidator and a major 
architect of the Southern Sung empire. He was a conscientious, 
persistent and energetic ruler, who was also practical-minded and 
efficient. He worked tirelessly day and night, attending court, 
reading memorials, interviewing officials and even holding 
discussions with his ministers in the evenings after the normal 
court sessions. The emperor thus carried a very heavy workload, 
especially because of his policy in keeping everything under his 
personal supervision or control, and his reluctance to delegate 
authority to his assistants. Such assertive leadership and
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autocratic tendencies characterized Hsiao-tsung's style of government. 
However, it should be borne in mind that while the enhancement of 
imperial authority during Hsiao-tsung's reign contributed to his 
success in consolidation, the growth of absolutism inevitably gave 
rise to countless abuses under less capable and responsible
successors.
It has been mentioned earlier that the Southern Sung was 
characterized by a conservative outlook, especially towards the 
later part of the dynasty. The development of such a trend could 
be observed during the reign of Hsiao-tsung, even as we compare the
court during the first half of Hsiao-tsung's reign soon gave way to 
a less healthy political atmosphere in the later period, generally 
marked by a spirit of acceptance, pessimism and conservatism. 
Undoubtedly the growth of such a political climate had a great deal 
to do with the increasing autocracy of the emperor and the politics 
of accommodation which together greatly suppressed political 
criticism or diversity, and instead, induced conformity and 
submission. Furthermore, the sense of inadequacy and powerlessness 
in the area of foreign relations, combined with a feeling of pride 
in their domestic achievements, served to enhance this attitude of 
conservatism in general. The growing conservatism and eventual
64. This was what happened during the^reigns of later Southern 
Sung emperors such as Ning-tsungjp.£^ and Li-tsung ,
who delegated their absolute authority to favourite ministers 
and as a result, numerous political and administrative 
problems arose.
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with that in the later (Ch'un-hsi
) era. The early vigour and optimism which prevailed in
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stagnation could be seen in the slowing down of the process of
change by the last century of the Southern Sung. Ironically, this
stagnation of Chinese society since the thirteenth century could to
a certain extent be traced to the consolidation and stability
65
attained during Hsiao-tsung's reign. In this respect, the reign 
of Hsiao-tsung was indeed a crucial period not only in Sung history 
but also in the development of Chinese history in general.
65. While the stability brought about by Hsiao-tsung's consolidation 
greatly strengthened the Southern Sung empire and enabled it to 
withstand both internal strains and external threats for almost 
another century, it should nevertheless be recognised that "it 
was a stability that suffered from a political standstill, even 
creeping deterioration." See James T.C. Liu, "Sung Roots of 
Chinese Conservatism: The Administrative Problems," JAS, Vol.26, 
No.3 (May 1967), p.457.
40
CHAPTER II
THE FOUNDING OF THE SOUTHERN SUNG:
THE REIGN OF EMPEROR KAO-TSUNG, 1127-1162
The Southern Sung came into existence in 5th/1127 when Kao- 
tsung formally ascended the throne at Ying-t'ien fu m  f J k  (modern 
Shang-ch'iu hsien in Ho-nan). The new regime began its
life as a dynasty in flight as in the course of the next few years, 
the emperor led his fugitive court from place to place in order to 
flee from the Jurchen armies. However, despite the uncertainties 
and the serious difficulties which threatened the very existence of 
the dynasty in its early years, the Southern Sung not only managed 
to survive but also became sufficiently strong to last for one and 
a half centuries. In this respect, the contributions made by its 
founder towards stabilizing the regime during its early crucial 
years should therefore not be overlooked. During his thirty-five 
years on the throne, Kao-tsung had successfully laid the foundations 
of a geo-political empire centred in south-eastern China, provided 
it with an institutional framework and initiated a style of govern­
ment, all of which were to influence the remainder of the Southern 
Sung dynasty.
The First Decade of Precarious Existence
The first ten years or so following the establishment of 
the Southern Sung were indeed most crucial to the survival of the 
dynasty. As soon as he ascended the throne at the age of twenty,
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the most pressing problem which confronted Kao-tsung was the foreign 
threat, which forced the emperor and his court to lead a precarious 
life. Besides the question of dynastic survival, Kao-tsung was also 
obliged to keep his newly acquired throne from falling into the hands 
of his rivals.
councillor who was made emperor by the Jurchen in 3rd/1127. After 
capturing K ’ai-feng in 12th/1126, the enemy found it difficult to 
govern all of their newly-acquired territory and decided to with­
draw temporarily north of the Yellow River. Nevertheless, they 
planned to keep the Ho-nan area under their control by establishing
ruler. The plan failed to work out because of widespread support 
for the Sung imperial family. After the fall of Northern Sung and 
the capture of its last two emperors, loyalist forces which had 
earlier gathered around Prince K*ang (the only imperial prince who 
escaped capture because he was away from the capital) urged him to 
take the throne. Once the Jurchen had withdrawn, Chang Pang-ch'ang 
did the same by stepping down from his newly-acquired position and 
requesting the prince to ascend the throne. After Chang Pang-ch’ang, 
Kao-tsung faced an even more serious threat from another puppet
1. Chang was on the throne for only thirty-three days from
7/3rd/1127 to 10/4th/1127, when he indicated his repentence 
by stepping down^from his throne and deferring to the Empress 
Dowager Y u a n - y u ( a  widow of Emperor C h e - t s u n g - ^ ), 
who took over the reins of government until Kao-tsung's 
ascension. See Anonymous, Chin-k'ang yao-lu 
(Taipei: Wen-hai, 1967), ch. 16, pp.l3a-39a.
Even before he became emperor, Kao-tsung was faced with a
strong rival in Chang a Northern Sung chief 
. „ . 1 .
the puppet with Chang Pang-ch'ang as its
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ruler, Liu Yii ', whose regime of Ch'i ■#- in Ho-nan lasted for
a good number of years from 1130 to 1137, although he was eventually 
deposed by the Chin.
uncertainty because of the lack of consistent foreign policy. In 
its relations with the Chin, the Southern Sung adopted a wavering 
policy which vacillated between war and peace. Even though Kao- 
tsung himself appears to have been more oriented towards peace, he 
did not wish to arouse opposition from those who were keen on 
restoration of the empire; furthermore, his father Hui-tsung and 
brother Ch'in-tsung were still in Jurchen hands, a fact which made 
his own position extremely difficult. Moreover, the adoption of a 
foreign policy was by no means a one-sided affair, depending as it 
did on the attitudes and actions of the other side. Very often, 
the Sung government was simply compelled to take up arms against the 
Chin because of the unrelenting military pressure against it. As 
we shall see, it was not until Ch'in Kuei became the sole chief 
councillor in 1138 that the Sung began to pursue peace in earnest.
period was reflected in the fluctuating fortunes of various 
councillors. These councillors can be roughly divided into two 
factions: those who desired to conclude peace with the Chin by 
agreeing to most of its demands; and those who aimed at reconquering 
the north from the Chin so as to bring about the restoration of the 
empire. Kao-tsung frequently changed his mind about which group to 
support and it was perhaps inevitable under such circumstances that 
there should be almost constant battles for power between them.
The early years of the dynasty were also marked by great
The unsettled foreign policy of the early Southern Sung
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Early in his career, the emperor had demonstrated his ability to play
court politics by balancing one faction against the other so that
neither would become powerful enough to dominate the court. Though
frequently entangled in the great factional struggle, he was able
to manipulate the political situation to his own advantage. Also,
because of the critical situation he was in, Kao-tsung found it
expedient to adopt the principle of accommodation in order to
consolidate his rule. He treated the officials with great leniency,
welcoming and accommodating all sorts of bureaucrats, including
those who had compromised their loyalty and political integrity by
2
serving under the puppet ruler Chang Pang-ch'ang.
Immediately after his accession to the throne, Kao-tsung
appears to have adopted an aggressive policy. This is indicated by
his appointment of Li Kang<3^^J^ (1083-1140) , one of the most ardent
advocates of war, to be chief councillor, while the peace advocates,
Huang Ch' ien-shen'^ and Wang P o - y e n ' ' i $ ^  , remained only
assistant councillors though they had been instrumental in Kao-
3
tsung's enthronement. However, Kao-tsung's fear of the Jurchen 
was indicated by his refusal to take immediate action against Chang 
Pang-ch'ang, who was instead given the honorary title of Grand 
Protector (t'ai-pao :t seems clear that Kao-tsung had
adopted a "wait and see" attitude which permitted the war and peace
yt w ' ?$P
2. Li Hsinrch’jian 3: r Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu
(CYYL) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1956),
ch.6, p.153. *
3. Ibid., ch.5, p.120.
4. Biography of Chang Pang-ch'ang, j5S, ch.475, p.13792.
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factions to exist side by side. This in turn set the scene for the 
first significant power struggle during this period, one in which 
Li Kang was to bring about the defeat of the peace faction, repre­
sented by Chang Pang-ch'ang and his supporters. Kao-tsung's support 
for the war faction at this time probably was motivated by his 
intention to consolidate his own power. He must have realized that 
his position was extremely vulnerable, as Chang's supporters were 
still influential at court. Thus, despite his fear of the Chin, Kao- 
tsung eventually decided to turn against Chang, who was demoted and 
exiled, and subsequently executed in 9th/1127, when the Jurchen made
5
him an excuse for attacking Sung. From the fall of Chang, it is 
clear that Kao-tsung was willing to accommodate him so long as he did 
not represent any threat to the throne, but the emperor did not 
hesitate to eliminate Chang when he realized that the latter's 
presence was potentially dangerous to the imperial position.
It is interesting to note that in this factional struggle, 
both sides enlisted the assistance of the censorial officials to 
bring about political attacks upon their rivals. Indeed, the 
prevalence of factionalism and power struggles from the very beginning 
of the Southern Sung had made the censorial officials active parti­
cipants of such political infighting in Kao-tsung's court. The 
emperor himself encouraged such practices by allowing the censorial 
officials a free hand in impeaching the ministers who had fallen out 
of his favour. Succeeding emperors followed his example and it is 
therefore not surprising that the censorial officials played a
5. CYYL, ch.9, p.224.
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significant role in court politics throughout the Southern Sung 
dynasty.
That Kao-tsung was not totally in support of the war faction
during the early part of his reign can be illustrated by the fact
that both Huang Ch'len-shan and Wang Po-yen were allowed to stay on
as assistant councillors despite the ascendency of the war faction
led by Li Kang. The emperor was no doubt grateful to Huang and Wang
for their former support and assistance, but also, it was his
intention to keep some of the peace advocates in power in order to
act as a check against the growing influence of the militant elements
at court. Thus, despite much criticism against Huang and Wang, Kao-
tsung did not waver in his support for them. In 8th/1127 he even
promoted Huang to the position of Right Chief Councillor and Wang
to that of Administrator of the Military Bureau, while Li Kang was
6
made Left Chief Councillor. This set the scene for the second 
phase of the power struggle between the two factions, and this time 
the peace advocates emerged victorious.
A major conflict between the two sides concerned the location
of the capital. Huang Ch’ien-shan and Wang Po-yen were in favour
of moving the capital to the south-east which, because of its rich
resources and distance from the enemy, was much more secure than 
7
other areas. Although he had consistently been against the emperor 
retreating to the south, Li Kang maintained that if this turned out 
to be unavoidable, Hsiang-yang in the south-west should be chosen as
6. Ibid., ch.8, p.198.
7. Ibid., ch.7, p.189.
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the temporary capital because it was a far better base than the
8
south-east from which to attack the enemy. Kao-tsung's agreement 
to Huang and Wang's proposal appears to demonstrate that he had 
begun to have doubts about the possibility of a successful war 
effort. His chief concern would seem to have been his personal 
safety and the security of his newly-founded empire rather than the 
restoration of the lost territory. Li Kang, who could not compromise 
with such a policy, was obliged to leave the government in 8th/1127, 
after having served as chief councillor for only seventy-five days.
Li's downfall is a clear indication that the emperor's 
foreign policy was changing from war to peace. The eighth month of 
1127 also witnessed the execution of the Imperial University student 
(t'ai-hsiieh sheng ) Ch'en Tung and the Chin-shih
^Ou-yang Ch'e who had memorialised against Huang
9
Ch'ien-shan and Wang Po-yen and spoken out for Li Kang. They also 
urged the emperor to return to K'ai-feng and to lead the army 
personally against the enemy. Moreover, Ch'en is said to have 
admonished Kao-tsung with regard to his accession, saying that this 
would complicate matters when Ch'in-tsung returned from the north.^ 
Noting Kao-tsung's displeasure at being accused of usurping the 
throne, Huang Ch'ien-shan seized the opportunity to request Ch'en 
Tung's and Ou-yang Ch'e's execution, to which the emperor quickly
8. Ibid.
9. CHSC, ch.2, pp.12a-12b.
10. Chao Sheng-shih jjj^j , I shihya , cited in CYYL,
ch.8, p.206.  "
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agreed. While he was generally benevolent towards his subjects, 
Kao-tsung was nevertheless intolerant of those who doubted the 
legality of his accession to the throne. In the above case, he not 
only went against the principle of accommodation but also violated 
T'ai-tsu's order against taking the life of scholar-officials.
In 9th/1127 Kao-tsung decided to adopt the proposal of the 
peace advocates by retreating to the south-east. Besides the 
political and strategic factors mentioned above, it should be 
pointed out that economic consideration was also extremely important 
in influencing the emperor's decision. As early as 7th/1127, the 
Co-Administrator of the Military Bureau, Chang Ch' ueh * a
great financial administrator of early Southern Sung, had emphasized 
the significant contribution of the south-eastern region to the 
empire's e c o n o m y . A s  a result of his proposal, Transport
Commissioners (fa-yun shih — ) were reappointed and assigned
the important function of supervising revenue-collection from the
12
south-east and sending it to the central government. Thus by 
deciding to move to the south-east, Kao-tsung showed that he fully 
understood the tremendous importance of financial resources in 
building up his empire.
In 10th/1127 the court stationed itself in Yang-chou 'tfj 
on the north banks of the Yang-tzu. Meanwhile, fighting was still 
raging in the north, with the Chin pressing further and further 
south towards Yang-chou. Although Kao-tsung*s pro-peace policy was
11. CHSC, ch.2, p.4b.
12. Ibid.
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affirmed by his appointment of Huang Ch’ien-shan and Wang Po-yen as
13
the Left and Right Chief Councillor respectively in 12th/1128,
the events of the ensuing months finally led to their downfall. At
the beginning of 1129, the Chin launched a large-scale invasion of
the south, sweeping all before them and putting the court once more
to flight. After the court had taken refuge at Hang-chou
south of the Yang-tzu, the two chief councillors were dismissed and
given prefectural positions.
It was in Hang-chou that Kao-tsung encountered his most 
serious personal crisis since becoming emperor. In 3rd/1129 a coup 
d'etat was mounted by two army officers of the Imperial Guard, Miao
because of certain grievancesFu^?-^^ and Liu Cheng-yen jjjpj
14
against certain ministers and eunuchs. Arguing that Kao-tsung had 
no right to stay on the throne as this would impose a problem after 
Ch*in-tsung's return, they forced him to abdicate in favour of his 
infant son, with the Empress Dowager Lung-yu rmerly known
- > j, 15
as Yifan-yu ) becoming regent. Fortunately for Kao-tsung,
?£ ..
loyalist forces led by officials Chang C h i i n a n d  Lu I-hao vi2 
and generals Han Shih-chung ' , Liu Kuang-shih
and Chang Chun^ L ^ ^  soon rallied to his support. In 4th/1129
13. Ibid., ch.3, pp.31b-32a.
14. Miao Fu and Liu Cheng-yen were discontented because they felt 
that they had not been properly rewarded for their part in 
suppressing some bandits earlier, and they directed their anger 
against Wang YuanJ^L^fJ , the Co-Signatory Official of the 
Military Bureau. The ’official biographies of Miao and Liu may 
be found in £!S, ch. 475, pp. 13802-09.
15. CYYL, ch.21, p.418.
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they succeeded in suppressing the rebels and Kao-tsung was restored 
16
to his throne. In the same month Kao-tsung instituted an important
measure in the civil government by uniting the Three Departments,
namely the Secretariat, Chancellery and Department of Ministries
17
under the control of the chief councillor. Such a step in centra­
lization appears to indicate a desire to achieve greater efficiency 
in the bureaucracy. It was probably also Kao-tsung's intention to 
expand the power of the civilian heads as a balance to the military, 
whose power was clearly demonstrated in the recent coup,
Kao-tsung1s troubles were far from over, however, as during 
a subsequent Chin invasion in late 1129/early 1130, the enemy forces 
were able to cross to the southern side of the Yang-tzu. The 
emperor fled to Ming-chou ^ j-] (modern Ning-po ^ 5 0  from where 
he and his entourage sailed south along the coast of Che-chiang
position of the government was far from secure, for by now the
whole of the Central Plain (chung-yuan ^  , covering the present
areas of Ho-nan, Western Shan-tung , Southern Shan-hsi
and Eastern ShensiJ^^^l? ) had fallen into enemy hands. In 9th/1130,
the Jurchen, in an attempt to fill the vacuum of a political
authority in the southern reaches of the Central Plain, set up
another puppet state called Ch’i, which they placed under the
.. 19
control of a former Sung official named Liu Yu.
.. l/ » 18
Even after the withdrawal of Chin forces in 4th/1130, the
16. Ibid., ch.22, p.463. Miao Fu and Liu Cheng-yen managed to 
flee from the loyalist forces but were subsequently captured 
and executed in 7th/1129.
17. CHSC, ch.5, pp.6a-7a,
18. Ibid., ch.6 , pp,19b-22b,
19. Ibid., ch.8, p.8a.
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During his first few years on the throne, therefore, Kao-
tsung' s position was extremely unstable. The legality of his
accession had been questioned and, in addition to the puppet emperors
enthroned by the Jurchen, there were other pretenders to the throne
who appeared to have threatened Kao-tsung's position. For example,
in 2nd/1130, a man by the name of Ts'ui Shao-tsu , who
earlier had been taken captive by the Jurchen, managed to escape to
Sung territory. He subsequently claimed to belong to the royal
family and to have received an order from Hui-tsung appointing him
Commander-in-chief of All Armies in the Empire (t'ien-hsia ping-ma
ta-yuan-shuai V  ^  ), a position held by Kao-tsung
himself prior to his enthronement. After a local official had
memorialised on his behalf, Ts'ui was summoned to the capital but
20
was discovered to be an impostor. Besides Ts'ui, there were
others in the 1130s who pretended to be members of the royal family
21
and even managed to gather support from the populace.
Under such precarious circumstances, Kao-tsung's first 
obligation as founder of the dynasty was the preservation of his 
throne. Externally this meant fighting the Jurchen and eliminating 
other rivals to the throne. Internally he had to be in constant 
guard against the possibility of another coup d'etat by powerful
20. CYYL, ch.42, p.769.
a
21. For example, in 1131 a man surnamed Y a n g ^ ^  from Teng-chou 
'Hj assumed the title of Prince Hsin/f"^ (Chao Ch'in;^;^^- , 
the eighteenth^on of Hui-tsung), while in 1132, Li Po 
frpm Wan-chou called himself Prince Hsu^jil (Chao
ypaL- t the fourtheenth son of Hui-tsung). Both were executed 
after they were discovered to be impostors. See biography of 
Prince Hsin, SS, ch.246, pp.8728-29, and biography of Prince 
Hsu, ibid., p.8727.
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generals. He was truly faced with a dilemma, for he needed the help 
of these generals to fight the war and to suppress domestic rebels 
and bandits. The emperor's first step was to consolidate his own 
power by assigning the generals to fight the bandits internally 
while seeking peace with the enemy externally.
Domestically, it was essential for the court to extend its
control inland, especially in areas overrun by local armed bands
and bandits. As early as 1127, various generals had been assigned
22
to suppress the bandits in the Yang-tzu and Huai regions. In
dealing with these bandits, the court adhered to the principle of
accommodation under which liberal terms were offered for them to
join the imperial army. While those who rejected the offer were
attacked, the bandits who surrendered were incorporated into the
imperial army, thereby securing domestic peace as well as
23
strengthening the government forces. Under this pacification
programme known as chao-an M 4 -  , the generals, especially Yueh
h <%.
Fei -$4 Tp** , played an active role in extending central government
24
control to the interior of Sung territory. By mid 1130s most of 
the bandits had been brought under control. On the other hand, the 
above policy further strengthened the armies of the leading generals
22. For an account of the suppression of bandits in early Southern 
Sung, see SSPM, ch.68, pp.673-86.
23. James T.C. Liu, "Ylfeh Fei (1103-41) and China's Heritage of 
Loyalty," JAS, Vol.31, No.2 (February 1972), p.292.
24. See E. Kaplan, "Yueh Fei and the Founding of the Southern
Sung,” Ph.D. dissertation (University of Iowa, 1970).
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25
because of the massive surrender of the bandits and rebels.
Kao-tsung's desire to pursue peace with the Chin is shown by
his appointment of Ch'in Kuei, the great peace advocate, as chief
councillor in 8th/1131. Ch'in had been taken captive by the Jurchen
in early 1127 because of his loyalty to the Sung and his refusal to
recognize the puppet regime of Ch'u. Soon after his return to Sung
26
territory in 10th/1130, Ch'in was rapidly promoted by the emperor,
who was feeling extremely insecure because of Liu Yii's puppet regime
and was keen to negotiate peace with the Jurchen. Since Ch'in had
previously announced that he had in mind "two schemes" which he would
27
implement once he became chief councillor, Kao-tsung was hopeful
that Ch'in would be able to find a solution to the international
problem. However, Ch'in held his post for only one year; he was
dismissed when it was revealed that his two-fold formula for peace
was the cession of Ho-pei to Chin and the cession of Ho-nan to 
28
Liu Yii. Kao-tsung found this formula unacceptable for although 
he was in favour of peace, he was unwilling to recognise the puppet 
ruler, and at this juncture, he still entertained hopes that Ho-nan 
would eventually be restored to the Sung.
25. Wang Fu-chih has remarked that during the Shao-hsing
era (1131-1162), the troops employed by the leading generals 
were mostly bandits who had surrendered. See SL, ch.10, 
pp.181-183.
26. The fact that Ch'in Kuei could return safely to the south 
together with his wife had led to doubts concerning the truth 
of his claim that he managed to escape from the enemy. See 
CYYL, ch.38, pp.718-21.
27. Ibid., ch.46, p.835.
28. Ibid., ch.57, p.999.
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Meanwhile, the Jurchen had given Liu control of Ho-nan and
the latter moved his capital to K'ai-feng in 4th/1132. Sporadic
fighting took place between the Sung and Liu's forces over the next
few years. Attempts at peace negotiations were carried out by the
29
Sung court with both Ch'i and Chin but failed. In 9th/1134 Liu 
joined with the Jurchen to attack the Sung, and Kao-tsung was even 
advised by many of his officials to retreat and disperse the govern­
ment offices. These suggestions were opposed by Chief Councillor
Chao Ting^J , however, who argued that the Sung should stand and
30 _
fight, and only withdraw if they were unsuccessful. The emperor
supported Chao as his own position was at stake and this was one of
the rare occasions when Kao-tsung adopted an aggressive posture 
31
towards the enemy. Nevertheless, even though the Sung troops
succeeded in defeating the enemy forces in llth/1134, the latter
32
continued to harass the Sung until 1137.
The period between 9th/1134 and llth/1137 saw the ascendancy 
of the war faction at court, when Chao Ting and Chang Chun served 
successively as chief councillors. However, the war policy which
29. SSPM, ch.67, p.690.
30. CYYL, ch.80, p.1313.
31. Kao-tsung moved north from Lin-an to P'ing-chiang
and even intended crossing the Yang-tzu to fight the enemy 
personally but was advised against doing so by Chao Ting, who, 
though pro-war, was also cautious. See SSPM, ch.67, p.692.
32. See Lin Jui-hun4^ ‘^ ^if*$, "Chien-yen Ming-chou chih-chan cj 
Shao-hsing Sung yu Wei-ch'i chih-chan"^^^<
• Ta-lu tsa-chih Vol. 1
No.12 (December 1955), pp.18-23. 1 ' ^  *
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had been pursued by the court since the end of 1134 gradually
changed to one of peace. This was especially true after the dethrone-
33
ment of Liu Yii by the Chin in late 1137, which removed the greatest
hindrance to peace negotiations. The defeat of the allied forces of
Chin and Ch'i by the Sung in 1134 and 1136 probably made the Jurchen
realize that it was impossible for them to conquer the south and
that they should seek peace instead. Indeed, with the help of a
group of able generals, the Southern Sung was able to put up a
gallant defence against its enemy. Its recent victories gave it a
better bargaining position with the Chin and both sides appeared
keen to negotiate. In 12th/1137 the envoy to Chin, Wang L u n j £ /'f^ ,
returned with the encouraging news that the Jurchen were willing to
return to the Sung the imperial coffin of Hui-tsung, who had died
in captivity in 4th/1135. They were also willing to release the
&Empress Dowager Wei (Kao-tsung's mother) and restore various
34
prefectures in Ho-nan to Sung. It is interesting to note that 
Ch'in-tsung's return was not mentioned as both sides apparently tried 
to avoid the issue. On the one hand, Kao-tsung did not desire his 
brother's return, while the Jurchen, undoubtedly aware of Kao-tsung's 
fear, tried to make the best bargain out of the peace negotiations 
by retaining Ch'in-tsung and using him as a threat when
33. SSPM, ch.67, p.6969.
34. CYYL, ch.117, p.1894. The willingness of the Jurchen to return 
various areas in Ho-nan to Sung has been attributed to the fact 
that they were unable to keep the territories under^ttiei.r 
control. See Anonymous, Chung-hsing yii-wu lu
^o.l3(YWL) , in Yiieh-ya-t' ang ts'ung-shu <^ 
(Taipei: Hua-wen s h u - c h i i ^ . ^ ^ ch.l, p.3a.
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necessary. In any case, Kao-tsung was pleased with this new 
development and sent Wang Lun on another mission to the Chin court.
With this change in Kao-tsung*s attitude, Ch*in Kuei again
came to power, being appointed Right Chief Councillor in 3rd/1138.
This again gave rise to the existence of two factions at court - a
peace faction led by Ch*in Kuei and a war faction led by Left Chief
Councillor Chao Ting. The struggle between these two groups ended
with Chao's dismissal in 10th/1138. This also brought an end to the
period of uncertainty, for with Ch'in Kuei as the sole chief
councillor and with Kao-tsung determined to pursue negotiations with
the Chin, a definite policy in favour of peace was finally adopted.
Also, by 1138 the element of uncertainty was further reduced with
the establishment of the Southern Sung capital in Lin-an (Hang-chou)
36
which remained the permanent capital for the rest of the dynasty. 
Lin-an, being further south and close to the sea, was able to 
provide Kao-tsung with greater security. Economically, it was also 
an ideal site as it was easily accessible to the rich resources of 
the lower Yang-tzu region. The choice of Lin-an as capital also 
s y m b o l i s e d  the triumph of the peace faction, as most of the war 
advocates were in favour of moving further north to the more exposed 
but strategically important Chien-k'ang (modem Nanking
35. After the dethronement of Liu YU, there were rumours that the 
Jurchen intended to make use of Ch'in-tsung as a new puppet 
ruler. See SSPM, ch.72, p.750.
36. Ld Ilsin-ch'uan/jt\c> , Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi
3 k j j i ^  2 ^ % $  "ys St’fy (CYTC) (Taipei: Wen-hai , 1967) ,
Vol.I, ch.5, pp.lb-2b.
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•» ) . ^  By choosing Lin-an,Kao-tsung indicated clearly that he 
had opted for peace and security rather than the uncertainty of war. 
In the course of the next few years the emperor moved towards 
achieving complete security by ending the war and by curtailing the 
power of the military. He finally managed to find someone who was 
willing to carry out these formidable tasks for him, namely, Ch'in 
Kuei.
The Chief Councillorship of Ch'in Kuei
Ch'in Kuei served as the sole chief councillor from 10th/
1138 until he fell fatally ill in 10th/ll55, and the extent of his
influence can be measured in part by his seventeen consecutive years
in office. During the first few years of his chief councillorship,
when his position was still not very stable, Ch'in made use of the
censorial officials to consolidate his power at court, first by
appointing his own men to censorial positions, and then bringing
about a purge of the remnants of the war faction with the help of
38
these same officials. Ch'in's actions naturally led to protests 
by his opponents, but they went unheeded by the emperor who wanted 
peace negotiations with the Jurchen carried out smoothly. These
37. It should be pointed out, however, that among the war advocates, 
Chao Ting was in favour of making Lin-an the capital, as 
opposed to Chang Chun and other members of the war faction, who 
were in favour of moving to Chien-k'ang. See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.5, 
p.2b; SSPM, ch.63, pp.652-53.
38. Ch'in Kuei had been advised by^  tlje Drafting Official of the 
Secretariat, Kuo-lung Ju-ylian $  » to appoint
censorial officials to get rid of all opponents of the peace 
party. Subsequently Ch'in appointed him Executive Censor in 
llth/1138 for this purpose. See CYYL, ch.123, p.1996; 
biography of Kuo-lung Ju-yuan, SS, ch.380, p.11718.
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negotiations had some initial success in 1138-1139, when a tentative
agreement was reached in which the Jurchen agreed to return certain
Sung territories, Hui-tsung’s coffin, and Empress Wei in exchange
for Sung acknowledgement of their suzerainty and the payment of an 
39
annual subsidy. However, the temporary peace was broken in 1140,
when an internal power struggle at the Chin court led to the
ascendancy of the war faction headed by Wu Chu y who renewed
40
hostilities against the Sung. This sudden change might have 
expected to result in Ch'in Euei's downfall. Nevertheless, he was 
permitted to remain in his post and was even given a second chance 
to bring about a more permanent peace settlement the following year.
In 5th/1140 the Chin forces led by Wu Chu began their 
southern invasion and were able to recapture the territories in Ho­
nan which had earlier been restored to Sung. But as they moved 
further south, they encountered stiff resistance from the Sung 
armies, which were even able to launch counter-offensives into 
enemy-held territories. The young general Yiieh Fei was especially 
noted for several victorious campaigns against the enemy. In one 
of his campaigns in 7th/1140, Yiieh was able to penetrate into
southern Ho-nan, within striking distance of the old capital K'ai- 
41feng. However, at this critical juncture, Yiieh was forced to
39. See SSPM, ch.72, pp.741-751 for the negotiations of the 
temporary peace.
40. Hsii M e n g - h s i n , San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien ^
(PMHP) (Taipei: Wen-hai, 1962), ch.197, pp.6 a-6b; 
an cTch. lfo<5 , p p . 4 a- 5 a.
41. SSPM, ch.70, p.722.
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retreat by repeated orders from the court. Kao-tsung was keen to 
end the war and regarded the improved military situation as the 
opportune moment to sue for peace. On their part, the Jurchen, 
having encountered serious difficulties in their invasion, were 
also willing to come to an agreement. The border situation became 
more stable with the withdrawal of the Chin forces north of the 
Huai in 3rd/ll4l.42
The prospects of peace being bright, the court decided that
it was time to do something about its own generals. Ever since the
founding of the Southern Sung, leading generals such as Han Shih-
chung, Chang Chun and Yiieh Fei had held great military power, and
43
the soldiers came to be loyal to them rather than to the court. 
Having little actual military power of his own, Kao-tsung had dealt 
cautiously with the generals, allowing them to take over some local 
financial resources and even overlooking the fact that they some­
times disregarded orders from the court and failed to maintain 
discipline among the troops. Nevertheless the great power enjoyed
by the military was a drastic departure from the dynastic tradition
44
and it naturally led to protests by the civilian bureaucracy.
42. Ibid., ch.72, p.754.
43. This could be seen from the fact that the early Southern Sung
armies were all known by the^names of the leading generals.
See Ting fh’uan-ching comp. , Sung-jen i-shih hui-
pien (SJ1S) (Taipei: Shang -wu yin-shu
kuan ^  1966 reprint), ch.15, p.723.
44. One of the most vigorous attacks against the genexals came 
from the Reviewing Policy Adviser Wang Ts'ao^^ in 1st/ 
1130. See CYYL, ch.31, pp.605-6. ^
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The emperor himself was anxious to bring the generals under control.
However, he was careful not to carry out any drastic reforms as long
as he needed the service of the generals. However, once the regime
approached stability and the external threat subsided, Kao-tsung
decided to bring the armies and the generals under control. In this
he had the support of the civilian ministers, who regarded the
military leaders as a greater menace to the security of the empire
45
than the Jurchen armies. From the political standpoint of the 
court, it was essential to reduce the power of the military so as 
to give unquestioned authority to the central government and 
ultimately to reestablish civilian supremacy over the armies.
Ch'in Kuei took up this responsibility and accomplished the
potentially dangerous task with great skill. In 4th/ll4l the three
leading generals - Han Shih-chung, Chang Chun and Yueh Fei were
summoned to court ostensibly to receive rewards for their recent
victories over the enemy. Upon their arrival they were promoted to
be military commissioners, while imperial orders were immediately
sent to their former lieutenants, appointing each to a separate
command over his own unit, with the additional privilege of reporting
46
directly to the court. In this way, the three generals were thus 
deprived of their military power and their armies placed under the
45. According to Wang Ts'ao, "(These generals) are usually
arrogant and recalcitrant. They refuse to follow the rules 
and regulations of the court. Wherever they go they will 
oppress and plunder (the people) , and they bring more harm 
than the foreign invaders...." Wang even said that according 
to the old law, all the generals deserved to be sentenced to 
death. See ibid.
46. CYYL, ch.140, pp.2247-8; see also James T.C. Liu, "Yueh Fei 
 ," p.293.
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control of the central government. Of the three, Chang Chlln
47
submitted willingly and was richly rewarded for his cooperation.
Han Shih-chung was less willing to comply, but he too submitted, and
48
was left alone to enjoy a retired life on the Western Lake. The
most stubborn among them was Yiieh Fei, who did not conceal his
dissatisfaction. His defiance merely played into the hands of Ch'in
Kuei. In the winter of 1141 Yiieh was suddenly imprisoned on a
49
trumped-up charge of insubordination and high treason, which 
subsequently led to his unjust death in prison in 12th/1141.
The refusal of Yueh to cooperate willingly was, however, not
the only reason for his tragic fate. What proved fatal was that
Yiieh had incurred the displeasure of Kao-tsung and caused the emperor
to suspect him of disloyalty. Yueh had offended the emperor on more
than one occasion. In 2nd/1137 he attempted to influence the
imperial decision regarding the heir-apparent. Kao-tsung's
displeasure was obvious when he rebuffed Yueh with the statement
that being a military official, he had no right to interfere in 
50 m
such matters. The emperor's displeasure was compounded by
47. Chang Chun received much wealth for himself and obtained local 
government posts for his former subordinates.^ See biography 
of Chang Chun, SS,^ch-369, p. 11475; Pi YuanJf^^U , Hsii Tzu- 
chih t'ung-chieiT^ ^  (HTC) (Peking: Ku-chi ch’u-pan-
she > ^ 9 5 7 ) 7  cfiTl24, p. 3824.
48. HTC, ch.124, p.3295.
49. Yueh was accused of being involved in a conspiracy to stage a 
rebellion with his former subordinates in Hsiang-yang. CHSC,
ch.27, pp,16b-17a and p.20a.
50. CYYL, ch.109, p.1764.
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suspicion when it was reported that Yiieh had close connection with 
Chao Shih-nio a remote member of the imperial clan.***
Also, despite his general tolerance towards the generals, Kao-tsung 
could not but feel uneasy about the great amount of wealth accumu­
lated by Yiieh in his army. Through various commercial activities 
such as the sale of wine and the establishment of a trading market, 
Yueh is said to have stored 20 million min (strings of cash) in 
his army. It is therefore not surprising that as soon as he was 
dismissed, the emperor ordered a thorough investigation of the
finances in Ytieh's army and restored its trading profits to the
52
central government.
Meanwhile, peace negotiations between Sung and Chin took on
a quicker pace after 9th/1141 and reached a successful conclusion
before the end of the year. The Huai River became the new boundary
in the eastern borders. In addition, the Sung agreed to pay an
annual tribute of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk
and to declare themselves vassals (ch'en j-^. ) of the Chin. They
were further obliged neither to encourage the migration of refugees
from North China nor to support the rebel activities of Sung
loyalists there. In return, the Chin promised to return the imperial
53
coffin of Hui-tsung and also send back Kao-tsungfs mother. The
51. Ibid., ch.142, p.2290.
52. CHSC, ch.27, p.16b.
53. SSPM, ch.72, pp.755-56; see also Herbert Franke, "Treaties
Between Sung and Chin," in Etudes Song, Series I (Paris:
Mouton & Co., 1970), pp.55-84.
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treaty established a pattern of coexistence between the two rival 
powers which was to endure in its essential form for almost a century.
From the signing of the above treaty, it is clear that Kao-
tsung regarded the achievement of internal stability as more
important than the complete restoration of the former empire. In
his opinion the call for hul-fu was not only impractical but also
54
impossible at the time. On the other hand, there were ample 
benefits to be gained from the peace agreement. There would be no 
more loss of innocent lives and with the return of the Empress 
Dowager and Hui-tsung's coffin, the emperor would be commended for 
his filiality. As for the humiliating terms involved in the agree­
ment, this was taken care of by Ch'in Kuei, who, in order to protect 
the imperial image, assumed total responsibility for the peace policy 
and all the blame that accompanied it. For his loyalty to the 
emperor, Ch'in was richly rewarded by Kao-tsung, who not only 
granted him great honour and prestige but also delegated so much 
authority to him that he became the most powerful bureaucrat in the 
court of early Southern Sung.
position became even more secure. A month after the return of 
Empress Dowager Wei in 8th/1142, Kao-tsung indicated his appreciation 
to Ch'in by raising his honorific rank to that of Senior Preceptor
With the successful conclusion of peace, Ch'in Kuei's
(t'ai-shih and enfeoffing him as Duke of Wei (Wei Kuo-
No minister since Ts'ai Ching had received
54. See CHSC, ch.27, pp.lOb-lla.
55. Ibid., ch.28, pp.l4a-14b.
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similarly high rank. In the ensuing years the emperor continued to
heap honours on Ch'in. In 4th/1145 Ch'in received further promotion
in rank; he was also given a new house and presented with valuable
56
gifts of money and goods. In 6th/1145 Kao-tsung even paid Ch'in 
the honour of a personal visit to his new house and conferred high
honorific ranks on the women of his family and official titles on
57 &
his grandsons. His adopted son Ch'in H s i ^ T ^  also rose in rank
and influence in court. The emperor's ties with Ch'in became even
closer with the marriage between Ch'in's grand-daughter and the
^  58
younger brother of Empress Vu ^  , Kao-tsung's consort. The
emperor and his chief councillor appear to have maintained extremely
cordial relations throughout the letter's seventeen years in office.
Having gained the emperor's confidence, Ch'in Kuei began to 
tighten his grip over the bureaucracy. Prior to the signing of the 
peace agreement, the majority of the officials purged by Ch'in were 
people who were opposed to the peace policy. However, from 1142 
onwards, even those who belonged to the peace faction became 
vulnerable. For example, Ho Chu , a chief negotiator of the
peace agreement, was made to leave in 8th/1142. Ho was able to gain 
the emperor's favour because of his successful peace mission and 
this naturally put Ch'in on his guard. It was probably because of 
his fear of Ho's rise to power to rival his own position that Ch'in
56. CYYL, ch.153, p.2468.
57. Ibid., ch.153, p.2474.
58. Biography of Wu I ^  , jSS, ch.465, p.13591.
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instigated the censorial officials to impeach Ho and to bring about
59
his dismissal soon after the latter's return from Chin. Also, in 
2nd/1144 the Second Privy Councillor Mo-ch'i Hsieh
former collaborator of Ch'in, was hounded out of office when he began
60
to show signs of excessive independence. Indeed, Ch'in became
increasingly intolerant of those who disagreed with him and was in
constant fear that his immediate subordinates would develop adequate
strength to challenge his position of dominance. Consequently, he
did not allow any of his assistant councillors to remain long at
their posts, many of them being dismissed after having been in office
for only a year or less. To remove officials who had become a threat
or who were no longer in his favour, Ch'in regularly turned to the
censorial organ for assistance. In turn the censorial officials were
rewarded with promotion to high positions in the bureaucracy, often
replacing the same individuals they had earlier impeached. In this
way, many censorial officials willingly became instruments of the
chief councillor because of their ambition to climb the bureaucratic
ladder. Besides using the censorial organ, Ch'in Kuei also exerted
his control over the bureaucracy by his personnel policy. It is
said that the assistant councillors he recommended were mostly
61
mediocre men who could be easily controlled.
Ch'in Kuei was also vigilant against the revival of the war 
faction. Though many of the active war advocates were in exile they
59. CYYL, ch.146, p.2340.
60. Ibid., ch.151, p.2427.
61. Ibid., ch.127, pp.3366-67.
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remained potentially influential. Among them were Chin's old
enemies Chang Chun and Chao Ting. In 7th/1146 Chang Chun was further
demoted and exiled to a more distant place in Lien-chou (in
Kuang-tung/%> ) for having sent a memorial urging the emperor to
62
speed up his war efforts. In 8th/1147 Ch'in even hounded Chao
63
Ting to death in his place of exile. Seeing Chao as a potential
rival to himself, Ch*in found it necessary to eliminate him totally.
Even after Chao's death many possible sympathisers of his were also
persecuted. In llth/1148 another prominent war advocate, Hu Ch'iian
1 had his place of exile shifted to a more remote location,
and in 8th/1150 Chang Chun was again moved further to a new place of 
65
exile.
Ch'in appears to have grown more and more suspicious of 
subversion against himself, not only from former war advocates but 
also from the scholar-officials in general. In early 1150 eight 
officials and former officials were implicated in the alleged 
circulation of a private history composed by an ex-councillor in 
exile, Li Kuang , and recorded by his son, Li Meng-chien
. Li was accused of criticizing the Ch'in regime in his work.
62. HTC, ch.127, pp.3366-67.
63. It is said that Ch'in ordered the local officials stationed at
Chao's place of exile to report monthly on whether Chao was
still alive or dead. On hearing this, Chao told his son that 
it was Ch'in's intention to see him dead, and the only way to 
save his family from harm was by giving up his own life. So
he deliberately starved himself to death. Ibid., ch.127,
pp.3374-75.
64. Ibid., ch.128, p.3396.
65. Ibid., ch.129, p.3411.
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As a result he was barred from future official appointment, his son
66
was exiled and the others were all demoted in rank. In llth/1151
a member of the civil service was publicly executed for defaming the 
67
administration. The persecutions continued over the next few
years, and resulted in the purging and exile of many more officials
from court. These included relatives and friends of prominent men
as well as those who were merely suspected of being disloyal to the
chief councillor. The persecutions of political dissidents
culminated in 1155, when fifty-three men including Chao Ting's son,
Chao Fen ?%) , Chang Chun, Li Kuang and others were implicated in
a case of alleged sedition. However, the case did not bear fruit as
Ch'in became increasingly ill and was unable to bring his accusations 
68
against them. Even till his very last days, therefore, Ch'in was 
on his guard against those who refused to fall in line with him.
Ch'in Euei's "reign of terror" naturally made him very
unpopular. His lack of popularity could also have been caused by
69
his amassing great wealth for himself. Furthermore, his blatant 
nepotism in placing his son and grandsons in high positions might
66. CYYL, ch.161, p.2604, pp.2607-8.
67. Ibid., ch.162, p.2647.
68. Ibid., ch.169, p.2769.
69. It is reported that the annual presents Ch'in received from
the officials of both the central and local governments amounted 
to hundreds of thousands and that his private wealth, accumulated 
through imperial favours and gifts from ingratiating bureaucrats, 
was several times more than that of the tso-tsang or
National Treasury, see CYYL, ch.169^ p.2772; HTC, chri30, 
p.3459.
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have also led to resentment on the part of Kao-tsung. In 3rd/1148
Ch'in Hsi was appointed Administrator of the Military Bureau; this
was obviously a move to pave the way for him to succeed his father.
Though Ch'in Hsi gave up his post the following month, he remained
70
effectively second in power only to his father. Since there was
no indication of any direct opposition in court against Hsi's appoint
ment, it could well be that he was obliged to step down from his
newly-acquired position because of the disapproval of the emperor.
Indeed, in the later years of Ch'in's chief councillorship, there
were signs that Kao-tsung was beginning to feel uneasy about Ch'in's
behaviour. In 3rd/1154 it is said that Ch'in Kuei intended to have
his grandson Ch'in Hsun-^^^. placed first in the palace examinations
71
but the emperor decided to place him third instead. In 10th/1155,
when Ch'in Kuei was on his death-bed, Ch'in Hsi attempted to
influence the imperial decision in making him his father's 
72
successor. Though Kao-tsung had supported Ch'in Kuei to the last, 
he was nevertheless unwilling to allow his son to succeed him.
After visiting Ch'in and realizing that he was dying, the emperor 
dismissed both him and his son.
Immediately after Ch'in's death in 10th/1155, Kao-tsung 
rapidly reestablished his authority over the government. A vigorous 
purge of Ch'in Kuei's faction was carried out with the help of the 
censorial organ, which resumed its role as the "ears and eyes" of 
the emperor. In the appointment of councillors, there was a return
70. ETC, ch.128, pp.3381-82.
71. CYYL, ch.166, pp.2712-13.
72. Ibid., ch.169, p.2770.
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to the old pattern where bureaucratic turnover at the chief minis­
terial level was remarkably high. In less than eight years from 
late 1155 to the time of Kao-tsung*s retirement in 1162, five chief 
councillors were appointed, in contrast to the period of Ch*in Kuei's 
domination, when there had been only one chief councillor in more 
than seventeen years.
It is interesting to note that many of the councillors
appointed after Ch'in's death had had previous connections with him.
Even though some of them might have fallen out of Ch'in Kuei's
favour, they were still men who had served under him and assisted him
in building up his power. It is ironical that on the one hand, there
was a purge of the so-called "faction" of Ch'in Kuei, while on the
other hand, many who had rendered services to Ch'in continued to
find their way into government service, with full consent from the
emperor. By allowing the service of men who had adhered to Ch'in's
policy, the emperor was able to maintain the same government policies
pursued by Ch'in formerly. Kao-tsung*s attitude was clearly
indicated in 12th/1155 when he told the ministers that although the
peace policy had been firmly upheld by the now discredited Ch'in
Kuei, they too had supported it and should continue to adhere to 
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it. On another occasion, in 3rd/1156, when there were rumours
regarding the possibility of a Chin invasion, the emperor proclaimed
that it was his intention to pursue peace and that Ch'in's death by
74
no means led to an end of this policy. However, despite his strict
73. Ibid., ch.170, p.2740.
74. Ibid., ch.172, p.2827.
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adherence to observe peace, Kao-tsung was eventually forced to take 
up arms against the Jurchen, who renewed their hostilities against 
the Sung and invaded the Southern Sung empire in 1161.
Renewal of Sung-Chin Hostilities
After the conclusion of the peace settlement between Sung 
and Chin in 1141, peaceful coexistence between the two states lasted 
for nearly twenty years. It was an uneasy peace, however (especially 
during the late 1150s), and was finally broken by another war in 
1161. This was the second and final attempt by the Jurchen to cross 
the Yang-tzu with the intention of eliminating the Southern Sung; 
and like the first attempt, it ended in failure.
The Jurchen forces on this occasion were led by Wan-yen
Liang wko was later given the posthumous title of Prince
Hai-ling (Hai-ling Wang ) ,75 In 1149 Hai-ling had usurped
the throne from his cousin, Emperor Hsi-tsung (r. 1136-1149),
* * J
and after his accession, he continued to exchange envoys with the 
Sung. Nevertheless, he harboured the ambition to conquer the Sung
76
and in 2nd/1159 declared his intention to invade Chinese territory. 
Two years later, he moved the capital to K'ai-feng, and from there 
launched his southern campaign against the Sung.
75. The official biography of Hai-ling is found in T'o T'o, Chin 
shih/^fi ^  _ (CS) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1975), ch.5, pp.91-118. 
For a_£tudy of his invasion of Southern Sung, see T ’ao Jing- 
shen 
chan-* ung-Q  U o K TaiPei: Taiwan University, 1963).
76. Biography of Hai-ling, CS, ch.5, p.110
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The Southern Sung forces were hardly prepared to go to war
at this time. After twenty years of coexistence with the enemy, both
the army and the populace had grown accustomed to the peace and
tranquility which had been brought by the settlement of 1141. Since
the soldiers were not engaged in fighting, many had been forced to
perform other duties by the generals to increase the latter's income.
One result of the rapid commercialization of the time was that many
military men became traders; they were more interested in building
77
up their own businesses rather than training the soldiers for war.
A criticism of the military put forward by the Minister of Personnel, 
Wang Ying-ch'en /^-/^Lln late 1161 revealed many weaknesses that 
existed in the Sung army:
Ever since the conclusion of the peace settlement, 
the generals have been able to enjoy riches and 
honour; their easy and luxurious living had made 
them proud and lazy, and caused them to lose their 
fighting spirit. Even though many soldiers have 
been recruited, they have not been given proper 
training. Instead, they are forced to do the work 
of artisans, merchants or labourers.... It is 
well-known that such soldiers are not able to fight. 
Therefore, on the arrival of the enemy, they fled 
without a fight....
Thus despite the heavy expenses incurred by the military which
79
amounted to 80% of the national expenditure, Sung forces were
77. This was.xpointed out by the Right Policy Critic Adviser, Ho 
p,u>j6 v #  » who *n his criticism of the army in 3rd/1161, 
mentioned that instead of training the soldiers, the generals 
were engaged in commercial pursuits, and that within twenty 
years, many military men had turned into traders. See CYYL, 
ch.189, p.3155.
78. See Wang Ying-ch'en Wen-ting chi (Ts'ung-
shu chi-ch'eng^ ^ ^ ^  ^  j ^ TSCC, ed. ) , ch.2, p.15.
79. In 12th/1160 Kao-tsung mentioned that 80% of the national 
income was spent on the army. See CYYL, ch.187, p.3131.
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unable to stop the advance of the Jurchen, who arrived on the 
northern banks of the Yang-tzu in less than a month.
Sung military efforts were further handicapped by the general
apathy of the court toward defence and war preparations. Although
news concerning the Chin intentions to invade was received as early
as 1156, the emperor and his ministers preferred to treat this as
mere rumours and refused to countenance any suggestion they should
prepare for war. In 3rd/1156, a Chin-shih degree holder from the
. ->#north who had managed to escape to Sung territory, Liang Hsun »
was even exiled for memorializing about the possibility of a Chin 
80
invasion. During the late 1150s Sung envoys to Chin also began
voicing their suspicions about the Jurchen intention to invade
Chinese territory, but they too went unheeded by the court. For
example, in 2nd/1158, the Junior Lord of the Court of Imperial
Sacrifices (t*ai-ch*ang shao-ch'ing Sun Tao-fu
who had recently returned from the Jurchen court, reported
that the Chin had made provoking accusations about Sung violations
81
of the peace treaty. Although it was apparent that the Jurchen 
were actually seeking an excuse to invade, the Sung did not respond 
positively to this report. In 4th/1159 the Vice-Director of 
Education (kuo-tzu ssu-yeh j ) Huang Chung<g^ vj2 returned
from the north with news that the Jurchen were rebuilding the
80. Ibid., ch.172, p.2827.
81. The Jurchen had questioned Liang about the change in Sung 
attitude after Ch'in Kuei's death, and about the acceptance 
of illegal immigrants from Chin and the acquisition of horses 
by the Sung. See HTC, ch.132, 3494.
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palaces in K'ai-feng, a sign that they were preparing to move the 
capital there. Huang called upon the emperor to prepare for the 
possibility of an invasion. However, his statement was immediately 
challenged by Chief Councillors Shen Kai 7 ^  5?^ and T'ang Ssu-t'ui 
'/'%} , and this and other requests to carry out defence
preparations were ignored. The reluctance of the Sung to go into 
war at this time was later aptly described by the Librarian of the 
Imperial Library, Wang Shih-p'eng JP- :
When news concerning the possibility of an enemy 
invasion was received, the officials were all 
frightened and spread the rumours round; however, 
when such reports subsided, they thought peace 
would reign again. Furthermore, they talked about 
the enemy being faced with their own internal 
problems and said that they would not invade our 
country after all. Instead of preparing for the 
eventuality of war, they were hoping against hope 
that the enemy would be obstructed by their internal 
problems; this was poor planning indeed!83
By the summer of 1160, however, the threat of foreign 
invasion could no longer be ignored. In 5th/1160, the Co-
Administrator of the Military Bureau Yeh I-wen ^  1 returned
from Chin with news that the Jurchen were continuing to rebuild K*ai- 
feng and preparing their battle-ships, developments which he felt 
clearly showed their intention to invade. At this stage, even Kao- 
tsung, who had all along dismissed such reports as unfounded, had 
to agree. Therefore, when the Right Chief Councillor Ch*en K'ang- 
P° P resented his P lans £°r defence of the Liang-Huai
82. CYYL, ch.181, p.3011.
83. Wang Shih-p’eng ^  Mei-ch'i hsien-sheng wen-chi
i n  ^  (MCC) (Ssu-pu ts * u: ‘
ed. ) , "tsou-i"^_ ch’2 , p. la.
ng-k« an yjfcgj* SPTK
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'j jj. region, the emperor promptly accepted them. Nevertheless, 
even when it became clear that war was likely, Kao-tsung still hoped 
to maintain the status quo and thus defence preparations were carried 
out only half-heartedly.
It was only after the visit by the Chin envoys in 5th/1161 
that the Sung began to take more positive action in preparing for 
war. On this occasion, apart from their nominal mission to congra­
tulate Kao-tsung on his birthday, the enemy also announced the death 
of Ch'in-tsung, and more importantly, put forward a demand that a 
new border be drawn up between Sung and Chin. Hai-ling conveyed his 
message through the envoys that he was dissatisfied with the current 
border along the Huai River because of the large number of illegal 
immigrants crossing in both directions, and demanded that the Sung
send ministers to K'ai-feng to negotiate about the demarcation of a 
85
new border. The Chin emperor was actually demanding the territory 
of the Huai region and this was naturally unacceptable to the Sung.
In fact, by making such demands, the Jurchen were trying to provoke 
Sung into hostilities so that they could have an excuse to invade. 
Kao-tsung immediately ordered his ministers to hold meetings to 
discuss preparations for war, an order which was promptly obeyed.
The prospect of an imminent Chin invasion led to some
Z £
confusion at the Sung court. The eunuch Chang Ch'u-wei 
tried to persuade the emperor to abandon his war efforts and plan 
instead to retreat. There were even rumours that the emperor was
84. CYYL, ch.185, p.3099.
85. Ibid., ch.190, pp.3172-73.
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.j&rfLplanning, if necessary, to go to either Fu-chien/f\#*3L-Or Ssu- 
86
ch'uan. And, indeed, even while preparations for war were in hand, 
arrangements for retreat were being planned. In fact, Kao-tsung
87
apparently was prepared to flee to the sea should it be necessary.
Meanwhile, Hai-ling had already moved to K'ai-feng and was
making final preparations for his invasion, which began in 9th/1161.
The Chin forces attacked the Sung from several directions, with the
main army being led by Hai-ling himself. In the western borders of
Shensi and Ssu-ch*uan, the enemy faced gallant resistance from the
88
Sung army led by Wu Lin . The Chin navy was also defeated
in Shan-tung by the Sung naval commander Li Pao ^  , who had
earlier lifted the siege at Hai-chou "Hj (modern Tung-hai hsien 
in Chiang-su .89 The major threat, however, came
from the main army, which did manage to cross the Huai and capture 
a large part of the southern Huai region by late 10th/1161. The
who had beenSung generals Wang Ch'uan
assigned the defence of the Huai region, both suffered defeats and 
90
retreated.
86. Ibid., ch.190, p.3175.
87. This was pointed,out by a scholar without rank (pu-i A  
Ho Sung-ying/f^j ^  , who in his memorial in 6th/1161,
criticized that at this critical juncture, the national funds 
were spent on building the imperial boats in preparation for 
fleeing to the sea to escape from enemy attacks. See PMHP, 
ch.227, pp.la-4a.
88. See biography of Wu Lin, SS, ch.366, pp.11417-18.
89. Hai-chou had been ceded to the Chin in the 1141 treaty but it 
was recaptured by Sung loyalists in 8th/1161. See CYYL, ch.192, 
p.3207.
90. Ibid., ch.193, pp.3241-42,
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Soon after the Chin invasion began, Kao-tsung issued a
decree calling upon all officials to take up the responsibility of
91
fighting the enemy. However, when news concerning the defeat of
the Sung forces in the Huai region was received, the court once
again was seized with panic. Kao-tsung summoned his ministers and
told them of his intention to disperse the officials and take to the
sea. This was again firmly opposed by Chief Councillor Ch'en K'ang-
po, while the ex-general Yang Ts'un-chung also promised to
fight the enemy to the end. Consequently, the emperor changed his
92
mind and even declared his intention to lead the army personally.
In llth/1161 the Sung was in a most dangerous situation for 
the Chin troops were preparing to cross the Yang-tzu at any moment.
With the fall of Kua-chou (south of Yang-chou on the northern
93
banks of the Yang-tzu) on 4/llth/1161, the whole of the southern 
Huai region fell into enemy hands. To the west, Wang Ch'uan had 
earlier crossed to the southern side of the Yang-tzu and stationed 
his troops at Ts'ai-shih /jZ- (on the southern banks of the lower 
Yang-tzu south-west of Chien-k'ang). The court then decided to 
dismiss Wang and replace him with Li Hsien-chung m i -  , who was 
stationed at Wu-hu further west. While Wang Ch'iian was
recalled, the Drafting Official of the Imperial Secretariat Yu Yun-
;i 
%
wen J   , who had been appointed Consultant of Military Affairs
91. Ibid., ch.193, p.3229.
92. HTC, ch.135, p.3577.
93. PMHP, ch.238, pp.5a-6a.
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(ts * an-mo chun-shih ' ) the previous month, was sent to
inform Li Hsien-chung to take over Wang's army, and at the same time
left for Ts'ai-shih where he found the remnants of Wang Ch'uan*s
army scattered along the road. Yu informed them that they would soon
have a new general, Li Hsien-chung, but before Li's arrival, he would
personally lead them. He also promised to reward them richly, and
the morale of the troops is said to have been raised. On 8/10th/1161
Yu organized the troops for battle by lining up both the cavalry and
infantry along the banks while warships were sent down the river to
attack the advancing enemy. The Chin forces were taken by surprise,
and because of the superiority of the Sung boats and the superior
skills of the Chinese in naval and river warfare, the latter were
95
able to inflict heavy casualties upon the Jurchen units.
After this defeat at Ts'ai-shih, Hai-ling withdrew his 
forces to Yang-chou, where preparations were made for a second 
attempt to cross the Yang-tzu. It should be pointed out that prior 
to the battle at Ts'ai-shih, Hai-ling had received news that during 
his absence from home, an uprising had taken place resulting in the 
usurpation of his throne by a member of the royal family, Wan-yen
disturbed by this event, Hai-ling decided to continue with his
94. HTC, ch.135, p.3587.
95. For a detailed account of the battle at Ts'ai-shih, see CYYL, 
ch.194, pp.3260-70; PMHP, ch.238, pp.l0a-14b.
96. See CS, ch.5, p.116; ch.6, pp.122-3.
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reward the soldiers at Ts'ai-shih. After seeing Li at Wu-hu, Yu
(Emperor Shih-tsung Although much
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southern campaign instead of returning home immediately, probably in
a desperate move to prove his strength. However, the disaster at
Ts'ai-shih greatly frustrated him and demoralised his army, and when
he ordered his generals to cross the Yang-tzu a second time, they
turned against him and pledged their loyalty to the new ruler.
Consequently, on 27/11th/1161, Hai-ling and several of his ministers
97
were murdered by their own troops.
Following these developments the Chin forces withdrew to
the north. Even though the war had not officially ended and heavy
fighting was to continue for several more months, the major threat
posed by the enemy had been removed. Seeing that the conditions
were now more favourable to the Sung, Kao-tsung and the imperial
entourage left for Chien-k'ang in 12th/1161. After a brief visit
in lst/1162, the emperor was satisfied with conditions there and
decided to return to Lin-an although he had been urged to stay on
98
in Chien-k'ang to direct the war effort from there. Meanwhile 
the Chin had sent envoys to officially inform the Sung about the 
accession of the new emperor. Both sides were keen to negotiate 
for peace, and while intermittent warfare continued along the border 
for the rest of the year, envoys were sent to and fro between the 
two states in an attempt to reach a satisfactory settlement.
While it is clear that the failure of the Jurchen campaign 
was largely caused by their internal problems, it is quite possible 
that if they had defeated the Sung army at Ts’ai-shih and crossed 
the Yang-tzu, Hai-ling might have succeeded in conquering the Sung 
after all. The Sung victory at Ts'ai-shih was therefore highly
97. CYYL, ch.194, pp.3280-81.
98. Ibid., ch.196, pp.3309-10.
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significant as it was crucial to the continued existence of the
empire. It was subsequently much glorified and Yu Yun-wen was
99
celebrated as a national hero.
The Chin invasion of 1161 was soon followed by another 
important political event: the abdication of Kao-tsung. After 
returning to Lin-an in 2nd/1162, the emperor decided that it was 
time for him to retire. Subsequently, in a formal abdication 
ceremony in 6th/1162, Kao-tsung handed over the reins of power to 
his chosen heir, Hsiao-tsung.
Kao-tsung's Role as a Dynastic Founder
In his long reign of thirty-five years, Kao-tsung had gone 
through two major wars and encountered numerous crises which made 
his position as emperor far from enviable. Furthermore, the 
strenous duties and heavy responsibilities involved in decision­
making under such unstable conditions would have been extremely 
trying for any ruler. Yet, despite his youth and inexperience at 
the time of his accession, Kao-tsung was able to overcome the 
various difficulties and restore the fallen Sung empire by giving 
it a new life in South China. On the whole, Kao-tsung can be said 
to have played a significant role as an empire-builder.
In founding the Southern Sung dynasty, Kao-tsung took 
several steps to ensure his personal supremacy and the supremacy of
99. Since the battle at Ts'ai-shih was crucial to the fate of the 
Southern Sung, the victory achieved here has been regarded as 
a celebrated event and many of the facts have been exaggerated 
to glorify the battle and its hero, Yu Ytfn-wen. In fact, 
neither was the victory such a "glorious" one nor was Yu such 
a great hero. It was his sheer loyalty and good planning, 
combined with the familiarity of the Sung with the Yang-tzu and 
their superior maritime skills that enabled the Sung forces to 
defeat their enemy. See T'ao Jing-shen, op.cit., pp.127-184.
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the central government. First of all he extended the control of 
the central government inland by suppressing the bandits with the 
help of the generals. Next he moved against the generals themselves. 
Being in a vulnerable position because of internal instability and 
external threat, it took Kao-tsung many years before he finally 
decided to curtail the power of the military. But he finally did 
so when peace negotiations were reaching a successful conclusion. By 
concluding a peace settlement and simultaneously withdrawing the 
power from the generals, Kao-tsung succeeded in achieving both 
internal security and restoring civilian supremacy over the military.
Having achieved his goals in restoring peace and internal 
security, Kao-tsung thus placed his newly-founded dynasty on a 
firmer footing. Territorially, the borders between Sung and Chin 
were defined with the River Huai as the major demarcation line. The 
boundaries remained essentially the same for the rest of the dynasty. 
With the establishment of Lin-an as the capital, the Southern Sung 
built up a coastal empire facing inland, an unprecedented event in 
Chinese history. Southern China, particularly the Yang-tzu region, 
became the political and socio-economic centre of the Chinese empire.
It has been mentioned earlier that economic consideration 
was an important factor for the decision of the Southern Sung court 
to establish its empire in the south-east. Indeed, it cannot be 
denied that financial resources played a crucial role in the 
founding of the Southern Sung. Ever since his accession to the 
throne, Kao-tsung paid special attention to the financial adminis­
tration of his empire. He was noted for introducing various reforms 
aimed at increasing the national income. Soon after becoming 
emperor in 5th/1127, Kao-tsung showed that he recognized the great 
potential in the tea and salt monopolies by channeling the revenue
80
from these sources into the court. From the very beginning of
the Southern Sung, the tea and salt monopolies contributed greatly
101
to the total income of the empire. Besides tea and salt, wine
was also considered an important source of revenue and the wine tax
was raised on numerous occasions during Kao-tsung's reign. The
income from these three monopolies was truly crucial to the finance
of the Southern Sung as it helped to take care of the heavy expenses
incurred by the military. As pointed out by Chief Councillor Lii
I-hao ^  f>J^/^in 10th/1132, "The empire is depending on the mono-
102
polies from tea, salt and wine to support the soldiers...."
Apart from the three monopolies mentioned above, the 
Southern Sung government also derived a considerable proportion of 
its income from a large number of supplementary taxes. Notable 
among these were the ching-chih ch'ien svmt first restored
100. GHSC, ch.l, p.10b
101. After the implementation of the tea and.salt reform in 5th/
1127. the monopoly office in Chen-chou (modern I-chen
hsien in Chiang-su) was able tcTreceive an annual 
income of 6 million min. In later years the tea and salt 
revenue in the south-east rose to 24 million min. See CHSC, 
ch.3, pp.24b-25a. Considering the fact that the annual cash 
revenue from the south-east was less than 10 million min at 
the beginning of Southern Sung and 65.3 million min by the 
end of Hsiao-tsung's reign, it is evident that the tea and 
salt monopolies contributed a large percentage to the national 
income of the Southern Sung empire. For figures on national 
income during the various periods of Sung rule, see CYTC,
Vol.l, ch.14, pp.la-lb.
102. CYYL, ch.59, p.1025.
103. The ching-chih ch’ien was first introduced during the last 
years of the Northern Sung but was later abolished. It was re­
imposed during the early years of Kao-tsung*s reign. It 
consisted of a variety of indirect taxes such as sales tax on 
documents, on wine, houses and other income-yielding properties. 
In the early 13th century, its contribution to the national 
income amounted to 6.6 million min. See CHSC, ch.6 , pp.l5a-15b; 
CYTC, Vol.l, ch.15, pp.3a-3b.
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by Kao-tsung In the winter of 1128 but was fully implemented only
in late 1129, and the tsung-chih ch’ien W i & 104 which was
introduced in early 1135. These were mainly indirect taxes imposed
upon the people in the south-east. Furthermore, the state also
introduced a special tax called the yueh-chuang ch'ien
105in 1132, designated solely for military expenses. Since these
were all extra taxes in addition to the regular levy from the "two-
tax" system, the burden carried by the people was naturally heavy.
Fortunately the abundant resources in the south-east and the rapid
commercialization during this period allowed the imposition of such
taxes without straining the people to the breaking-point. Kao-
tsung' s policy of heavy taxation was continued by Ch'in Kuei during
106the latter's administration. In fact, the policy remained in
effect for the duration of the Southern Sung.
104. The tsung-chih ch'ien represents another series of additional 
taxes similar to the ching-chih ch'ien mentioned above. Its 
contribution to the national income amounted to 7.8 million 
min in the early 13th century. See CHSC, ch.17, pp.l7b-18a; 
CYTC, Vol.l, ch.15, pp.3b-4b. For a study on the importance 
of the ching-tsung-chih ch'ien see Hisatomi H i s a s h i X ^ p ^  » 
"Nan-S5 no zaisei to kei-s75-sei seh"
» Hokudai Shigaku -^0 » Vol.9 (Sapporo,
1964), pp.32-54. *
105. This was introduced by Chief Councillors L(i I-hao and Chu 
Shen-fei to meet the heavy military expenses of the
time. The money was raised by drawing from various sources 
such as wine-taxes, tax-income designated for the capital 
(s h a n g - k u n g /r^ T* ) and the ching-chih ch'ien. While the 
imposition of this tax led to great hardship among the people 
in the south-east, it was able to contribute another 4 million 
min to the national income. See CHSC, ch.14, p.4a; CYTC, 
Vol.l, ch.14, p.lb and ch.15, pp.7a-8a.
106. It is said that Ch'in Kuei initially found that the empire's 
income was insufficient, and thus ordered the circuit 
intendants in the Chiang and Che^ ftff region (south-eastern 
China) to increase the taxes, imposing great burden upon the 
people. See HTC, ch.130, p.3459.
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In addition to the policy of heavy taxation, the government
also placed a great deal of emphasis upon the effective collection
of revenue in provincial and prefectural administrations. In 7th/
1130, in an attempt to encourage prefectural officials to be
diligent in their duty of tax-collection, an efficiency-rating system
was set up according to the proposal of the Ministry of Finance,
whereby the administrators would be rewarded or punished according
to their performance in gathering revenue for the central govern- 
107
ment. In 8th/1141 the circuit intendants and the prefectural
administrators were called upon by the emperor to cooperate with
each other so that financial administration could be efficiently 
108
carried out. Also, in 6th/1143, during Ch'in Kuei's administra­
tion, circuit intendants were required to check on the accounts of 
the prefectural governments and to impeach administrators who
failed to keep proper books on the income and expenditure in the
109
prefectures concerned.
greater efficiency in revenue-collection and a fairer distribution 
of taxes among the rural population was the land survey programme 
known as ching-chieh fa ~/%k . This was proposed by the
Division Chief in the Department of Ministries (tso-ssu yUan-wai
Another important measure which was intended to attain
lane fi- %  \  ij5. ) Li Ch'un-nien and accepted by the
court in 1142. The reform was prompted by the problem of
110
107. CYYL, ch.35, p.680.
108. CHSC, ch.27, p.16a.
109. CYYL, ch.149, p.2398.
110. Ibid, ch.147, pp.2365-66.
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inaccurate records which led to disorder and confusion in the 
levying of taxes based on the properties of individual households. 
Under this reform, maps were drawn and proper registers compiled on 
the' properties of village households so as to remedy the problem of 
tax evasion and the unequal distribution of local services among the 
rural population. The system was adopted in most parts of the 
empire in the 1140s and although it met with opposition from the 
wealthy landowners in certain areas, it did bring about more 
equitable taxes in the areas where it was successfully implemented. 
This system continued to function in different localities through­
out most of the rest of the dynasty.
Kao-tsung was noted not only for his concern for financial
administration but was also well-known for his efforts in promoting
agriculture. Two plots of land in the palace compound were set
aside for the cultivation of rice while silkworms were also raised 
112
for sericulture. Through the palace farms the emperor was able 
to monitor the two major agrarian activities of grain-cultivation 
and sericulture in the country. He would be well-informed as to 
whether the grain was growing well and would be able to take 
precautionary measures against poor harvests etc. Besides taking 
a personal interest in agriculture, Kao-tsung also emphasized the 
role of prefectural and sub-prefectural officials in encouraging 
agrarian activities. For example, in 5th/1135, a merit-evaluation
111. For a study on the ching-chieh fa, see Wang Te 
"Li Ch'un-nien yU Nan-Sung t’u-ti ching-chieh"^. ^
SSYCC■ Vo1-7 <1974>. pp. 441-4©U.
112. CHSC, ch.21, pp.10b-11a.
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system was set up for promoting or demoting officials according to
113
their efforts in encouraging farming among the population. The 
promotion of agriculture was thus seen by the founder as vital to 
the economic restoration of the war-torn empire.
Institutionally, the major governmental organs were 
Inherited from the Northern Sung but there were certain modifications. 
With the centralization of the Three Departments under the chief 
councillor's control, the executive power of the head of the civilian 
bureaucracy was greatly expanded. Also, because of war, military 
and economic powers were also assigned to the chief councillor in 
times of need. Thus Southern Sung chief councillors became 
generally more powerful than their predecessors. This was 
especially true during the period of Ch'in Kuei's administration. 
Although it was Kao-tsung who voluntarily delegated his authority 
to Ch'in, the dominant feature of court politics during the 
seventeen years of Ch'in's chief councillorship appears to have 
been the consolidation of the chief councillor's power rather than 
the emperor's power. On the other hand, it should be remembered 
that Ch'in was able to gain Kao-tsung's confidence and sustaining 
support because of his absolute loyalty to the emperor. In the 
final analysis, the expansion of the executive power of the chief 
councillor in turn led to the growth of the absolute authority of 
the emperor for it was the latter who delegated such executive 
power to the former. Thus, in general, it can be said that the 
institutional framework established by Kao-tsung was basically
113. Ibid., ch.18, p.6b.
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founded upon the dynastic traditions of centralization, absolutism 
and civilian supremacy.
It was in the style of government that the Southern Sung 
appears to be most innovative. The precarious circumstances in the 
early part of his political career forced Kao-tsung to adopt the 
principle of accommodation as the main guideline for his government. 
He had to accommodate not only the ministers and generals but also 
the bandits and rebels. It was largely through accommodative 
politics that Kao-tsung succeeded in stabilizing his regime. In 
foreign policy too the principle of accommodation served as the 
governing factor as shown by Kao-tsung's willingness to co-exist 
with the enemy and to submit to the humiliating terms dictated by 
the Jurchen. Furthermore, in court politics the emperor was able 
to consolidate his own position by employing various manipulative 
techniques and balancing measures based upon the principle of 
accommodation. In so doing, he set the pattern of Southern Sung 
politics for succeeding emperors to follow.
Kao-tsung's peace policy and reliance upon Ch'in Kuei
brought judgement upon him that disparaged his role as founder of
114
the Southern Sung dynasty. Also, traditional Chinese sources 
tend to emphasize the weak and timid aspects of Kao-tsung's 
personality in order to provide an excuse for the humiliating peace 
concluded by the emperor. To a certain extent such an image was 
created by Kao-tsung himself, who allowed Ch'in Kuei to take over 
the reins of government as his own interests coincided with the
114. See footnote 59 of Chapter I.
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chief councillor's. Far from being weak, however, Kao-tsung was an
assertive monarch who directed the government behind the scenes.
It should also be pointed out that despite his lack of enthusiasm
for war, Kao-tsung proved to be a responsible emperor. When the
Chin troops began advancing southwards in late 1161, the emperor
did contemplate fleeing from the enemy by sea, but he did not act
as his father had done, abdicating in favour of his heir and
115leaving for a tour of the Yang-tzu region. On the contrary, 
under the encouragement of his chief councillor, Ch'en K'ang-po, 
Kao-tsung summoned up enough courage to stay in the capital and 
even declared that he would lead the armies personally. It was only 
when the empire was no longer threatened in early 1162 that Kao- 
tsung declared his intention to step down from his throne.
It is interesting to note that although Kao-tsung abdicated 
his throne with an air of decisiveness in 6th/1162, he nevertheless 
took a long time to choose his heir. As he was childless after the 
death of his only son in 7th/1129, the emperor adopted two boys of 
royal descent (one of them being Hsiao-tsung) successively in 1132 
and 1134 and brought them up as his own sons. Despite the frequent
requests by his ministers to install his heir-apparent, Kao-tsung
refused to indicate his preference for either of his two potential 
heirs. His reluctance to designate his heir-apparent was most 
probably due to his deep-seated fear that should another coup d'etat 
occur, he would be forced to abdicate in favour of his heir, as had
happened during the Miao-Liu coup. Moreover, the fact that the war
115. Biography of Hui-tsung, SS, ch.22, p.417.
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and peace advocates at court appear to have chosen each of the two
116princes as their favourite must have caused the emperor to act
cautiously. He must have deliberately refrained from naming his
heir in order to keep a balance between the war and peace advocates,
so that no powerful faction could be built around the person of the
heir-apparent. It was not until 1160 that Kao-tsung finally
indicated his choice between the two potential heirs by formally
&  -j 117
declaring Hsiao-tsung to be the "Emperor's Son" (huang-tzu ).
Even then, it was two years later, on the eve of his abdication, 
that he designated Hsiao-tsung as the heir-apparent.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Kao-tsung
chose his successor wisely. Hsiao-tsung turned out to be one of
the best emperors of the Southern Sung and for this reason, Kao-
tsung's appointment of Hsiao-tsung as his heir rightly gained the
118
founding emperor the praise of later historians. After many
years of observation, Kao-tsung must have noticed certain qualities 
in Hsiao-tsung that made him decide in favour of the latter. Hsiao- 
tsung was adopted by Kao-tsung at the age of five in 1132, He was
116. While the war advocates on the whole appear to champion the 
cause of the elder prince, Y u a n ( t h a t  is, Hsiao-tsung), 
peace advocates such as Ch'in Kuei appear to be in favour 
of the younger, Chii see CYTC, Vol.2, ch.l, pp.6a-7a.
The preference of Ch'in for Chii is also mentioned in CTYY, 
ch.11, pp. 12a-12b.
117. CYYL, ch.184, p.3082. On the other hand, the title of 
Emperor's Nephew" (h u a n g - c h i h ) was given to Prince Chti 
and thus for the first time a formal distinction was made 
between the two princes.
118. For example, the commentary attached to Hsiao-tsung's bio­
graphy in the official Sung History gives credit to Kao-tsung 
for his choice of successor. See annals of Hsiao-tsung, SS , 
ch.35, p.692.
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described as a boy of serious disposition, whose proper behaviour
and non-impulsive character had influenced the emperor's decision
119
to select him from a number of candidates sent for adoption.
It is also said that the prince's "heroic disposition" had so
greatly impressed Yiieh Fei in 1137 that the latter was prompted to
memorialize the throne to designate the young Hsiao-tsung as heir- 
120
apparent. While it is doubtful whether a boy under ten years of
age could really display such "heroic" nature, it may, however, be
deduced that the prince's character could have been moulded by his 
121
first tutors, who were on the side of the war advocates and were 
probably responsible to a certain extent for cultivating an anti­
pacifist disposition in the future Hsiao-tsung. This anti-pacifist 
inclination of Hsiao-tsung is clearly portrayed during the 1161
119. According to an anecdote, Kao-tsung had ten boys of royal 
descent brought into the palace as candidates for adoption.
From the ten were chosen two whom the emperor was undecided 
about. So he ordered the two boys to stand in front of him 
with their arms folded so as to examine them closely. Suddenly 
a cat walked past, and while Hsiao-tsung stood undistracted, 
the other boy could not resist himself and gave the innocent 
cat a kick. Kao-tsung commented that such flippant behaviour 
would not be capable of carrying out important responsibilities 
and decided in favour of Hsiao-tsung. SeexWang Ming-ch'ing
, Hul-chu lu, yti-hua^ f  (TSCC ed.>,
ch.1, p.874; CYTC, Vol.2, ch.l, pp7l2a-12b.
120. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.l, p.7a; CYYL, ch.109, p.1764.
121. In 1135 Hsiao-tsung, who was then eight years old, began to 
receive instruction in the Confucian classics from Fan Ch'ung
and Chu Chen . The fact that Fan was related to
Chao Ting by marriage and that both Fan and Chu had been 
recommended by Chang Chun and Chao Ting indicates that they 
were most probably friends of the war advocates, if not 
actually members of the war faction themselves. See biogra­
phies of Fan Ch'ung and Chu Chen in SS, ch.435, pp.12905-08. 
The relation between Fan Ch'ung and Chao Ting is mentioned in 
Chou Pi-ta, Wen-chung chi (WCC) (Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu
chen-pen SKCP ed. ) , ch. 176, p. lb.
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crisis, when he requested the emperor's permission to lead the army
122
personally against the Jurchen invaders. Although Kao-tsung
appears to have been upset by his son's request, it is also likely 
that he could not but be impressed by the latter's bravery and 
unselfish concern for the defence of the empire.
Apart from handing over the reins of power to an able and
responsible successor, Kao-tsung's abdication was also significant
in another respect. Considering the fact that in the history of
imperial China, most cases of succession to the throne was accom-
123
panied by a crisis, many involving violence, the succession of
Hsiao-tsung was indeed a smooth one. By his voluntary abdication,
Kao-tsung was able to raise the status of the "Emperor Emeritus"
or t ' ai-shang-huang ^  and redeem its honour in the light of
imperial history. Although all Chinese abdications were officially
voluntary, most of them were nevertheless forced, and "the creation
of the t* ai-shang-huang became a kind of stylistic and moral
124
solution to the untidy and unfilial problem of usurpation." By
the mid-T'ang period, the status of the t 'ai-shang-huang had fallen
125
low because of the many cases of forced abdication. In the
122. Biography of Hsiao-tsung, SS, ch.33, p.617.
123. See Dison H.F. Poe, "Imperial Succession and Attendant Crisis 
in Dynastic China", Tsing-hua Journal of Chinese Studies, New 
Series, Vol.8 (August 1970), Nos.l & 2, pp.84-150.
124. Harold L. Kahn, Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.202.
125. Ibid., pp.205-211.
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case of Sung Hui-tsung, even though his abdication vas voluntary,
the fact that he immediately fled to the south after becoming
"Emperor Emeritus" did not contribute much to redeeming the honour
of the t* ai-shang-huang either. It was thus left to Kao-tsung, who
not only abdicated of his own free will but also with great honour 
126
and prestige. The fact that Kao-tsung had abdicated from a
position of strength rather than weakness was also an indication of 
the relative political stability of the time despite the recent 
emergency caused by the Jurchen invasion.
In conclusion, it can be said that although Kao-tsung failed 
to mount a campaign of reconquest against Chin, he did succeed in 
founding an empire and stabilizing its territorial holdings during 
his three and a half decades on the throne. He should be given due 
credit for salvaging the remnants of a fallen dynasty and laying 
new foundations upon the war-stricken empire. It was upon these 
foundations that his successor, Hsiao-tsung, was able to consolidate 
the regime.
126. An eyewitness account of the abdication ceremony is recorded 
in Chou Pi-ta, Chrin-cheng lu WCC, ch. 163,
pp. 18b-19b.
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CHAPTER III
THE EARLY YEARS OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE PEACE 
SETTLEMENT OF 1164-1165
War or Peace?
At the time of Hsiao-tsung's accession to the throne, the 
Sung and Chin states were still at war. After the withdrawal of 
Chin forces in llth/1161, the Sung army rapidly recovered the 
territories which had recently fallen into enemy hands. As fighting 
continued, the Sung were even able to recapture certain prefectures 
and districts which had come under Chin rule after the signing of 
the 1141-42 treaty, These included the four prefectures of Hai,
Ssu (south-east of modern Ssu-hsien ^ M - n An-hui ,
T'ang (modern Pi-yuan^ffc,7/ ^ hsien in Ho-nan) and Teng ^,3
' 1
(modern Teng-hsien in Ho-nan) in the Huai and Hsiang regions. Also,
just before Hsiao-tsung ascended the throne, the Pacification
Commissioner of Ssu-ch’uan (Ssu-ch*uan hsiian-fu shih **J ^  »
Wu Lin, had succeeded in recovering a number of prefectures along
2
the north-western frontier. The Chin were naturally unhappy with
1. After the renewal of Sung-Chin hostilities in 1161, the Sung 
managed to recover ten prefectures in the Huai and Hsiang 
regions, but by the time Hsiao-tsung became emperor, only the 
four prefectures of Hai, Ssu, T'ang and Teng remained in Sung 
hands. See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.5b.
2, See Shen Ch'i-wei7 , Sung-Chin chan-cheng shih-lueh
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these developments, and the territory mentioned above became an 
Important bone of contention between the two nations.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, following the
death of their leader Hai-ling, the Chin immediately withdrew their
forces to the north. Although fighting continued for a time, in
lst/1162 the Chin sent envoys to Sung territory to announce the
accession of their new emperor, Shih-tsung (r. 1161-1189), and the
Sung immediately responded by sending the Division Chief in the
Department of Ministries Hung Mai and the Administrator of
the Palace Postern (chih ko-men shih
receive them at the border and discuss mutually acceptable 
3
conditions for peace. After several months of negotiations at
Hsii-i (modern Hsii-i, on the southern banks of the Huai River),4
the Chin envoys were finally allowed to proceed to the Sung court
in 3rd/1162. Following their visit, Kao-tsung decided to send Hung
Mai and Chang Lun as envoys to Chin to congratulate the Chin
emperor on his accession. At the same time, they were to present
three requests to the Chin emperor, namely, the return of the
imperial coffin of Ch'in-tsung, the return of former Sung territory
5
in Ho-nan, and the abolition of vassal status and annual tribute.
It can thus be seen that the Sung were attempting to use 
their improved military position to achieve long-cherished political
3. CYYL, ch.196, p.3313.
4. For an account of the negotiations between Hung Mai and the 
Chin envoys, see YWL, ch.2, pp.4b-5a.
5. Ibid., p.5b.
f  > Chung Lun
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goals. They also considered themselves entitled to some form of
compensation for the enemy's violation of their peace agreement.
However, their requests proved to be too demanding for the Chin, who
6
insisted that the former treaty terms be observed. . The mission
thus failed to accomplish its aims and both Hung Mai and Chang Lun
7
were demoted after their return in 7th/1162. By then, Hsiao-tsung 
had been on the throne for over a month, and at the insistence of 
Second Privy Councillor Shih Hao s^ cf. , the emperor decided to
send the Drafting Official of the Secretariat, Liu K u n g / ^ | ^ ^  , and
.. *5the Administrator of the Palace Postern Chang Yueh tj it- &/J , as
8
envoys to Chin to formally announce his own accession. By 
accepting Shih Hao's advice, Hsiao-tsung indicated his desire for 
restoring peace. Before they would receive the Sung envoys, how­
ever, the Chin once again demanded the return of the territories 
which had recently fallen into Sung hands as well as the resumption 
of former protocol in official documents and annual payments. After
going through negotiations at the border, the Sung envoys were
9
refused entry to Chin territory and returned home.
6 . For the arguments between the Sung envoys and their Chin 
counterparts, see ibid, , pp.7b-9a,
7. Ibid., p.7b,
8. It is said that after their return from Chin, Hung Mai and 
Chang Lun told Chang ChGn that they had not been treated with 
proper respect by the enemy; thereupon Chang said that no 
more envoys should be sent. However, Shih Hao proposed that 
envoys be sent to announce the accession of Hsiao-tsung, and 
thus it was decided to send Liu Kung to Chin. See CYYL, ch.200, 
p.3394; HTC, ch.137, pp.3651-52.
9. YWL, ch.2, p.9b; CYYL, ch,200, p,3394.
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The initial attempts at peace negotiations thus failed
because of the Sung refusal to accede to Chin demands for the
restoration of former treaty terms. Although Hsiao-tsung was
initially hoping for a negotiated settlement, he was more aggresive
than his predecessor Kao-tsung, and one perhaps would not have
expected him to give in easily to the enemy. His determination to
hold on to his newly-recovered territories is illustrated by the
fact that one of his first acts as emperor was to summon the great
war advocate, Chang Chun, to court. Although Chang had been
appointed Governor of Chien-k'ang (p'an Chlen-k' ang txi
after the Chin invasion in the previous year, he had not been
further promoted by Kao-tsung. However, Hsiao-tsung expressed his
confidence in Chang Chun by honouring him with the prestigious
titles of Wei K u o - k u n g %  and Junior Tutor (shao-fu‘^ 7 * ) ,
and also by appointing him to be Pacification Commissioner of the
Chi ang-Huai region (Chiang-Huai hsuan-fu shih -yl* 7^
10
within the same month of his accession. Besides Chang, another 
well-known war advocate, Hu Ch'uan , who had suffered
persecution at the hands of Ch'in Kuei, was also summoned. 
Hsiao-tsung also indicated his own position at this time by 
granting posthumous honours to the greatest victim of Ch'in Kuei's
10. CYYL , ch.200, p.3391. For the imperial audience granted 
to Chang Chun in 6th/1162, see the hsing-chuan 
(biographical account of the deceased) of Chang Chun in Chu 
Hsi , Chu Wen—kung wen-chi #  jl'zZ (CWC) , SPTK
ed. , cfi\£5 , pt.2, p. 1696.
11. Biography of Hu Ch'uan, SS, ch.374, p.11583. See also Hu's 
tomb inscription (shen-tao p e i J ^ j £  7n% ) in WCC, ch.30, 
pp.l3b-14a. /' 1 aH/ y
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administration, Yueh Fei.12
Hsiao-tsung appears to have been very much impressed by
13
Chang Chun during their first interview. Seeing that the emperor 
was inclined towards the war advocates, Chang naturally seized the 
opportunity to encourage Hsiao-tsung to adopt a more aggressive 
foreign policy. Despite his personal inclinations, however, Hsiao- 
tsung proved cautious in his dealings with the Chin. In this he 
was at least to some extent influenced by Shih Hao, his former 
tutor who was promoted to be second privy councillor soon after 
Hsiao-tsung's accession. Shih became the chief opponent of Chang 
Chun in a number of subsequent controversies at court.
As might be expected, one of these clashes concerned the 
question of defence. Shih was in favour of fortifying Kua-chou and 
Ts'ai-shih along the Yang-tzu, but Chang opposed this on the
grounds that it would indicate weakness on the part of the Sung.
14
He proposed fortifying Ssu-chou further north. It should be 
noted that while the pacifists were on the whole in favour of 
consolidating the Sung position along the Yang-tzu, the irredentists 
were more ambitious and insisted on building up defences along the
12. Chou Pi-ta, Lung-fei lu in WCC, ch.164, p.5b;
CYYL ch.200, p.3392.
13. CWC, ch.95,pt.ii, p.1696; SSPM, ch.77, p.809.
j
14. For Chang Chun's memorial regarding the importance of defending 
Ssu-chou, see F.u Tsengr-hsiang/f comp., Sung-tai Shu-wen
I chi-ts'un Jfr (SWCT) (Hong Kong: Lung-men shu-
tien, 1971), ch.43, pp.6a-6b.
96
15Huai River. The question of whether to concentrate Sung defence 
in the Yang-tzu or Huai regions was to become a matter of intense 
debate in the next few years of war against the Chin.
Soon after becoming emperor, Hsiao-tsung was confronted
with two other issues relating to foreign relations. In 9th/1162,
in response to Chin demands for peace, Hsiao-tsung issued a decree
calling upon the officials to discuss two urgent matters. First,
they were to discuss whether to agree to Chin demands for the
restoration of the former treaty terms or to refuse them and keep
fighting. Second, they were to discuss the problem of the refugees
(kuei-cheng jen ) who kept fleeing into Sung territory
from the north. These refugees had placed Sung in something of a
dilemma, for by accepting them, the country would be faced with a
heavy financial burden in order to support them; by refusing them,
however, it was felt that the Sung state would lose the loyalty
16of the people of the Central Plain. In the ensuing discussion 
at court, most officials were against giving up the four prefectures 
of Hai, Ssu, T'ang and Teng which were being demanded by the Chin.
17
Most also appear to have been in favour of accepting the refugees.
15. For example, the censorial official Wang Shih-p'eng was a 
supporter of Chang Chiin in his policy of defending the Huai 
region. He said: "... to defend the Huai is to defend the 
Yang-tzu. If we abandon the Huai and defend only the Yang- 
tzu, we will be sharing the natural defences of the Yang-tzu 
with the enemy, how are we going to keep it in our hands!" 
See MCC, "tsou-i", ch.2, p.14a.
16. CYTC, Vol.1, ch.20, p.6a.
17. For the views of the various officials on the two issues, 
see ibid., p.6b .
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The councillors were the only ones who did not give their opinions 
voluntarily. When questioned by the emperor, Shih Hao replied:
... to first prepare ourselves for defence is the 
best strategy. Whether to have war or peace does 
not depend on us but on the enemy.... We should 
fortify the walls to defend against the enemy 
onslaught and await for an opportune time to carry 
out a campaign of reconquest....
Shih went on to accuse his opponents of advocating irresponsible 
aggressive action, saying that much misery would be caused if their
With regard to the question of refugees, Shih Hao also held
a different view from most of the other officials at court. Since 
the renewal of Sung-Chin hostilities in 1161, a great number of 
refugees had crossed into Sung territory from the north. The 
policy so far had been rather lenient towards them and they had 
been well-treated by Sung authorities. Apart from humanitarian 
reasons, it had been argued that the acceptance of these refugees 
would ensure the loyalty of the former Sung citizens in enemy 
territory. For example, Chang Chun once pointed out strongly why 
the refugees should not be refused:
Once the order (of not taking in refugees) is 
passed, the people in the Central Plain will 
think that we Intend to reject them and 
consequently we will lose their loyalty to our 
country.... Once they change their loyalty, 
they will become our e n e m y . . . . 20
(MFML/ , onur cu. , ui.o , p .xu.
19. Ibid., ch.8 , p.2a.
20. See Chang Chun's memorial on "Six reasons why the refugees 
should not be refused," in SWCT, ch.43, p.5b.
policies were implemented.
19
18. Shih
i
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In the same memorial Chang also claimed that the best soldiers were 
usually refugees from the north. Indeed, it was his policy to
Shih Hao, on the other hand, regarded the refugees with
great suspicion and was against taking them in because of the 
expense they would entail for the local population. As he said in 
one of his memorials on the subject:
Since war broke out last winter, the loyalist 
officials who returned as refugees came to more 
than five hundred in number, and they have all 
been rewarded with important positions by the 
government.... Also there are numerous loyalist 
commoners among the refugees who drain the fat 
and blood (that is, the resources) of our people 
.... I am afraid that in a few years' time, our 
country's reserves will be g o n e . . . . 22
In another memorial he questioned the refugees' loyalty:
When the northerners first arrive with their old 
and young, they appear to be very grateful to be 
united with their fellow countrymen.... But these 
people often turn out to be of mean character. If 
the rewards and payments fail to satisfy them, 
they will feel discontented and it is not unlikely 
that they might secretly report our country's 
affairs to the enemy. Furthermore there are those
21. In 5th/1162, when he was governor of Chien-k'ang, Chang Chun 
had memorialised for the recruitment of the loyalist soldiers 
in Huai-pei to fight the enemy. His request was 
approved and many were recruited. See CYYL, ch.119, p.3376.
22. See Shih Hao's memorial on "A discussion on refugees," in 
MFML, ch.7, pp.8b-lla; the quotation is taken from p.9a.
recruit the so-called "loyalist soldiers" into the
21
army.
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among them whose original intention of coming to 
our country is to act as s p i e s . . . . 23
Shih also argued that since the Sung were not ready to launch any
successful offensive against the Jurchen, it was therefore
unrealistic to recruit the refugees as a means of ensuring the
24
loyalty of the people of the Central Plain. Nevertheless, the 
war advocates were of the opinion that the reconquest of the lost 
territory was imminent and that it was essential to get the co­
operation of the loyalists in the Central Plain. Consequently, 
the policy concerning the refugees varied quite widely from time 
to time during these early years of Hsiao-tsung's reign. Vhen an 
offensive foreign policy was pursued, the refugees were recruited 
in large numbers by the authorities. However, when the government 
was in favour of peace negotiations, orders would be sent out to 
the officials at the borders not to take in any more refugees.
During the first few months of his reign Hsiao-tsung 
appears to have been as yet undecided about his foreign policy.
He was not prone to be rash and rarely accepted the advice of his 
officials uncritically. While putting his trust on Chang Chlin to 
prepare for military action, he did not regard the counsel of Shih 
Hao lightly. It was due to Shih’s ideas that in 12th/1162, Hsiao- 
tsung ordered Wu Lin to withdraw from the military prefecture of 
Te-shun/^]^f (,(i^(east of modern Ching-ning^^ in Kan-su^ ’^ j  ),
23. See Shih Hao's memorial on "A second discussion on refugees," 
in ibid., ch.7, pp.lla-13a; the quotation is taken from 
p .12a.
24. Ibid., ch.7, p.lib.
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which Wu had been trying to prevent from falling into enemy hands. 
The caution advocated by Shih Hao was clearly reflected in the 
personally written decree which Hsiao-tsung sent to Wu Lin on this 
occasion:
If we defend Te-shun with all our might, the 
enemy might flee ... but our soldiers will be 
exhausted or dead in the remote region and this 
will not serve the purpose of reconquest....26
modern T*ien-shui 'fj hsien in Kan-su) and Lung-chou
He thus ordered Wu to return to Chfin-chou (south-west of
(Lung-hsien ln Shensi) so as to concentrate the war
efforts in areas closer to the Sung borders. It is said that Wu 
was much disheartened on receiving these orders, but knowing that 
the court was in favour of peace, he obeyed and withdrew his forces 
As a result, the newly-recovered territory in the north-west
27
consisting of thirteen prefectures again fell into Chin hands.
Meanwhile, the Chin began to show signs of impatience at 
the continued refusal of the Sung to observe the terms of the 
former treaty. It should be pointed out that in the first year of 
his reign, Chin Shih-tsung had been troubled by uprisings in
25. See the tomb inscription for Shih Hao in Lou Yueh/F%r t 
Kung-k*uei chi - f r f e (KKC) » SPTK ed. , ch.93, p. 877.
In his impeachment of Shih Hao in 5th/1163, Wang Shih-p'eng 
accused Shih of instigating his faction to spread rumours 
about a combined attack by the Jurchen and the Hsi-hsia 
against Wu Lin, thereby forcing Wu to withdraw from Te-shun. 
See MCC, 'tsou-i", ch.3, p.3b and p.6a.
26. The decree of Hsiao-tsung to Wu Lin is preserved in MFML, 
ch.6 , pp.l5b-16a.
27. HTC, ch.138, p.3660.
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28
various parts of his territory. However, by 9th/1162, having 
consolidated his own power and suppressed the rebels, the Chin 
emperor now turned his attention to Sung. During the next few
months two generals named Ho-shih-lieh Chin-ning
and Pu-san Chung-i were ordered to prepare for a
29
southern expedition against the Sung. By the end of 1162, the
Chin had stationed 100,000 men in Ho-nan in preparation for an
30
attack on the Liang-Huai region. Chang Chun then strengthened 
Sung defences there by stationing troops in Hsii-i, Ssu-chou, Hao- 
chou (north-east of Feng-yang2^J(^ in An-hui) and Lu-chou
1% (Ho-fei in An-hui). Seeing that the Sung were well
prepared, the Chin did not attack but sent a letter to demand the
£
prefectures of Hai, Ssu, T*ang, Teng and Shang |<aQ (modern Shang—
31
hsien in Shensi) and annual payments from Sung. In other words, 
the Chin were still insisting that the terms of the former treaty 
be observed. At the advice of Chang Chun, the Sung paid no 
attention to this letter and nothing immediately came of the Chin 
th re at.
In lst/1163, Shih Hao was promoted to be Right Chief 
Counciliar while Chang Ch(m was appointed Commissioner of Military 
Affairs and General Superintendent of the Chiang-Huai Army (tu-tu
28. YWL, ch.2, p.9a.
29. The official biographies of Ho-shih-lleh chih-ning and Pu-san 
Chung-i are found in CS, ch.87, pp.1929-41.
30. CYYL, ch.200, p.3409.
31. Ibid.
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Chi ang-Huai chlin-ma ><32 Their simultaneous
appointments to these important positions must have been designed 
by Hsiao-tsung in order to maintain a balance between war and peace 
advocates during this time of indecision. Although the two chief 
councillors, Ch'en K'ang-po and Shih Hao, were both opposed to war, 
however, the court began to be dominated by a group of militants who 
were ardent supporters of Chang Chun. They included such famous 
officials as Hu Ch'uan, Wang Shih-p'eng and Wang Ta-pao
In his advocacy of an offensive foreign policy in late 1162,
Chang Chun put forward the proposal that the Sung should first
recover the territory in Shan-tung(J,} , and argued that warships
should be sent there in order to reduce the military pressure on Wu
33
Lin in the north-west. His proposals were opposed by Shih Hao who 
argued that by sending forces to Shan-tung, the Sung were weakening 
the defence of the Chiang-Huai area and exposing it to enemy 
attacks:
If we have the idea of invading Shan-tung in 
order to relieve the pressure in the Ssu-ch'uan 
and Shensi region, would not the enemy have a 
similar idea of attacking the Liang-Huai and 
the Ching-Hsiang^jHL regions in order to relieve 
the emergency in Shan-tung? Our strategy is to 
fortify the defence of the Chiang-Huai region ... 
to control the strategic locations and not to 
move away from there....^4
32. WCC, ch.164, p.13a.
33. For Chang Chun's memorials on attacking Shan-tung, see SWCT, 
ch.44, pp.l4b-17a.
34. See MFML, ch.7, pp.4a-7b, and in particular, p.4b.
103
Hsiao-tsung was apparently convinced by these arguments and Chang 
Chun's plans were not approved.
Shih Hao's influence upon Hsiao-tsung is also shown by the
emperor's decision to adopt Shih's proposal concerning the method of
gathering support in the Central Plain. Instead of recruiting the
loyalists into the Sung army, Shih proposed giving official
recognition to these loyalists by granting the status of "fiefs" to
the areas and prefectures occupied by them in enemy territory. His
plan was adopted in 2nd/1163, when a scholar without rank (pu-i
), Li Hsin-fu (who had earlier memorialised about
the advantages of recruiting loyalists), was sent as Proclamation
Commissioner (hsiian-yu shih to meet the loyalists in the
35
Central Plain. He carried with him a message from the emperor
informing those loyalists who were occupying various territories
that they were permitted to make their possessions into hereditary 
36
fiefs. This was a way of consolidating the areas in the hands of 
Sung loyalists without incurring any expense on the part of the 
government.
While this was taking place, the Chin began to step up 
their pressure upon the Sung. In 3rd/1163, the assistant commander 
of the Chin army, Ho-shih-lieh chih-ning, sent a letter to Chang 
Chun demanding the return of the territories which had fallen into 
Sung hands since 1161. He further insisted that the former borders
35. CYTC, Vol.1, ch.20, p.7b; HTC, ch.138, p.3660.
36. For the imperial proclamation to the loyalists of the Central 
Plain, see MFML, ch.6, pp.l9a-21a.
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and all the terms of the former treaty be observed. If these
37
demands were not met, he threatened, war would ensue. Chang
refused to submit to this pressure and replied that it was common
for territory on the frontiers to change hands from time to time,
just as it was common for the army to experience victories and 
38
defeat in battles.
Throughout these diplomatic exchanges, the Chin were
stationing their troops in Hung-hsien (modern Ssu-hsien
• in northern An-hui) and L i n g - p i ( m o d e r n  Ling-pi in 
39
northern An-hui). Chang Chun, who felt that the Sung forces were 
ready for war, decided that it was time for them to begin an offen­
sive against the enemy. Two generals under Chains command, Li
Hsien-chung and Shao Hung-yuan ^ h a d  earlier proposed
40
attacking Hung-hsien and Ling-pi, and Chang agreed. Others
opposed the plan, however, including the general Ch'en Min
41
who argued against fighting during the heat of summer. The 
Military Consultants (tstan-tsan chun-shih ^  ^  ) T'ang Wen-
and Ch'en Chun-ch'ing^j^/y^£^|2j?also proposed delaying
42action.
37. HTC, ch.138, pp.3661-62.
38. For Chang Chun's letter to the Chin commander, see SWCT, ch.41, 
p.15a.
39. SSPM, ch.77, p.810.
40. CYTC, Vol.1, ch.20, p.7b; HTC, ch.138, p.3665.
41. For Chlen Min's arguments against the Sung offensive, see Chou 
Mi (£] 'jg , Ch'i-tung y e h - y u ^  (CTYY) (Chin-tai pi-
shu ed* > * ch.2, pp.10a-10b.
42. See CYTC, Vol. 1, ch.20, p. 7b and CTYY, ch.2, p.11a.
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The Abortive Campaign of 1163 and its Aftermath
In 4th/1163, Chang Chun was summoned to court and there he
put forward his proposal for a northern campaign against the Chin.
Seeing that the emperor was interested in restoration, Chang Chun
tried to persuade him to move to Chien-k'ang in order to speed up
the war efforts. Hsiao-tsung was still hesitant and asked Shih Hao
for his opinion. Shih opposed the proposal on the grounds that this
would put the enemy on the alert and at the same time incur heavy
43
expenses for the Sung. Thereupon, Hsiao-tsung decided against
leaving for Chien-k'ang. Chang Chun was naturally disappointed and
told the emperor that he should think in terms of achieving
immediate success rather than losing an opportunity for the sake of
short-term security. After the court session, Shih Hao is said to
have told Chang Chun, "The emperor's army should be used with great
44
caution. How can we use it to try our luck?"
This event was followed by a debate between the two in which 
Chang was of the opinion that if the Central Plain was not recovered 
then, it would fall into the hands of the "heroic fighters" (hao-
who took up -arms against the enemy). Shih replied that there were 
no such heroes there, otherwise they would already have risen up 
against the Chin. Chang then said that the heroes were unable to 
fight without proper arms and were waiting for the assistance of 
the Sung army. To this Shih replied that if they had to wait for
chieh military strongmen and loyalists
43. KKC, ch.93, p.877; CTYY. ch.2, p.lib.
44. KKC, ch.93, p.877.
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Sung assistance, they were no heroes; if indeed there were such 
heroes, the fact that they were unable to organise an uprising 
showed that they were under the control of the Chin, and that meant
41
the Sung should not attack the enemy without careful consideration.
Shih Hao further tried to dissuade Hsiao-tsung against the 
northern campaign by submitting a memorial in which he said that 
he fully understood the desire of the emperor to avenge the wrong 
done by the enemy, but that they had to face the reality the Sung 
were simply not prepared for such a campaign. He went on to point 
out that it was not that Kao-tsung had not wanted to fight the 
enemy, but that it was impossible to mount a successful counter­
attack then; and it was even more difficult now:
At that time, the generals Chang Chun, Han Shih- 
chung, Liu Kuang-shlh and Yueh Fei each commanded 
several hundred thousands of soldiers who were 
all courageous men from the northwest. They fought 
the enemy for fifteen to sixteen years, yet they 
were unable to recover a single inch of territory!
Now, would it not be difficult for reckless and 
inexperienced generals such as Li Hsien-chung and 
Shao Hung-yuan to achieve victory!4®
He then proposed building up the defences of the country and perhaps 
attempting a campaign against the Chin in another ten years' time.
Shih Hao thus constantly stressed the theme of consolidation 
rather than expansion. On this occasion, however, his advice was 
not adopted. Chang Chun is said to have told the emperor that Shih 
was too stubborn and that the golden opportunity might be lost. He
45. For the debate between Chang Ch(m and Shih Hao, see KKC, ch.93, 
pp.877-78 and CTYY, ch.2, pp.l2a-12b.
46. For Shih Hao's memorial against the northern campaign, see 
MFML, ch.7, pp.13b-14b.
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also stressed that the Jurchen would definitely attack in the coming
autumn and that the Sung should surprise them with an offensive 
47
before they did. Despite his father's warnings that he should
«« 48
not listen to Chang Chun, Hsiao-tsung finally decided in favour
of the northern expedition. Because this was opposed by both chief
49
councillors Shih Hao and Ch'en K'ang-po, Hsiao-tsung decided to
proceed without going through the proper channels of the Three
Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs. Secret orders were
issued for Chang Chun to supervise the formation of Sung troops in
the Huai valley in preparation for a northern offensive. The
campaign was launched in late 4th/1163 when Chang Chtin ordered Li
Hsien-chung to leave Hao-chou for Ling-pi, and Shao Huang-yiian to
50
leave Ssu-chou for Hung-hsien.
This was the first occasion since the beginning of Sung-
Chin hostilities nearly two years earlier that the Sung had mounted
an offensive campaign, and they had considerable initial success.
51
On 7/5th/1163, Li Hsien-chung captured Ling-pi while on the
47. SSPM, ch.77, p.811. For one of Chang Chun's memorials in 
favour of an offensive campaign, see SWCT, ch.41, pp.l6b-17a.
48. It is said that when Kao-tsung heard of the intended campaign, 
he asked Hsiao-tsung not to listen to Chang Chun, and said 
that Chang would bring more harm than good to the country.
See CTYY. ch.2, p.14a.
49. Most sources emphasize that Shih Hao was opposed to the northern 
expedition,/but it should be pointed out that the Left Chief 
Councillor Ch'en K'ang-po was also not in favour of the 
campaign, as stated in CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.8a.
50. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1699; SSPM, ch.77, p.811.
51. YWL, ch.2, p.11a.
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following day, Shao Huang-yuan recovered Hung-hsien with Li's 
52
assistance. By the middle of 5th/1163, these two commanders had
>*
also succeeded in dislodging Chin forces from Su-chou (modern
Su-hsien'/^j north of the Huai River in northern An-hui).
Hsiao-tsung was overjoyed when he heard about these
victories and wrote to Chang Chun saying that the news had led to
53
much rejoicing at court and elsewhere. In the meantime, however,
Shih Hao had indignantly submitted his resignation in protest
against the emperor's decision to carry out the campaign without
his knowledge. He also told Hsiao-tsung that he could not
compromise with Ch'en K'ang-po’s policy of recruiting the refugees
(while advocating the adoption of a cautious foreign policy, Ch'en
was nevertheless in favour of accepting refugees), or Chang Chun's
54
offensive foreign policy. The General Censor Wang Shih-p'eng
then impeached Shih, accusing him of following in Ch'in Kuei's
footsteps by pursuing a peace policy and by abandoning the recovered
55
territory of Te-shun, among other "crimes*1. Despite his high 
regard for Shih, Hsiao-tsung decided to accept his resignation, 
since the former's uncompromising attitude would be an obstruction 
rather than a help to the implementation of an offensive foreign
52. Li Hsien-chung is said to have sent the surrendered troops 
from Ling-pi to speak to the Chin generals in Hung-hsien, 
and succeeded in persuading them to surrender. See HTC, 
ch.138, p.3666; biography of Li Hsien-chung, SS, ch.367, 
p.11431.
53. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1699; HTC, ch.138, p.3667.
54. KKC, ch.93, pp.878-79.
55. For Wang Shih-p'eng impeachment of Shih Hao, see MCC, "tsou-i",
ch.3, pp.2b-5b.
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policy, which, at the moment, appeared to be a successful one.
The triumph of the hawkish elements at court was short­
lived, however. After their early success, the Sung forces
experienced a disastrous defeat in Su-chou before the end of 5th/
1163. Among the factors which contributed to this defeat were a
56
rapid counter-attack by the Chin, and the jealousy and lack of
co-operation between the Sung generals Li Hsien-chung and Shao
Hung-yuan. Difficulties between the two men began when Li executed
57
one of Shao's men for robbing a Chin soldier of his sword. Shao
was even more displeased when an order from Chang Chun placed him
58
under Li's command. Although a second order arrived the next
day giving equal power to both men, Shao was still bitter and is
said to have refused to give Li any assistance in fighting the 
59
enemy. The problems between the two commanders naturally affected
the morale of the troops, who were already unhappy with the small
60
rewards they had received after recovering Su-chou.
56. It is said that after their defeat at Su-chou, the Chin sent a 
selected army of 100,000 men to fight the Sung forces at Su- 
chou; also, a cavalry of 100,000 men was dispatched from K'ai- 
feng for the counter-attack. YWL, ch.2, p.12a; HTC, ch.138,
p.3668.
57. Biography of Li Hsien-chung, SS, ch.367, p.11431.
58. YWL, ch.2, p.12a.
59. HTC, ch.138, p.3668; biography of Li Hsien-chung, SS, ch.367, 
p.11432.
60. Li Hsien-chung was to be blamed for this, for instead of 
rewarding the soldiers richly as Shao Hung-yuan had suggested,
Li only gave each of them a little cash, and is said to have 
collected all the valuables in the Su-chou treasury for himself. 
See CTYY, ch.2, p.15b. The dissatisfaction of the Sung troops 
was regarded as the chief cause for Sung defeat. See the tomb 
inscription for Chou K ’uei in WCC, ch.63, p.9b.
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Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that
the demoralised officers under Li's and Shao's command fled with
their troops at the approach of the Chin reinforcements on 22/5th/
1163. Li was able to withstand the enemy assault for a while, but
61
since he was unable to get Shao's co-operation, he eventually had
no choice but to flee as well. Consequently, the Chin forces under
Ho-shih-lieh Chih-ning succeeded in recapturing Su-chou, and sent
an army after the retreating Sung troops. The Sung forces were
caught at nearby Fu-li and suffered heavy losses; many
soldiers were killed and others drowned in the river while attempting 
62
to escape. The Chin were thus able to score a decisive victory
after earlier losses, which were very minor compared with the cues
63
suffered by the Sung at Fu-li.
The news of the Sung defeat must have been a shock and
humiliation for both Chang Chun and the emperor. Chang was at Hsu-i 
when Li Hsien-chung came to see him and handed in his official seal. 
Chang then crossed to the northern side of the Huai River, and 
after inspecting the defeated troops at Ssu-chou, withdrew to
61. Shao Hung-yuan was in favour of withdrawal on grounds that the 
Sung forces would not be able to fight the Chin troops, who had 
been reinforced with 200,000 men. See HTC, ch.138, p.3669.
62. Ibid. An account of the Sung defeat is also given in CTYY, 
ch.2 , pp.16a-16b.
63. While the Chin lost a few generals and several hundred men who 
surrendered to Sung after the fall of Ling-pi and Hung-hsien 
(see CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.301), the Sung loss was much 
greater. According to CTYY, ch.2, p.16b, the Sung troops
numbered 130,000 and many were killed during their withdrawal. 
According to HTC, ch.138, p.3669, during the disaster at Fu- 
li, besides the countless number of soldiers who were drowned, 
the Chin decapitated over 4,000 men and obtained 30,000 sets 
of armour.
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Yang-chou, where he wrote a self-impeaching memorial to the throne.
Chang was so discouraged by the Sung defeat that in 6th/1163, he
submitted his resignation and even requested that peace negotiations
65
be carried out with the Chin. It is said that Hsiao-tsung was
furious and remarked: "What do you mean by suing for peace just 
66
after our defeat!" Despite his disappointment and anger over 
the abortive campaign, however, the emperor did not immediately 
demote Chang, even though many officials were blaming the latter 
for the Sung defeat. Instead Hsiao-tsung told Chang:
The responsibility of the border is still entrusted 
to you. You must not waver because of what others 
say. At the beginning of the campaign I gave you 
the responsibility, and now I will support you to
the e n d . 67
With the reassurance from the emperor, Chang carried out 
various defence measures in the Liang-Huai region, assigning Wei 
Shen to defend Hai-chou, Ch'en Min to defend Ssu-chou, Ch'i Fang 
j ^  to defend Hao-chou and Kuo Chen defend Liu-ho ^
(modern Liu-ho hsien in Chiang-su). He also fortified the walls at
64. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1699.
65. It is said that after the Sung defeat, Chang Chun heard rumours 
that the Jurchen were on their way to invade Sung and thus 
requested that envoys be sent to negotiate for peace. See 
CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.8b. According to Chou Mi, Chang Chun 
contemplated sending the Prefectural Vicq^Admipistrator of 
T'ai-p'ing (T'ai-p'ing chou t * ung-p1 an ),
Chang Wen-ku , as envoy to Chin tx> negotiate for
peace, but was dissuaded by his subordinates. He then 
resigned but again requested sending envoys to negotiate for 
peace. See CTYY, ch.2, p.16b.
66. CTYY, ch.2, p.16b.
67. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1699.
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Kao-yuj2^^^ (modern Kao-yu in Chiang-su) and Ch ' ao-hsien
(modern An-ch' ing in An-hui), and repaired the walls at Ch'u-
chou (modern Ch'u-hsien in An-hui). Finally, he assembled
the navy at Huai-yin?^ (modern Huai-yin hsien in Chiang-su)
and the cavalry at Shou-ch'un (modern Shou-hsien in An-
68
Hui). By fortifying Sung defence in the Huai region and by 
sending his generals to guard Hai-chou and Ssu-chou and other 
locations, it is clear that Chang had not given up his intention 
of pursuing an offensive foreign policy despite his temporary loss 
of confidence following the Sung defeat at Fu-li,
Nevertheless, even though he put a brave face on the matter,
the abortive attempt to recover lost territory somewhat discouraged
Hsiao-tsung, and his subsequent actions showed that he was
beginning to waver in his determination to fight the enemy. Indeed,
he soon appeared to have been anxious to enter into peace
69
negotiations with the Jurchen. Soon after the defeat at Fu-li 
in 6th/1163, the emperor appointed T'ang Ssu-t'ui, a well-known 
peace advocate who had served as chief councillor during Kao-
tsung’ s reign, to the position of Reader-In-Waiting (shlh-tu 
/l<j'|j,jjf ) . ^  A few days later, he issued a self-critical edict
on the campaign. An Investigating Censor, Yin Se who was closely 
associated with T'ang Ssu-t'ui, then impeached Chang Chun. As a 
result, Chang was demoted from his post as General Superintendent
68- Ibld*
69. HTC, ch.138, p.3670.
70. Ibid.
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71
to that of Pacification Commissioner of the Chiang-Huai region.
The demotion of Chang Chun immediately led to protests
from the more aggressive elements at court. The General Censor
Wang Shih-p'eng had earlier spoken in defence of the abortive
campaign and requested the emperor not to waver because of dis-
72
senting opinions over the Sung defeat. Now, in another memorial, 
he again spoke in defence of Chang Chun and the campaign:
I was partly responsible for advising Your 
Majesty to employ Chang Chun despite the 
opposition of others.... Chang then sent the 
two generals to recover Ling-pi, Hung-hsien 
and Su-chou, achieving three victories within 
a month, and everyone was impressed.... How­
ever, dissent immediately arose again once 
the Sung troops were defeated.... As I told 
Your Majesty formerly, the northern campaign 
was launched for the sake of the imperial 
tombs, to avenge the two emperors, Hui-tsung 
and Gh'in-tsung, and to avenge the people of 
the Central Plain. It is by no means comparable 
to irresponsible campaigns motivated by the 
desire for fame....73
Wang then submitted his resignation saying that since Chang Chun 
was demoted, he himself could no longer stay on as a censorial 
official. Hsiao-tsung then appointed him Vice-Minister of 
Personnel but eventually assigned him to be Administrator of Jao- 
chou/^2,-/'Hafter Wang persistently declined to serve at court.
71. Ibid.
72. For Wang Shih-p'eng's memorial on the defeat at Su-chou, 
see MCC, "tsou-i", ch.2, pp.l3b-14a.
73. For the memorial of Wang Shih-p'eng, see ibid.,ch.4, pp.6b-7b.
74. See biography of Wang Shih-p'eng, SS^ , ch,387, p. 11886,
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Following Wang's departure, the Second Privy Councillor
Hsin Tz'u-ying resigned on the grounds of illness. The
real reason for his resignation, however, was his friendship with
75
Wang and his opposition to T'ang Ssu-t'ui. Despite Hsin's
warning that T'ang would not be able to live up to the emperor's
expectations, Hsiao-tsung had made up his mind and T'ang was
subsequently made Right Chief Councillor in 7th/1163. The Right
Policy Critic Adviser Wang Ta-pao then criticized T'ang for his
peace policies in general and his proposal to abolish the office
of General Superintendent (tu-fu ), formerly headed by
Chang Chun, in particular. In order to prevent Wang from making
further criticism, Hsiao-tsung promoted him to the position of
Vice-Minister of War, but he eventually left the court with a
76
sinecure after having declined his new appointment.
From the dismissal of censorial officials such as Wang 
Ta-pao and Wang Shih-p'eng, it appears that Hsiao-tsung decided 
to prevent them from criticizing his policy. However, instead 
of suppressing their opinion entirely, he subtly reduced their 
influence by transferring them to other positions. Nevertheless, 
the fact that both Wangs declined their new appointments shows 
that they fully understood the ramifications of Hsiao-tsung1s 
actions. Besides these two men, there were many other censorial
75. Hsin Tz'u-ying had formerly recommended Wang Shih-p'eng 
and memorialized against T'ang Ssu-t'ui. See biography 
of Hsin Tz'u-ying, S£5, ch,383, p,11804,
76. Biography of Wang Ta-pao, SS, ch,386, p,11857; CYTC, 
Vol.l, ch,5, p.7a.
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officials who resigned and left because of their opposition to
T'ang Ssu-t'ai, thus leaving a vacuum in the Censorate which Hsiao-
77
tsung did not attempt to fill. When he was approached by the
1*11Minister of Works Chang Shan^^J sq concerning the appointment of 
more censorial officials, the emperor avoided the issue by saying 
that as most scholar-officials were fond of making a name of them­
selves by appearing to be upright, it was difficult to select
78
censorial officials. It was after much persuasion by Chang Shan
and the Chancellery Imperial Recorder (ch'i-chu lang )
Hu Ch'lian that Hsiao-tsung agreed to look into the matter though
79
he kept insisting that he was not against upright criticism.
From the above, it appears that the Censorate had been dominated 
by the war advocates at the beginning of Hsiao-tsung's reign, and 
their dismissal clearly indicates the change in government policy 
from an offensive one to one which was in favour of peace.
However, in spite of the ascendancy of the pacifists in
court after the abortive campaign, their victory was not total. In
8th/1163 Hsiao-tsung reinstated Chang Chun as General Superinten-
80
dent of the Chiang-Huai Army. While anxious to achieve peace,
77. CYTC, Vol.1, ch.5, p.7a.
78. See the tomb inscription for Chang Shan, WCC, ch.61, pp.7a-7b; 
CYTC, Vol.1, ch.6 , p.7a.
79. WCC, ch.61, pp.7a-7b; CYTC, Vol.l, ch.5, p.7a.
80. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1700. Chang’s reinstatement came after 
the Vice-Minister of Rites, Ch'en Chun-ch'ing, had 
memorialised that it was not right to strip Chang Chun of 
his power as General Superintendent and yet keep him at 
Yang-chou, which was a precarious place. See hsing-chuan 
of Ch'en Chun-ch'ing in CWC, ch.96, p.1712; SSPM, ch.77, 
p . 814.
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the emperor was nevertheless determined that the Sung should strike 
a good bargain in the negotiations with the Jurchen. If those 
negotiations failed, he would still be able to rely on Chang Chun 
to carry on the war.
Peace Negotiations and the Treaty of 1164-1165
Soon after Chang's reinstatement, the Chin commander,
Ho-Shih-lieh Chih-ning, once again sent a letter to the Sung
government demanding the return of the four prefectures of Hai,
Ssu, T'ang and Teng, a resumption of annual payments, the
submission of the Sung as a vassal state to the Chin, and the
return of refugees who had fled from the Central Plain. He
threatened war if these conditions were not met. Hsiao-tsung
showed the letter to Chang Chun, who remarked: "The Chin will
attack when they are strong, and stop when they are weak. It
81
does not make any difference whether there is peace or not!"
However, the general opinion of the court was in favour of pursuing
the negotiations with the Chin, and when T'ang Ssu-t'ui proposed
sending envoys there, he was supported by the other councillors,
namely, Ch'en K'ang-po, Chou K'uei, and Hung Tsun, who believed
that peace would enable the Sung state to put its own house in
82
order before undertaking any further military action. The Vice- 
Minister of Works, Chang Shan, appears to have been the only 
official at court who opposed the peace policy. Hsiao-tsung is
81. See biography of Chang Chun, SS, ch.361, p.11309; CWC, 
ch.95, pt.ii, p.1700.
82. SSPM, ch.77, p.814.
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said to have told Chang that although he agreed with his views, he
83
thought it wise to play along with the enemy for the time being.
It subsequently was decided to send the Officer-In-Charge
commanders. Lu carried with him a letter from the Sung government
replying to the Chin demands which stated that the four prefectures
in question had been recovered by the Sung after hostilities had
broken out in 1161 (implying that the Sung had the right to keep
them). With regard to the question of the annual payments, the
letter held that although the Sung did not mind paying, they might
not be able to meet the sum required since the Liang-Huai region
84
was still recovering from the devastation of war. The Sung thus
were still unwilling to give in completely to the Chin demands.
Indeed, before Lu Chung-hsien left on his mission in 9th/1163,
Hsiao-tsung warned him not to give way on the issue of the four
prefectures, although T'ang Ssu-t'ui and other pro-peace ministers
85
apparently advised him to the contrary. In one last attempt to 
stop the peace negotiations, Chang Chun memorialised to the effect 
that Lu Chung-hsien was untrustworthy and should not be sent, but 
his advice was disregarded. Instead, probably in an attempt to 
influence Chang Chun to change his hard-line attitude, Hsiao-tsung
83. Biography of Chang Shan, SS, ch.381, p.11747; WCC, ch.61, 
p. 7b.
84. CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.9a.
of Public Affairs in Huai-hsi (Huai-hsi kan-pan Kung-shih
), Lu Chung-hsien/^ A ^ , to see the Chin
85. CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.9a; CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1701.
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took Ch'ang's son, Chang S h i h ^ ^ ' T ? ^  to see Kao-tsung in the 
Te-shou palace. After inquiring about his father's attitude 
concerning the peace negotiations, the retired emperor told Chang 
Shih:
Please tell your father that in carrying out 
any national campaign nowadays, one must take 
into consideration the strength of the people 
and that of the nation.... I have heard that 
the Khitans are fighting the Jurchen; if the 
Khitans are successful, we would be able to 
reap our profits without any effort. However, 
if the Chin are not faced with internal up­
rising, we should keep our own state in order
and bide our time.86
At this time Hsiao-tsung appears to have been influenced
by the pacifist attitude of his father. However, this does not
mean that he was willing to completely bow to Chin demands. In
10th/1163 while Lu Chung-hsien was away, the emperor called upon
the officials in court to discuss the four issues raised by the
Chin. While different views were held by the officials, Hsiao-
tsung said that he might consider giving way concerning the four
prefectures and the annual payments, but he definitely would not
87
acknowledge Chin overlordship nor return the refugees. This 
was to remain as his attitude throughout the negotiations.
Meanwhile, Lu Chung-hsien met the Chin commanders at Su- 
chou. It is said that he had been so frightened by Pu-san Chung-i 
that instead of representing the Sung cause, he agreed to present
the Chin demands to the Sung court. Therefore, on his return in
86. HTC, ch,138, p.3674,
87. SSPM, ch.77, p.815.
11th/1163, Lu reported on the four conditions of peace laid down
by the Chin, firstly, to adopt the pseudofamily relation of
younger uncle and nephew (shu-chih ) instead of the former
lord-vassal relation; secondly, to return the four prefectures
of Hai, Ssu, T'ang and Teng; thirdly, to pay the same amount of
silver and silk in the annual payments as before; and finally,
88
to return the fugitive rebels and captives to Chin. There were
different reactions to Lu Chung-hsien's report. The councillors
were happy with the fact that the Chin no longer Insisted on the
recognition of their overlordship, while Hsiao-tsung was still
89
reluctant to alienate the prefectures of Hai and Ssu. The chief
councillor, T'ang Ssu-t'ui, requested that another mission under
the Vice-Minister of Finance, Wang Chin-wan 2- ^  » and the
Administrator of the Palace Postern, Lung T u - y u a n , be
sent to inform the Chin that the Sung agreed to give up the four
prefectures, but requested the annual payments be reduced by 
90
half. T'ang's proposal was opposed by the General Censor, Chou 
T s ' a o ^ ^ f L ,  and the Right Policy Monitor, Ch'en Liang-han
» who were against alienating the four prefectures; 
they suggested that the annual payments should not be given until 
the territory of the imperial tombs in Ho-nan was returned to 
Sung, and finally, they proposed that instead of sending Wang
88. CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.9a.
89. Ibid.
90. HTC, ch.138, p.3676; tomb inscription for Ch'en Liang-han, 
WCC, ch.66, p.3a.
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Chih-wan, a minor envoy should first be sent to negotiate with
1L ^ . 91
the Chin,
Hsiao-tsung's disappointment with Lu Chung-hsien's mission
was shown by the fact that he had Lu imprisoned and demoted soon 
92
after his return. Then, upon the suggestion of the councillors, 
the emperor decided to call upon the officials at court to discuss 
the issues raised by the Chin, and at the same time to summon 
Chang Chun to court for his opinion. In the ensuing court 
discussion, the general opinion among the officials was that 
since the Chin did not insist on the recognition of their over­
lordship, peace negotiations should be continued. However, there 
were a few officials who resolutely opposed the peace negotiations. 
The Proclamation Commissioner of Hu-pei and Ching-hsi (Hu-pei, 
Ching-hsi hsuan-yii shih ^  , Yii Ytin-wen,
memorialised on several occasions against the abandonment of the 
four prefectures; he was of the opinion that the Chin had sought
peace out of their own weakness, and that it was time for the Sung
93
to launch their counter-attack, In a strongly-worded memorial, 
the Chancellery Imperial Recorder Hu Ch'uan denounced peace 
negotiations as having been responsible for many of the disasters
91. WCC, ch.66, p.3a; CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.9b.
92. It is said that Chang Chun instructed his son Chang Shih to 
memorialise against Lu Chung-hsien for bringing shame upon 
the country, and the emperor decided to have Lu punished as 
a result of Chang Shih's accusations. See CWC, ch.95, pt.2, 
p.1701; CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.10b; HTC, ch.138, p,3677,
93. For Yii Yun-wen's memorials against the abandonment of the 
four prefectures, see SWCT, ch.58, pp,12b-14b.
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faced by the Sung in the past forty years, and warned the emperor
not to repeat the former mistakes for the sake of temporary 
94
security. The Investigating Censor Yen An-chung
protested that the four prefectures were crucial to Sung defence
95
and should never be abandoned. On hearing the memorials of the 
war advocates, T ’ang Ssu-t'ui angrily denounced them:
Thinking that the consequences. /o± war/ do not 
affect them personally, they speak boastfully 
and mislead the country in order to make a name 
for themselves. They should know that such 
matters of national importance are different
from play-acting!96
Hsiao-tsung then decided to carry on with the negotiations.
Chang Chun was on his way back to court when he heard the
news concerning the mission of Wang Chih-wan. He immediately
memorialised in protest, referring to the peace advocates as
members of Ch'in Kuei's faction, and arguing that by sending
peace envoys to Chin, the Sung would lose the loyalty of the
fighters in the Central Plain and the admiration of the people 
97
there. Chang saw the emperor in 12th/1163, and having spoken
against peace negotiations, he once more requested Hsiao-tsung to
98
move to Chien-k'ang. Hsiao-tsung then sent a personally-written
94. See Hu Ch'Uan Hu Tan-an hsien-sheng wen-chi
tjrj £  (Taipei : Han-hua Company, 1970) , ch.7,
95. CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.10b.
96. SSPM, ch.77, p.816.
97. For Chang Chun's memorial, see SWCT, ch.42, p.11a.
98. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1702; SSPM, ch.77, p.816.
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decree to Wang Chih-wan, asking him to wait for further orders at
sent to inform the Chin commanders that the 
Sung would not hand back the four prefectures and threatened to 
call back Wang Chih-wan and stop all peace negotiations if the
happy about losing the four prefectures (as seen by his punishment
of Lu Chung-hsien), and Chang Chun must have encouraged him to
adopt a tougher approach to the enemy. The fact that Hsiao-tsung
still had faith in Chang Chun is shown by his appointment of
Chang as Right Chief Councillor in 12th/1163, although T'ang Ssu-
t'ui was promoted to the position of Left Chief Councillor to
100
replace Ch'en K'ang-po who had recently resigned. Again Hsiao-
tsung appears to have intended to keep a balance between the peace 
and war advocates so that the court would not be dominated by 
T'ang and his supporters.
Chih-wan led to considerable tension between the Chin and Sung in 
the early months of 1164. Hu and Yang were initially detained by 
the Jurchen on the grounds that the Sung did not comply with their
100. Ch'en K'ang-po resigned on plea of illness, but it should 
be pointed out that in the recent controversy over the 
peace negotiations, the councillors had been accused of 
inefficiency by the war advocates; it is said that the 
councillors then sent in their resignations, but were 
refused by Hsiao-tsung. See YWL, ch.2, p.15a. Ch'en, 
however, must have been quite badly affected by the 
accusations that he decided to leave his top position at 
this time of national crisis.
the border. Two minor
Chin insisted on their demands. The emperor had never been
The decision to send Hu Fang and Yang Yu-i ahead of Wang
99. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1702; SSPM, ch.77, p.816.
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wishes. On hearing that the Sung envoys were held by the enemy,
Hsiao-tsung is said to have told Chang Chun that it was the will
of Heaven that the peace negotiations failed, and that from then
101
on, war appeared to be the only solution. However, Hu and Yang
were later released and allowed to return from Su-chou in 
102
2nd/1164. Because of Chin’s refusal to consider the Sung
request, Wang Chih-wan was ordered to return to Lin-an with all 
the payments and gifts meant for the Chin,
The breakdown of peace negotiations at this point might
have led to renewed hostilities between the two states, but this
was avoided by a dramatic change of events over the next few
months. Chang Chun appears to have been getting ready for war by
recruiting large numbers of loyalists into the army, fortifying
the strategic locations and increasing the number of warships in
103the Chiang-Huai region. However, Hsiao-tsung was beginning to
have doubts. On his way back to court, Wang Chih-wan wrote a 
report which strongly criticized Chang Chun’s war efforts. Wang 
mentioned that during his stay in Hsvi-i he had been told by the 
officials there of the lack of manpower in the army, the 
insufficiency of financial resources and food supplies, and the 
lack of proper arms. He further claimed that it was unwise to
101. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1703.
102. The Chin commander, Pu-san Chung-i, referred the Sung 
letter to the Chin emperor, who then ordered that Hu Fang 
and Yang Yu-i be released, saying the envoys were not to 
be blamed for the change in their government's policy.
See SSPM, ch.77, p.817.
103. Biography of Chang Chun, SS, ch.361, p.11310.
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assign 40,000 men to defend Ssu-chou while other strategically
more important locations were unguarded, pointing out that the
104
enemy had never invaded Sung territory from Ssu-chou.
Wang Chih-wan’s memorial appears to have made the emperor
apprehensive. Hsiao-tsung was further discouraged by the Vice-
Minister of Finance, Ch’ien Tuan-li , who cautioned him
against war, saying that the defeat at Fu-li should serve as a 
105
warning example. Being worried about the strength of Sung
defence, Hsiao-tsung ordered Chang Chun to inspect the army in the
Chiang-Huai region. Chang was subsequently impeached by the Right
Policy Monitor, Yin Se, for insubordination and misappropriation
106
of the national funds. The emperor thus decided to summon
Chang back to court and send Ch'ien Tuan-li and Wang Chih-wan in 
his place as Pacification Commissioners of the Liang-Huai region. 
Consequently, Chang Chun submitted his resignation in a series of 
eight memorials. Hsiao-tsung then allowed him to leave with great 
honour by giving him the title of Junior Preceptor (shao-shih 
"y ) and that of Military Governor, and appointing him
Governor of Fu-chou (p ’an Fu-chou /f'^ 7
The dismissal of Chang Chiin from court thus paved the way 
for the renewal of the peace negotiations. Since the reinstatement
--4 -•& &104. For Wang Chih-wan’s memorial, see Han-pin chi 
(SKCPed.), ch.6 , pp.l5b-17b. ^
105. HTC, ch.138, p.3681.
106. SSPM, ch.77, p.818; biography of Chang Chiin, SS, ch.361, 
p.11310.
107. CWC, ch.95, pt.2, p.1704.
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of Chang Chiin In 8th/1163 until his departure in 4th/1164, Hsiao-
tsung, although somewhat discouraged by the abortive campaign,
still allowed Chang to carry out defence preparations while
attempting to reach a negotiated settlement at the same time. It
was after Chang's dismissal that all-out efforts were carried out
to seek peace, as shown by the events in the next few months. In
5th/1164, Wu Lin was ordered not to recruit any more refugees, and
in 6th/1164, Yii Ylin-wen was ordered to abandon the prefectures of 
108 .,
T'ang and Teng. Yu Yun-wen protested and was subsequently 
109
dismissed. In the same month, the border guards in the
110
prefectures of Hai and Ssu were ordered to withdraw. This was 
followed by the abandonment of the border defence in the Liang- 
Huai region in 7th/1164. In order to hasten the success of peace 
negotiations, T'ang Ssu-t'ui voluntarily abandoned the border 
defence, stopped building the walls in Shou-ch'un, dispersed the 
archers, and put a stop to the building of warships.
the same month, the emperor agreed to T'ang Ssu-t'ui's proposal 
to send the Junior Lord of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (t * ai
Chin. Wei was to carry with him a letter from the Sung emperor
108. HTC, ch.138, p.3683.
109. For Yii Yun-wen's memorial opposing the abandonment of T'ang 
and Teng, see SWCT, ch.58, pp.2b-3a.
110. HTC, ch.138, p.3684.
111. SSPM, ch.77, p.818.
The eighth month of 1164 saw the death of Chang Chun. In
ch'ang shao-ch
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addressed to his "uncle", the Chin emperor. Hsiao-tsung personally
gave Wei a briefing and told him that the purpose of his mission
was firstly, to rectify the status of Sung (the uncle-nephew
relation was formally accepted by Sung); secondly, to request for
the withdrawal of the Chin forces; thirdly, to reduce the amount
of annual payments; and lastly, to inform the Chin about the Sung
112
refusal to return the refugees. It thus appears that the Sung 
were agreeable to Chin demands regarding the slightly inferior 
status of their state and the continuation of annual payments, 
though they found the demand regarding the refugees unacceptable.
Of the four issues raised by the Chin formerly, the issue of the 
refugees appears to have been the only problem, since by abandoning 
the defence of the four prefectures, the Sung had already bowed to 
the Chin demand over this issue.
The decision of the court to resume peace negotiations led 
to a strong protest by the Vice-Minister of War, Hu Ch'uan, who 
vigorously opposed giving up the four prefectures, especially Hai 
and Ssu:
The prefectures of Hai and Ssu are equivalent to 
our throat. If the enemy get hold of Hai and Ssu, 
they are able to squeeze us to death ... thus we 
will not be able to hold on to the Liang-Huai 
region, and if so, neither are we able to defend 
the Yang-tzu region....
He ended the memorial by calling all the officials at court women 
because of their lack of courage. However, in spite of Hu's
112. Ibid.. ch.77, pp.820-21.
113. For Hu Ch'uan's memorial, see Hu Tan-an hsien-sheng wen-chi, 
ch.8 , pp.la-4b.
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vigorous protest, it was decided to send Wei Ch'i to the Chin 
court.
The Sung's effort for peace was not met with the same 
response from the Chin, who saw the slackening of Sung defences as 
a good opportunity for them to invade. In 8th/1164, after sending 
a messenger to meet Wei Ch'i at Hsii-i, the Chin commanders claimed 
that the Sung were not willing to comply with all their demands, 
and at the same time, they put forward a new demand for the
114
prefectures of Ch'in and Shang in the north-western border. On
hearing reports concerning the possibility of a Chin invasion,
Hsiao-tsung appointed T'ang Ssu-t'ui General Superintendent of the
Chiang-Huai army (Chang Chun's former position) in dth/1164, but
T'ang declined to leave, and consequently Yang Ts*un-chung was
appointed Co-Superintendent and placed in charge of defence 
115
there. The Chin forces crossed the Huai in late 10th/1164 and
began their invasion in llth/1164. Ch'u-chou (modem Huai-
an hsien ? i * # ,  , just south of the Huai River in Chiang-su)
was attacked, and the Sung general, Wei Shen, died in defending 
116
it. The fall of Ch'u-chou was followed by that of Hao-chou 
and Ch'u-chou7(^jL,f4'j in the Huai valley as the Chin army moved 
southwards.
114. YWL, ch.2, pp.20b-21a.
115. CYTC, Vol.l, ch.20, p.12a.
116. SSPM, ch.77, pp.821-22.
117. Ibid.
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Following the Chin invasion, T'ang Ssu-t'ui was removed
from the office of General Superintendent and replaced by Yang
Ts’un-chung. At that time, the general opinion of the court was
to abandon the Huai and defend the Yang-tzu region, but such a
policy was not carried out because of Yang Ts'un-chung's 
118
opposition. Meanwhile, the former Chief Councillor, Ch'en 
K'ang-po, was summoned back to office. To ensure the loyalty of 
the refugees during this time of crisis, an edict was issued 
announcing that they would certainly not be deported to Chin and
119
called upon them to join in the effort of eliminating the enemy.
The national crisis led to a protest among the students of
the Imperial University at this time. Seventy-two students led by
Chang Kuan^Jl^l^J sent in a petition denouncing the peace advocates,
holding them responsible for the Chin invasion, and calling for
their execution. On the other hand, they requested the emperor to
employ Ch'en K'ang-po and Hu Ch'uan and to summon renowned war
advocates such as Yii Yun-wen, Wang Ta-pao, Wang Shih-p'eng and 
120
others. Since the students had sent in the petition in defiance
of earlier warnings from the authorities, Hsiao-tsung was furious 
and intended to punish them severely. It was after much inter­
vention on the part of the officials, including those who had been 
denounced by the students, that the emperor decided not to take
118. Ibid.
119. For the text of this edict, see Hung K ua 5^ £**_ , P'an-chou 
wen-chi JtfL ^  (SPTK ed.), ch. 12, p. 121. &  n —
120. SSPM, ch.77, p.822.
129
121
any action against them.
The Chin invasion was responsible for the downfall of T'ang 
Ssu-t'ui. In llth/1164, a day before the students' petition, he 
was dismissed from his chief-councillorship and exiled to Yung-
accused of voluntarily neglecting Sung defences in order to hasten
the success of the peace negotiations. T'ang subsequently died
122
on the way to his place of exile.
message that the Sung were willing to alienate the prefectures of 
Shang and Ch'in after all. Also, they were willing to return the 
Chin captives but not those who had betrayed Chin on their own 
initiative (who therefore influded the refugees). They again 
confirmed their agreement to the "uncle-nephew" relation, and 
requested for the reduction of annual payments of silver and silk 
by 50,000 units each, and for the change of the humiliating term
jfc X
"annual tribute" (s u l - k u n g ^  ) to "annual payment" (sui-pi
and sent Wang Pien back with their reply. By the end of llth/1164, 
Wang was again sent as peace envoy to the Chin commanders carrying 
with him a letter from Chief Councillor Ch'en K'ang-po confirming
121. ETC, ch.139, p.3693.
122. Biography of T'ang Ssu-t'ui, SS, ch.371, p.11531.
123. HTC, ch. 139, p.369 3; biography of Wang Pien, SJJ, ch.470,
(Ling-ling^ in Hu-nan^ ) after having beenchou
Meanwhile, the Sung decided to bow to Chin pressure.
was sent to the Chin camp with the
The Chin commanders were agreeable to all these terms
p.13692.
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Sung agreement to the terms of the treaty. Thus the peace nego­
tiations finally reached a successful conclusion.
In 12th/1164, Wei Ch'i was sent to the Chin court with a 
letter from Hsiao-tsung. Meanwhile, an official announcement was 
made concerning Wang Pien's mission and the success of the peace 
negotiations. The imperial proclamation stated:
Wang Pien was recently sent to meet^he Chin 
commanders on the banks of the Ying-^3 river 
.... As a result of the negotiations, the 
status of the Sung emperor is rectified with 
the establishment of the "uncle-nephew" relation, 
the annual payments are reduced by 100,000 units, 
and the borders remain the same as the former
treaty.... Because of humanitarian reasons, it
is also decided not to deport the fugitive rebels
on both sides.... *2*
The official announcement thus marked the conclusion of the peace 
settlement, although it was only in lst/1165 that Wei Ch'i arrived 
in Chin and presented Hsiao-tsung's letter to the Chin emperor. 
Shih-tsung then officially agreed to the tezms of the treaty and 
declared that war was over.
It can be said that the peace settlement of 1164-65 brought 
some improvements to the conditions imposed on the Sung as compared 
to the treaty of 1141-42. The humiliation of being vassal to the
Chin for the past twenty years was finally removed, even though
124. SSPM, ch.77, p.823. This, however, represented a much
shortened version of the original text of the treaty, which 
has not been preserved in any of the sources. See Herbert 
Franke, "Treaties between Sung and Chin" in Etudes Song, 
Ser.I, p.81.
125. See SSPM, ch.77, p.823.
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the Sung still had to acknowledge the superior status of the 
enemy. The reduction in the annual payments (from 250,000 to 
200,000 taels of silver and bolts of silk each), and the agreement 
of the Jurchen on the question of refugees, also represented 
considerable concessions on the part of Chin. However, the fact 
that the former borders were maintained and that the Sung had to 
give up their newly recovered territories means that not a single 
inch of their former territory had been recovered despite their 
efforts in the past few years. Indeed, it appears that Shih Hao 
and other peace advocates had been proven right over this point. 
For the time being, Hsiao-tsung had to be content with 
maintaining the status quo and putting his own state in order 
while waiting for opportunity to achieve his life-long ambition 
of reconquest.
132
CHAPTER IV
COURT POLITICS DURING THE CH’IEN-TAO ERA: 
YEARS OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1165-1173
After the conclusion of the peace settlement in 1165, the 
Southern Sung dynasty was to experience another four decades of 
military stalemate and uneasy co-existence with the Jurchen.* With 
the immediate threat of enemy invasion removed, however, frictions 
between the war and peace advocates, which had dominated court 
politics for the previous two years, were largely terminated. The 
year 1165 thus not only marked the end of war and uncertainty, but 
also signified the beginning of a new era in domestic politics. 
Hsiao-tsung marked the occasion by changing the reign title from 
Lung-hsing f^§P^(Great Prosperity)^ to Ch'ien-tao (The Way of 
Heaven) the latter of which was adopted at the beginning of 1165 
and continued in effect for the next nine years. During this
1. Hostilities resumed between the Sung and Chin states in 
1206-08 when the Sung chief minister, Han T'o-chou 
started war against the Jurchen, but the northern campaign 
was again abortive. For an account of the campaign, see 
SSPM, ch.83.
2. The reign title Lung-hsing was originally adopted by Hsiao- 
tsung to mean "Upholding the administration of the Shao-hslng 
(1131-1162, reign title of Kao-tsung) era (wu-lung shao- 
hsing chih-cheng &£-) •" However, its meaning
was later altered to ^corporate the two reign titles of 
Chien-lung,^^^^ (960-963, reign title of T'ai-tsu) and 
Shao-hsing. This title was changed two years later when 
Hsiao-tsung discovered that it had previously been adopted
by a northern Sung rebel, Chao Shenj£& (in 1102). See
CHSC, Vol.l, ch.3, p.lb. ‘
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period, the emperor and his ministers embarked on new tasks which
aimed at rebuilding the empire - strengthening its defences,
improving the standards of both central and local administrations,
developing its economic resources, and tending to the livelihood
of the people in general. It was the objective of the court to
- i *
put its own state in order (tzu-chih Q  7 &  ) before actively 
considering any ambitious schemes or military campaigns to achieve 
reconquest. Although the objective of hui-fu was constantly borne 
in mind by both the emperor and the officials, the court generally 
refrained from any bellicose gestures after the abortive campaign 
of 1163.
During his twenty-seven years on the throne, Hsiao-tsung
assumed as his personal responsibility three major tasks of
dynasty-building, namely, founding (ch1uang-yeh) preserving (shou-
3
ch'eng) and reviving (chung-hsing). Although the task of 
founding the dynasty had largely been accomplished by Kao-tsung, 
Hsiao-tsung nevertheless considered it necessary to continue the 
work of his father. Similarly, the task of restoration, of 
reviving a dynasty after a major disaster, was accomplished not 
only by Kao-tsung but also by Hsiao-tsung. However, the most 
outstanding contribution made by Hsiao-tsung was in the realm of 
consolidation, the preservation of gains achieved during the 
previous reign which contributed to the stabilization of the 
Southern Sung regime. Indeed, the policies implemented during
3. For Hsiao-tsung's reference to these three mammoth tasks of 
founding, preserving and reviving a dynasty, see his 
conversation with his ministers on p. 186 of this chapter.
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the Ch'ien-tao period clearly reflect the fact that consolidation 
was a national priority of the time.
During these years of reconstruction, the major issues 
which frequently faced the court included administrative reforms, 
finance, defence and foreign policy. By examining the way in 
which the emperor and the officials dealt with these issues, we 
hope to get a clear picture of court politics during this period, 
and to see how the theme of consolidation often emerged in the 
discussion and formulation of both domestic and foreign policies. 
A study of court politics of the time also entails an examination 
of the relations between Hsiao-tsung and his ministers, as well 
as his relations with the Inner Court favourites. This provides 
some insight into the emperor's character, his personal ambition 
to achieve hui-fu, and his desire to concentrate power in his own 
hands, the last of which contributed to the growth of absolutism, 
especially towards the later part of his reign.
Hsiao-tsung has generally been recorded in history as a 
wise and responsible monarch, who embodied a number of key 
Confucian virtues, especially those of filial piety, frugality, 
diligence and willingness to seek the advice of his ministers on 
matters related to government and administration. His reign is 
often described as the finest of the Southern Sung, characterized 
by peace and prosperity. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
beneath this tranquility, the court was not entirely free from 
tensions, strains and even outright conflicts between the emperor 
and his ministers, between the ministers themselves, and between 
the Outer Court bureaucrats and the Inner Court attendants.
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Confrontations between Hsiao-tsung and the officials often arose 
because of disagreements over certain issues or policies. However, 
despite the frequent stormy scenes, Hsiao-tsung was generally 
broad-minded enough not to hold a grudge against the ministers 
when they openly criticized him. Also, it should be pointed out 
that for the duration of his reign, the court was largely free 
from truly divisive bureaucratic factionalism. It is to Hsiao- 
tsung' s credit that he managed to keep everything under control 
and reduce political tensions to an acceptable level.
Hsiao-tsung and his Ministers
It is interesting to note that the Hsiao-tsung reign was
one of the few during Southern Sung times which was not dominated
by powerful councillors. Ministers such as Ch'in Kuei during
4the reign of Kao-tsung, Han T'o-chou-^^ \fk> fi during the reign 
of Ning-tsung (r. 1190-1224), and Shih Mi-yuan 5
during the reign of Ning-tsung and Li-tsung (r. 1225-1274), were 
granted so much authority by their sovereigns that they became 
powerful autocrats who completely dominated the bureaucracy.
During Hsiao-tsung's reign, however, the emperor's power remained 
supreme and unchallenged. A brief account of Hsiao-tsung's 
relations with his ministers helps to illustrate this point.
4. The official biography of Han T'o-chou is found in SS, ch. 474, 
pp.13771-78.
5. The official biography of Shih Ml-yiian is found in SJJ, ch. 414, 
pp.12415-18.
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Following the death of Left Chief Councillor Ch'en K'ang-
po in 2nd/1165, the central bureaucracy was headed by Second Privy
Councillor Ch'ien Tuan-li. Other high-ranking ministers included
Yii Yun-wen and Wang Kang-chung^t. , who were appointed Second
Privy Councillor and Co-Administrator of the Military Bureau
respectively in the following month. Ch'ien was related to the
emperor by marriage, as his daughter was married to Hsiao-tsung's
eldest son, Prince Teng (T e n g - w a n g ). This must have put
Hsiao-tsung in a somewhat awkward position, though he did not seem
to mind Ch'ien staying on as councillor initially, and several
officials who had expressed their uneasiness about Ch'ien's key
6
position in government was rapidly dismissed. Ch'ien was in fact
eyeing the office of chief councillor, Knowing the emperor's
respect for his former tutor Ch'en Chun-ch'ing who had been serving
as Vice-Minister of Rites since lst/1165, Ch'ien sought to win
Ch'en over to his side by promising him a position as councillor
once he himself became chief councillor. However, he was rebuffed
by Ch'en, who admonished the emperor for allowing relatives of
7
the imperial family to stay in power. It is said that Hsiao- 
tsung accepted his advice, but the faet that Ch'en was soon
6 . See Anonymous^, Sung-shih ch'uan-wen hsli tzu-chih t'ung-chien
£  -sV. %  (SSCW) (Taipei: Wen-hal, 1969).
ch.24, p.1901; hsing-chuang of Ch'en Chun-ch'ing in CWC, 
ch.96, p.1713; and hsing-chuang of Ch'ien Tuan-li in KKC, 
ch.92, p.870. It is also pointed out^in the last source that 
the General Censor T'ang Yao-feng^ ^  was demoted to be 
Junior Lord of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices for having 
criticized Ch'ien that as a relative of the emperor, he should 
not be holding a councillor position.
7. CWC, ch.96, p.1713.
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8
demoted to a prefectural position shows that Ch'ien remained in
the emperor's favour. Nevertheless, when Prince Teng was made
heir-apparent in 8th/1165, Ch'ien was finally obliged to step down
9
from the position of Second Privy Councillor. Being an astute 
politician, Hsiao-tsung must have realized that it was unwise to 
keep Ch'ien in power since he was now the father-in-law of the 
heir to the throne.
The departure of Ch'ien Tuan-li might also have been due
to Hsiao-tsung's concern about certain flaws in Ch'ien's character.
It is said that a man from Ssu-ch'uan called Li Hung had
previously approached the councillors of state to grant him an
official position. While Ch'ien was willing to comply with his
request, however, Yii Yun-wen was reluctant to do so. Ch'ien
subsequently told the emperor that Yu had accepted a bribe from Li
Hung in return for an official post. A censor, Chang Fu^jT$/jL,
thereupon impeached Yu on this charge, and the latter was dismissed
in early 8th/1165. However, Hsiao-tsung subsequently discovered
that it was Ch'ien rather than Yii who had accepted the bribe and
decided that Ch'ien should leave. At the same time, Li Hung was
10exiled and Chang Fu was demoted.
8. Ch'en Chun-ch'ing was dismissed from his court position in 
the autumn of 1165. See SSCW, ch.24, p.1901; CWC, ch.96, 
p.1713.
9. KXC, ch.92, p.871; HTC, ch.139, p.3706.
10. For an account of this incident, see the tomb inscription 
for Yii Yun-wen in Yang Wan-li^^ > Ch'eng-chai chi
(CCC) SPTK ed. , ch.120^ p.1070.
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With the departure of both Second Privy Councillors Ch'ien
Tuan-li and Yii Yiin-wen, Hung Kua , who became the next
Second Privy Councillor, was able to rise to the position of Right
Chief Councillor in 12th/1165. Despite his rapid promotion in the
civil service,^1 his performance as chief councillor apparently
did not satisfy the emperor, who dismissed him several months 
12
later. A primary concern of Hsiao-tsung at this time was the
efficiency of the councillors. In 5th/1166, he is reported to
have said to them, "Recently many officials have pointed out that
the councillors are not fulfilling their responsibilities; you
13
should therefore work harder...." Hsiao-tsung proved to be a 
rather demanding emperor, who did not hesitate to dismiss his 
ministers if they failed to measure up to his expectations.
The frequent dismissals of councillors and other officials 
led to much criticism of the emperor's personnel policy. For 
example, in 9th/1166, the Lesser Lord of Agricultural Supervision 
(ssu-nung shao-ch'ing foj ) Mo ^  said to Hsiao-
j tsung:
II________ _________________________________
11. For the rapid rise of Hung Kua in his civil service career, 
see his tomb inscription in WCC, ch.68 , p.5b; CYTC, Vol.2, 
ch. 8, p . lb.
12. During his several months in office, Chief Councillor Hung 
Kua was noted for his policy of reducing military expenditure 
and retrenchment of personnel. Most of all he was known for 
encouraging the emperor to carry out the policy of inter­
viewing appointees to prefectural positions, which became a 
regular practice during Hsiao-tsung's reign. See WCC, ch.6 8 , 
pp.6a-6b.
13. CHSC, ch.29, p.2b.
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The way of government depends on the appointment 
of /the right/ personnel, while the appointment 
of personnel depends on the fulfilling of _  
responsibilities /by the personnel concerned/.
If we appoint the officials but do not keep them
in office for a sufficiently long period, we will
not be able to judge the excellencies of the good
and the capable; on the other hand, the evil and
unworthy officials manage to go unpunished....14
He then went on to criticize the emperor for dismissing the
councillors and other officials after they had served for only a
few months. Although Hsiao-tsung commended Mo for his criticism,
he still carried on as before. In addition to being dissatisfied
with their performance, it could well be that having personally
witnessed the great power wielded by the chief councillor Ch'in
15
Kuei during his father's reign, Hsiao-tsung was especially 
careful that there should not be a recurrence during his own time 
on the throne. A convenient way to restrict the growth of
councillor power would be to limit the tenure of their office,
so that they would not have the opportunity to build up their own 
power base in court and thus constitute a threat to imperial power.
Besides frequently removing the councillors, Hsiao-tsung 
also sought to keep them under control by not granting them their 
due authority. In 12th/1166 the emperor finally filled every
14. Ibid., ch.29, p.5b.
15. The enmity between Hsiao-tsung and Ch'in Kuei is illustrated 
by an incident in 1154 when the prince exposed the chief 
councillor's dishonesty for deliberately keeping the emperor 
uninformed about the suppression of a certain uprising. 
Hsiao-tsung is also said to have cautioned Kao-tsung about 
Ch'in's intention to make his son succeed him as chief 
councillor. See CYTC, Vol.2, ch.l, p.9a.
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vacancy in the Council of State by appointing both the Left and 
Right Chief Councillors and two assistant councillors. The 
bureaucracy was generally pleased with the appointment of these key 
officials, but the remarks of the Vice-Minister of War, Ch'en Yen-
Your Majesty's recent appointments of the Left 
and Right Chief Councillors and the assistant 
councillors have led to much jubilation among 
the officials, who rejoice that the right men 
have been found to lead the government. How- 
ever, in my opinion, the councillors should be 
given more power so that they can take up the 
responsibility of governing the empire.16
From this, we know some officials were already concerned about the 
lack of authority of the councillors. Although Hsiao-tsung is 
said to have heeded Ch'en’s advice, he never actually put it into 
practice, and a chief complaint among the officials was the 
tendency of the emperor to impinge upon their authority throughout 
his reign.
On the other hand, Hsiao-tsung appears to have realized
the importance of accommodating his councillors by giving them the 
psychological satisfaction of being respected and given full 
executive authority in principle, although this might not turn 
out to be the case in practice. Thus, ironically, it was during 
Hsiao-tsung's reign that the councillors were given much power, 
at least on paper. Soon after his accession in 12th/1162, for 
example, Hsiao-tsung appointed the chief councillors to the 
concurrent positions of Commissioners of Military Affairs, thus
, reveal a certain sceptism:
16. CHSC, ch.29, pp.l2a-12b.
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17
formally assigning them with military authority. A few years
later, in 12th/1166, the chief councillors were further granted
financial authority when they were given the concurrent title of
Controller of National Finance (chih kuo-yung shih
It thus appears there was a concentration of civil, military and
financial powers in the hands of the chief councillors. Indeed,
such concentration of powers has been seen as an important factor
19
in the rise of powerful councillors during the Southern Sung.
Yet, as will be seen, this was not the case during Hsiao-tsung's 
reign.
Besides intending to raise the morale of his councillors, 
Hsiao-tsung's main purpose in granting military and financial 
authority to his chief councillors was to enable the top
17. During the Northern Sung there were a few occasions, during 
times of emergency, when the chief councillors were appointed 
to concurrent positions in the Bureau of Military Affairs, 
but it was not until 1130 that they were appointed on a 
regular basis. But after the death of Ch'in Kuei in 1155, 
the concurrent title of Commissioner of Military Affairs held 
by the chief councillors was again abolished. The title was 
restored to the chief councillore gfter the accession of 
Hsiao-tsung. See Ma Tuan-linj^ , Wen-hsien t 1 ung-
k ’ao 'ft' (WHTK) .(Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1936), ch.58,
p.5287^'^ ^
18. Hsii Tzu-ming /f^~ ^  , Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu ^  ^
(Taipei: Wen-hai, 1967), ch. 17, p. 1542. For an 
account of the_office of the Controller of National Finance, 
see Hsii Sung^f- comp. , Sung hui-yao chi-kao
(SHY) .(Peking: Chung-hua, 1957), chih-kuan 
6 : 20-6; 21, pp.2506-7; CYTC. Vol.l, ch.10, pp.3b-4a.
, , ^ j>y
19. See Lin T* ien-wei , "Sung-tai chj iian-hsiang hsing-
ch’eng ti f e n g - h s i i n  Ssu yu 
y e n ^ - ^ f ^  , Vol.10, No.3 (1973), pp.350-360; see also 
Liang T'ien-hsi » "Lun Sung Itsai-fu hu-chien chih-tu"
p  9 in SSYCC ,pVol. 4 (1969), p.294.
ov\
142
executives to carry out their administrative functions effectively.
Apart from these, it was not his intention that his ministers
should exercise such powers in reality. It should be noted that
Hsiao-tsung was in the habit of guarding his imperial prerogatives
jealously and frequently exercising them, especially in military
matters. This was revealed by the Secretariat Imperial Recorder
Hung Mai, who remarked in 12th/1166 that the imperial orders
issued to the Bureau of Military Affairs frequently went straight
on to the Imperial Chancellery, bypassing the Imperial Secretariat
(which means that the orders were passed without the knowledge
or approval of the councillors, who were the heads of the Imperial
Secretariat). Hung then requested that all orders issued to the
20Military Bureau should go through the proper procedure. Although 
Hsiao-tsung promised to rectify this, the so-called confidential 
matters of the Military Bureau (shu-mi chi-su shih ^ )
were still to be dispatched directly to the Chancellery without 
going through the Secretariat. These were referred to as 
"confidential orders" (mi-pai ^  ^  ).2* Besides the use of 
"confidential orders", Hsiao-tsung also employed similar methods 
to enhance his ultimate power. Notable among these were the use 
of "palace orders" (nei-p ) and "imperial decrees"
(y i i - p i ), both of which were issued directly from the
20. CHSC, ch.29, pp.llb-12a.
21. Ibid.
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22
palace, without prior consultation with the councillors.
The emperor's disregard of routine procedure caused much 
concern among the officials. Ch'en Chun-ch'ing was one of the most 
outspoken ministers and he frequently confronted Hsiao-tsung over 
various issues regarding national policies and the emperor's 
personal conduct. He was noted for his vigilance against any 
infringement of bureaucratic power by the emperor. For example, 
on the eve of his appointment as chief councillor in 10th/1168, 
Ch'en had a serious row with Hsiao-tsung over the matter of secret 
orders issued to the army without the knowledge of the ministers 
at court. The emperor had earlier sent a Commander of the Palace 
Guards (tien-ch'ien chih-hui shih ) Wang Ch'i
^ ^ _ to inspect the walls in the Liang-Huai region. After
Wang's return, a report was received from Yang-chou stating that 
more walls had been built according to the imperial order trans­
mitted by Wang Ch'i earlier. Ch'en Chiin-ch'ing immediately 
questioned Hsiao-tsung on the matter since such an order had not 
been sent out officially. Ch'en then insisted that Wang should be
severely punished for falsely transmitting imperial orders, and
23
consequently, Wang was stripped of his rank and dismissed.
22. Both nei-p' i and yii-pi were imperial orders issued directly 
from the palace. These direct orders were traditionally 
known as nei-p'i, but the latter term yu-pi was used since 
the Ch'ung-ning/2? and Ta-kuan jZ tj$J eras (reign-titles
of Hui-tsung, lasting from 1102-1110). These orders were 
not necessarily written by the emperor himself and were there­
fore different from the "personally-written decrees" (ch'in-
). See CYTC, Vol.2, ch.11, p.la.
23. For an account of this episode, see CWC, ch.96, p.1716; 
SSCW, ch.25, pp.1943-44.
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The above episode was merely the prelude to an even greater
confrontation between Hsiao-tsung and Ch'en Chun-ch'ing. Ch'en
and his colleagues in the Council of State had formerly been
unhappy about the emperor sending confidential orders to the army
and had requested that all departments receiving imperial orders
issued directly from the palace (yii-pi) should first memorialise
the court for verification before implementing them. Such a
request was again made by the ministers after the Wang Ch'i
incident. Hsiao-tsung initially agreed but changed his mind two
days later, much to the frustration of the ministers. Obviously
the emperor was unwilling to give up his imperial prerogatives and
tried to evade the issue by remarking, "Even' when the palace wishes
to get a drink or some food, it has to obtain court verification;
now, would that not be over-restraining!" Ch'en Chun-ch'ing
protested that the ministers were concerned with much more important
matters, such as requesting that military matters be notified to
the Bureau of Military Affairs and financial matters be notified
to the Three Departments. He argued that, after all, the court
belonged to the emperor, and the ministers were merely carrying
out the emperor's orders, and that court verification of all
matters meant that ultimate decision still lay in the hands of
the emperor. Finally he expressed his fear that the emperor had
changed his mind after being influenced by elements within the
palace. Such strongly-worded criticism infuriated Hsiao-tsung,
24
but Ch'en was unwilling to yield.
I
24. CWC, ch.96, pp.1716-17; SSCW, ch.25, pp.1944-45.
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Ch'en Chun-ch'ing was not the only minister who took up
the matter of imperial orders with Hsiao-tsung. Indeed, the Co-
Administrator of the Military Bureau Liu Kung, so offended the
emperor with his vehement protest that the latter decided to 
25
dismiss him. Ch'en then pleaded for Liu's retention, but Hsiao- 
tsung refused to change his mind. Finally, due to Ch'en's 
insistence that Liu be given at least an important prefectural 
position, Hsiao-tsung appointed him Pacification Commissioner of 
Chiang-hsi (Chiang-hsi an-fu-shih After this,
Ch'en submitted a self-impeaching memorial for having annoyed the 
emperor, but Hsiao-tsung refused to allow him to resign. Though 
frequently offended by Ch'en's criticism, the emperor nevertheless 
recognised him as a righteous and responsible minister. Thus a 
few days after this exchange, Ch'en was even promoted to be Right 
Chief Councillor.^
The above incident clearly illustrates the clash between 
imperial power and ministerial power. While Hsiao-tsung intended 
to concentrate power in his own hands through the use of secret 
orders, Ch'en Chun-ch'ing and Liu Kung opposed such practices 
by insisting on court verification before implementation. On this 
occasion, Hsiao-tsung's anger was much aroused by the opposition
25. It is said that Liu was especially outspoken during the 
above incident. See hsing-chuang of Liu Kung, CWC, ch.97, 
p.1729.
26. CWC, ch.97, p.1729; SSCW, ch.25, pp.1945-46.
27. CWC, ch.96, p.1717; SSCW. ch.25, p.1946.
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of his ministers, and he gave vent to his frustration by punishing 
Liu Kung. On the other hand, Ch'en Chun-ch'ing, vho shared Liu's 
views, was promoted. In so doing, Hsiao-tsung showed that he was 
not completely indifferent to criticism and would reward ministers 
for their loyalty in spite of the fact that they sometimes 
displeased him in their speech.
Indeed, despite his autocratic tendencies, Hsiao-tsung
tried to project the image of an enlightened and open-minded
monarch. He often encouraged the officials to speak their minds
and even invited criticism of himself. For example, in 12th/1165,
the Chancellery Imperial Recorder Chiang Feirt^ , who had been
newly appointed Drafting Official of the Secretariat on probation,
told Hsiao-tsung apologetically that as a drafting official who
had the power of veto, he was afraid he might occasionally offend
the emperor while carrying out his official duties. Thereupon
Hsiao-tsung replied that this was exactly what he expected from
the drafting official, and that Chiang should not confine himself
to commenting on political matters and appointments but. could also
28
criticize the ruler if the latter had any faults. However,’ it 
should be remembered that although Hsiao-tsung did try to be 
receptive to criticism, he did not always live up to this ideal.
Hsiao-tsung did, however, make it a point to keep in close 
touch with his ministers. In 5th/1165, he expressed his regrets 
to the councillors that he could not afford more time with them 
during the morning court sessions and proposed inviting them to
28. SSCy ch.24. p.1911.
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the palace in the evening to discuss the "way of government"
(chih-tao ).2^ Policy discussions were frequently held
between Hsiao-tsung and his ministers in the Hsuan-te?3£ 4,*3^
30
Palace Hall. The cordial relations between the emperor and his 
ministers were especially noted during the period of Yii Yiin-wen's 
chief-councillorship (from 8th/1169 to 9th/1172). For Instance, 
in 2nd/1171, Hsiao-tsung said to the councillors:
During the time of the founding ancestors, the 
councillors had frequently been invited to join 
in various leisurely activities by the emperor 
.... On the days when I am free, I would like 
to invite you over for a game of archery and to 
wine and dine together.
When Yii and his colleagues praised Hsiao-tsung for his willingness
to spend time with them, the emperor replied that it was important
for the ruler and the ministers to be close so as to be able to
communicate with each other. He again emphasized thay since the
morning court sessions were too short for any detailec discussion
of government, he wished to spend more time with them so that they
31could carry on their discussions in a more leisurely manner.
In an attempt to streamline the administration and bring 
about a more effective government, Hsiao-tsung initiated a number 
of political reforms in 1172. In the second month of that year, 
the title of the chief councillors was changed from that of Left 
and Right Executives of the Department of Ministries (shang-shu
29. Ibid., ch.24, p.1902.
30. "Hsuan-te tien chi" in WCC, ch. 104, p. 10b.
31. SSCW, ch.25, p.1980.
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tso-yu p*u-yeh ) to that of Left and Right
Chief Ministers (tso-yu ch*eng-hsiang The
ostensible reason given by the emperor for this change was that he
33
was unhappy with the term p*u-yeh for he felt that as heads of
the bureaucracy, the chief councillors should be properly addressed.
On the other hand, the term ch*eng-hsiang (which is a close
equivalent of the term "prime-minister") would, in his opinion,
34
accord proper respect to the chief councillors. At the same 
time, Hsiao-tsung reorganized the civil administration by
32. CHSC, ch.51, p.3b. The emperor in fact ordered his ministers 
to discuss the rectification in chief councillor title in 
12th/1171 and was opposed by Chief Councillor Yii Yiin-wen on 
the grounds that the term ch'eng-hsiang was adopted by the 
Jurchen. Nevertheless, despite his opposition, Hsiao-tsung 
went ahead with the rectification in 2nd/1172. At the same 
time it was also announced that Liang K'e-chia ^
was made Right Chief Councillor and Yii Yiin-wen (who had 
served as sole chief councillor for some time and was 
becoming unpopular because he assumed sole authority over the 
government) was appointed Left Chief Councillor. See WCC, 
ch.14, pp.9a-lla.
33. Hsiao-tsung*s objection to the term p*u-yeh was because it 
was originally a minor office during the Ch*in dynasty and 
did not carry much responsibility. The post became 
increasingly important after the Eastern Han, but this does 
not mean that the holder of such a position had become head 
of the bureaucracy. For the evolution of the office of 
p*u-yeh, see WHTK, ch.51, pp.470-71.
34. In the past the chief councillors had been known by different 
names, such as ch*eng-hsiang during the Ch*in and Han 
dynasties, and p*u-yeh during the T'ang and Northern Sung 
dynasties. For a short time during the reign of Hui-tsung
of the Northern §ung, they were known as t * ai-tsai 
and shao-tsai^  ^  (Left and Right Chief Councillor 
respectively), but the term p*u-yeh was once again adopted 
during the Southern Sung, until Hsiao-tsung changed it to 
ch*eng-hsiang. Thereafter the term ch*eng-hsiang remained 
in use for the duration of the Southern Sung dynasty. For 
an account of the titles of chief councillors, see WHTK, 
ch.49, pp.449-51, ch.51, pp.470-71; CYTC, Vol.l, ch.10, 
pp.la-lb.
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eliminating the top administrative posts in the Three Departments
and making subordinate officers directly responsible to the chief
35
councillor's office. By so doing, the emperor sought to reduce 
the great number of intermediaries in the bureaucratic hierarchy 
and enhance the responsiveness of lower-ranking officials to the 
top.
Nevertheless, although in principle the above reforms 
expanded the authority of the councillors, in practice Hsiao- 
tsung exerted such rigorous control over the councillors that most 
were reduced to virtual sycophants. Councillors with strong views 
such as Shih Hao and Ch'en Chun-ch'ing soon left office and were 
replaced by others who were more agreeable to the emperor. With 
the top seats occupied by men easily manipulated by the throne, 
Hsiao-tsung thus managed to maintain effective personal command 
over the entire bureaucratic machine.
Like Kao-tsung before him, Hsiao-tsung was also noted for 
using censorial power against the ministers. Right from the 
beginning of his reign, he found the practice of dismissing 
councillors through censorial impeachment expedient, and 
frequently made use of the censorial organ to bring about the 
downfall of these top officials. In examining the reasons for
35. Soon after the rectification of the chief councillor's
title, it was announced that the various titles held formerly 
by chief councillors of state such as Chancellor (shih-chung 
K  Secretary-General of the Secretariat (chung-shu 
ling ) and Presiding Minister of the Department of
Ministries (shang-shu ling ) were to be abolished
and their functions assumed b y ^ h e  Left and Right Chief 
Councillors. See CHSC, ch.51, p.4a.
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the removal of councillors from office, one finds that many of 
them were dismissed through censorial impeachment after they had 
fallen out of the emperor’s favour. By resorting to the use of 
censorial power against ministerial power, Hsiao-tsung was able 
to greatly enhance his own authority.
Hsiao-tsung and the Inner Court
Another method employed by Hsiao-tsung for the same purpose 
was to use Inner Court personnel as a counter-weight to the regular 
bureaucracy. Because of their proximity to the throne and the 
tendency of the emperor to regard them as his confidants, the 
palace attendants were a constant source of anxiety for the 
ministers of the Outer Court. Hsiao-tsung had indeed shown great 
favour to certain members of the Inner Court and occasionally used 
them to interfere in the normal operations of the bureaucracy. It 
is therefore not surprising that the emperor's favours to the so- 
called "close attendants" (chin-hsi) in the Inner Court 
frequently led to protests among the officials.
During Hsiao-tsung’s time on the throne there were several 
occasions when the Outer Court officials seriously quarreled with 
the Inner Court attendants. Soon after his accession in 6th/1162, 
Hsiao-tsung appointed two of his favourite palace attendants, Lung 
Ta-yuan and Tseng Tiv$ » Assistant General Transmitter of 
Directives in the Military Bureau (shu-mi fu-tu ch’eng-chih
) and Bearer-of-Arms (tai yu-ch*i-hsieh 
36
respectively. Both Lung and Tseng had won the
36. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.6 , p.la.
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confidence of Hsiao-tsung while he was still crown prince, but
they were extremely unpopular among the regular bureaucrats, who
regarded them as petty men and sycophants. In 3rd/1163, for
example, they were impeached by the Right Policy Critic Adviser
(yu chien-i ta-fu ^  Liu Tu % \ f t  , who accused them
of manipulating affairs in the palace and requested that they be
dismissed. Instead the emperor appointed them Administrators of
the Palace Postern, a position which appeared to be lower in rank
than their previous appointments but nonetheless important as it
would allow them easy access to the emperor and would give them
the opportunity to influence imperial decisions. Liu then
resigned in protest, saying that he could no longer stay on as a
policy-criticism official since his advice had not been heeded by 
37
the emperor. Liu was supported by others including drafting 
officials, a censor and a Second Privy Councillor, who all
38
indicated their opposition to the appointments of Lung and Tseng.
Hsiao-tsung was much angered by this combined attack upon 
his favourites and commented to Chief Councillor Shih Hao that the 
officials would not have dared do such a thing during the reign of
37. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.6 , p.lb; HTC, ch.183, pp.3662-63.
38. Among those jxrho protested were the Second Privy Councillor 
Chang T'ao^fL‘>? , the Drafting Official of the Imperial 
Secretariat Cfiang Chen . General Censor YLu I »
Reviewing Policy Adviser Chin An-chieh and
Chancellery Imperial Recorder Chou Pi-ta, who was also 
serving as Reviewing Policy Adviser and Drafting Official 
of the Imperial Secretariat on probation. See CYTC, Vol.2, 
ch.6 , pp.2a-2b; HTC, ch.138, p.3663. For the joint statement 
of Chou Pi-ta and Chin An-chieh opposing the appointments of 
Lung and Tseng, see WCC, ch.99, pp.l7a-18b.
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Kao-tsung. Suspecting the officials of factionalism, he had 
them dismissed one by one. And although the appointments of Lung 
and Tseng were temporarily withdrawn, Hsiao-tsung eventually
40
appointed them Administrators of the Palace Postern in 8th/1163. 
They remained in these positions for the next few years despite 
frequent criticism against them.
Among the Outer Court ministers, Ch'en Chun-ch'ing in
particular was noted for his opposition to the emperor's 
41
favourites. In 2nd/1167, just two months after his appointment 
as Co-Administrator of the Military Bureau, Ch'en had his first 
confrontation with the emperor over this issue. The incident 
sparked off when Ch'en heard from the Secretariat Imperial Recorder 
Hung Mai that the latter had received news about official 
appointments. When asked where he obtained his information, Hung 
replied that it had come from Lung Ta-yuan and Tseng Ti. On 
hearing this, Ch'en immediately sprang into action by informing 
his colleagues in the Council of State that he had obtained 
evidence regarding the revelation of confidential matters by Lung 
and Tseng; thereupon all the councillors agreed that they should 
bring this matter up to the throne. Still unable to contain his 
indignation, Ch'en personally questioned Hsiao-tsung, who denied
39. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.6 , pp.2a-2b; WCC, ch.99, p.20a.
40. HTC, ch.138, p.3674.
41. Lung Ta-yuan had sought the friendship of Ch'en Chun-ch'ing 
but was rebuffed by the latter. See CHSC, ch.29, p.12b; 
CWC, ch.96, p.1714.
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that he had ever consulted Lung and Tseng regarding official
appointments. The emperor further commended Ch'en for his loyalty
and promised that he would have the two attendants dismissed.
Consequently, Lung and Tseng were both given prefectural appoint-
42
ments, much to the joy of the officials. Thus on this occasion 
at least, the councillors scored a victory against the emperor's 
favourites. Hsiao-tsung most probably considered it unwise to go 
against the wishes of the ministers since they had obtained 
evidence against his favourites. He might also have felt that the 
palace attendants had gone too far in exercising their power, and 
decided to teach them a lesson.
However, despite his punishment of Lung Ta-yuan and Tseng 
Ti, Hsiao-tsung still reserved a soft spot for them. After Lung's 
death in 7th/1168, Hsiao-tsung took pity on Tseng and considered 
summoning him back to court. He was admonished by both the Second 
Privy Councillor Ch'en Chun-ch'ing and the Co-Administrator of 
the Military Bureau Liu Kung, who shared Ch'en's intense dislike 
and distrust of the Inner Court favourites. Liu said to Hsiao- 
tsung:
These people are mere servants, so if Your 
Majesty pities them, it is all right to shower 
them with expensive gifts. But if Your Highness 
were to bring them close to Your side, giving 
them an opportunity to interfere with the 
appointment and dismissal of officials, I am 
afraid that would not be the way to increase 
Your imperial virtue or strengthen governmental 
principles at court.
42. For an account of this incident, see CWC, ch.96, p.1714; 
CYTC, Vol.2, ch.6 , pp.5a-5b.
43. CWC, ch.97, p.1729; CYTC, Vol.2, ch.6 , p.5b.
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Similarly, Ch'en Chun-ch'ing told the emperor, ''Since Your Majesty 
dismissed these two persons from court, everyone praised you for 
Your imperial virtue. Now that you wish to summon Tseng Ti back;
threatened to resign, and faced with this opposition from his 
ministers, Hsiao-tsung decided not to summon Tseng on this occasion. 
However, soon after Ch'en Chun-ch'ing left office in5th/1170, Tseng 
was able to find his way back to court, where no one dared speak
as the emperor bestowed upon him numerous favours and honorary 
titles.
Apart from opposing Tseng Ti, Ch'en Chun-ch'ing was also 
highly vigilant against the Inner Court personnel gaining power 
through other means. He was especially concerned about the palace 
attendants coming into contact with the generals. In 8th/1167, 
the commander of the Chen-chiang /^ J§ >> army, Ch'i Fang, was 
dismissed for oppressing his soldiers with forced labour and 
services. Ch'en Chlin-ch'ing then brought to the emperor's notice 
the fact that certain members of the Inner Court had connections 
with Ch"i. Hsiao-tsung replied that he was aware of this and that 
not only should Ch'i not be pardoned for his crimes, but those who 
had connections with him should also be punished as a warning to 
others. Subsequently, two of the Inner Court attendants, Ch'en
I am afraid the whole nation will be disappointed."
44
He then
45
against him. He rose rapidly in power during the next decade
, were accused of having
44. CHSC, ch.47, p.4b; CWC, ch.96, p.1716.
45. CHSC, ch.48, p.10b.
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received bribes from Ch'i, and were demoted and exiled. An edict
was then issued prohibiting the military officials from befriending
the Inner Court attendants, threatening severe punishment for 
46
future offenders.
Following the above incident, Hsiao-tsung told his ministers
M 1-/6
that the commander of the Chien-k'ang army, Liu Y u a n ^ j y 4^, was 
also guilty of bribing palace personnel, and that he was thinking 
of having Liu dismissed. The emperor further said that he intended 
to send Wang Pien (another of his palace favourites) to Chien-k'ang 
to investigate Liu's crimes and to stay with the army there for a 
few months to ensure that the new commander would not commit the 
same offences. Ch'en Chlin-ch'ing immediately opposed such a 
proposal, saying that if the commanders were carefully selected, 
the offences would naturally be eliminated. Hsiao-tsung replied 
that it was exactly because such good commanders had not been 
available that he proposed sending Wang Pien. Ch’en Chlin-ch'ing 
replied:
If the right person has not been found, we should 
all the more take care in our selection. After 
having been appointed, the army commanders should 
be trusted. If we were to show our mistrust even 
before their appointment, that is not the way the 
court should treat the generals....47
He further showed his utter mistrust for the emperor's favourite 
by saying that if Wang Pien happened to be unreliable, the
48
offences would be committed by him rather than by the generals.
46. SSCW, ch.24, p.1934.
47- £W£» ch.96, p.1715; CHSC, ch.46, p.12a.
48. CWC, ch.96, p.1715; CHSC, ch.46, p.12b.
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Hsiao-tsung's intention in sending Wang was undoubtedly to exert 
his personal control over the army commanders. But his plan was 
again thwarted by Ch'en Chun-ch'ing, who resisted every move by 
the emperor to increase imperial power at the expense of the civil 
and military officials.
Besides Tseng Ti and Lung Ta-yuan, one other prominent
palace favourite of Hsiao-tsung was Chang Yiieh, who was the
husband of the empress dowager’s younger sister. In 3rd/1171,
the emperor promoted Chang from his position as Administrator of
the Palace Postern to that of Signatory Official of the Military 
49
Bureau. The appointment of a minor palace official to such a 
high-ranking position led to much commotion in court. The 
Lecturer-In-Waiting Chang Shih submitted a memorial admonishing
Hsiao-tsung; at the same time, he reproached Chief Councillor
.. .. 50Yu Yun-wen for allowing this to happen. The Drafting Official
of the Imperial Secretariat, Fan Ch'eng-ta 7 1 also opposed
51
the appointment by refusing to endorse it. The emperor was 
obliged to compromise by giving Chang a sinecure and the honorary 
title of Military Governor (chieh-tu shih). Nevertheless, 
Hsiao-tsung was still determined to get Chang into the Military
49. HTC, ch.142, p.3795.
50. Chang is said to have told Yii Y(in-wen, "The appointment of 
eunuchs to councillor positions started with Ts'ai Ching 
and Wang Fu (bad last ministers of Northern Sung)
while the appointment of close attendants to councillor 
positions started with you, sir." See ibid.
51. Tomb inscription for Fan Ch'eng-ta in WCC, ch.61, pp.l8b-19a; 
HTC, ch.142, p.3796.
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Bureau, which he succeeded in doing a year later.
In 2nd/1172, Chang Yiieh was once again appointed Signatory
Official of the Military Bureau, by which time Chang Shih had been
dismissed from court and was serving as a prefectural adminis- 
52
trator. Fan Ch'eng-ta too had left court and was given a
53
prefectural position. Although Hsiao-tsung may therefore have
thought there would not be any strong opposition to this
appointment, such was not to be. Indeed, when the appointment
was announced, it was opposed by various censorial and drafting 
54
officials. The emperor was undeterred by their opposition, 
however, and the officials were either dismissed or demoted for 
their defiance. It is important to note that the chief councillor 
Yii Yiin-wen remained non-commital throughout the entire incident, 
and his toleration of the emperor's favourites and his general 
support for the emperor's policies must have helped him to rise 
in Hsiao-tsung's favour. In any event, he served for a longer
52. Chang was eventually ousted from office because of his 
opposition to Chief Councillor Yii Yun-wen and the Inner 
Court favourites. See his hsing-chuang in CWC, ch.89, 
p. 1579.
53. WCC, ch.61, p.19a.
54. These include the General Censor Li Heng , Right
Policy Monitor Wang Hsi-l{i_£-^p ^  , Vice-Minister of Rites
and concurrently Auxiliary Academician Chou Pi-ta and 
Reviewing Adviser Mo Chi. See HTC, ch. 143, p. 3811. For 
Chou Pi-ta's memorial, see WCC, ch.10, pp.l2b-14a.
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period than most of his colleagues at the time.
In examining Hsiao-tsung*s relations with the Inner Court, 
it is found that during the Gh'ien-tao period, because of the 
strong opposition of ministers such as Ch'en Chlin-ch'ing and Liu 
Kung to the palace personnel, the emperor was on the whole more 
restrained in bestowing favours upon his attendants. However, 
towards the later part of his reign, the palace favourites became 
more influential as they faced less opposition from the top 
officials in the government.
Financial Policy
In addition to the consolidation of imperial power, the 
Ch'ien-tao era also witnessed the consolidation of the empire in 
other fields. Like his predecessor Kao-tsung, Hsiao-tsung 
realized the great importance of finance in building up the 
Southern Sung regime. The emperor's concern for financial 
administration was reflected by the fact that one of his first 
acts after his accession to the throne was to check on the
55. Yii Yiin-wen left his position as chief councillor in 9th/1172. 
In 4th/1172, two months after the rectification in chief 
councillor title and the appointment of Liang K'e-chia as 
the Right Chief Councillor, the Palace Censor Hsiao Chih-min 
ml L- , sensing that Yii was losing imperial favour, 
brought about a vigorous attack upon Yii. Yii resigned after 
Hsiao's impeachment but was reinstated through the inter­
vention of Kao-tsung. Nevertheless, Hsiao's severe impeach­
ment must have prompted Yii's resignation several months 
later. See the epitaph (mu-chih-ming ) for Hsiao
Chih-min in WCC, ch.33, pp.10b-11a; HTC, ch.143, p.3814.
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accounts of the Ministry of Finance. His thorough investigation
of the income and expenditure of the above ministry led to the
protest of its Vice-Minister Chou K ’uei^j in lst/1163. In
his memorial Chou referred to the emperor's queries on the "minor
details" of financial matters and attributed the imperial action
to instigation from the "petty elements" at court (an obvious
57attack upon Lung Ta-yuan and Tseng Ti). Besides being appre­
hensive about the influence these imperial favourites possibly 
had upon the emperor, Chou K'uei and other officials in opposing 
Hsiao-tsung*s interest in the details of financial administration, 
appear to imply that His Majesty should involve himself with 
greater tasks than with such mundane matters. Indeed, there 
existed certain differences in opinion between the emperor and the 
scholar-officials on the importance of finance. Hsiao-tsung was 
unhappy about the general indifference shown by the scholar- 
officials towards financial administration and criticized them 
for their attitude. For example, in lst/1167 the emperor expressed 
his concern over the fact that the Confucian scholar-officials
were ignorant about finance and agriculture and indicated his wish
58
that they should devote more attention to such matters. Also,
56. Soon after his accession, Hsiao-tsung frequently summoned 
finance officials into the palace and carefully examined the 
finance and revenue of the empire; he also personally checked 
the accounts books of the various treasuries. See CYTC,
Vol.2, ch.3, p.6a.
57. Tomb inscription for Chou K'uei, WCC, ch.63, p.9a; HTC, 
ch.138, p.3660.
58. CHSC, ch.46, p.la.
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in 8th/1171 Hsiao-tsung severely criticized the scholar-officials
for refraining from discussing matters regarding finance and
agriculture, even though these formed the essential livelihood of 
59
the state.
Holding strongly to the view that agriculture was the 
60
foundation of the state, Hsiao-tsung frequently emphasized the
importance of agrarian matters. He had on numerous occasions
admonished the prefectural officials to play a more active role in
promoting agriculture. In 8th/1164 the administrators of various
prefectures in the Chiang-Che region were ordered to look
61
into the irrigation and farming of their respective territories.
Irrigation projects were subsequently carried out in the various
62
prefectures of the region. The emperor also made it a point to
advise new appointees who came to court for an imperial audience
before leaving for their prefectural posts to pay more attention
to farming and sericulture. His personal interest in agriculture
was also indicated by his following Kao-tsung's example in
practising grain-cultivation and sericulture in the palace 
63
compound. The imperial concern for agrarian matters could also
59. CHSC, ch.50, pp.l7a-17b.
60. In one of his discussions with his ministers in 4th/1172, 
Hsiao-tsung emphasized the point that "to devote oneself to 
agriculture is the basis of government" (wu-nung wei chih 
chih-pen -At jj/b* ). See ibid. , ch.51, p. 10b.
63.. SHY, shih-huo ^  j^jf 61:116, p.5931; HTC, ch.138, p.3689.
62. SHY, shih-huo, 61:117, p.5932.
63. CHSC, ch.59, p.13a. In lst/1182 a new crop of wheat which 
had been successfully experimented in the palace farm was 
introduced to farmers in the various circuits of the empire. 
See ibid., ch.59, pp.l4a-14b.
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be seen from the many occasions when he genuinely expressed joy 
over good harvests and anxiety when adverse weather conditions 
appeared to threaten the crops.
Other than promoting agriculture, Hsiao-tsung also sought 
to strengthen the empire's economy through a series of financial 
reforms, some of which were aimed at achieving a more effective 
control of the national expenditure by the central government. In 
12th/1166, in response to an earlier proposal by the Left Policy
should be properly controlled, the emperor appointed the chief 
councillor and the assistant councillor to the concurrent positions 
of Controller and Co-Controller of the National Finance (t1ung-
Hsiao-tsung not only intended that his councillors should play a 
more effective role in financial administration but it was also his 
purpose to impose a more centralized control upon the national 
finance by placing it under the supervision of the chief ministers 
of state. Another measure to control national expenditure was 
introduced in 2nd/1167 when the emperor ordered that all government 
officials, whether civil or military and whether in the Inner or 
Outer Courts, should submit monthly statements of their official 
spending to the Bureau of National Expenditure (kuo-yung fang
not merely restricted to officials in the capital as government 
personnel in all prefectures were required to submit such monthly
64. SSCW, ch.24, p.1923; SHY, chih-kuan 6; 20-6: 21, pp.2506-07.
Critic that the national expenditure
chih kuo-yung shih ( respectively. By so doing
) on the 5th day of every month. This regulation was
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accounts. Such a measure would naturally result In more careful 
spending by government personnel and reduce cases of misappro­
priation of official funds. An additional reform to impose strict 
control over the national finance was introduced in 6th/1168 when 
a Centralized Register of Public Revenue (tu-chih tu-chi 
A ) was established according to the proposal of the 
Supervisor of Public Revenue Chao Pu-ti • The purpose
for setting up such a register was to enable easy checking of its
66
accounts and at the same time prevent abuses of corrupt clerks.
Apart from the great emphasis upon proper control, Hsiao-
tsung' s financial policy was also characterized by his desire to
reduce expenditure. The theme of frugality often emerged in the
policy discussion of the time. Also, the policy of retrenchment
was frequently resorted to as a measure to reduce expenditure
during the early years of the Ch'ien-tao era. Soon after his
accession, in an imperial decree issued in 4th/ll63, Hsiao-tsung
ordered the Ministry of Finance and the censorial officials to
67
discuSs ways of cutting down excessive expenditure. This was
followed by another decree in lst/1164, announcing the emperor's
decision to reduce expenses in the performance of religious 
68 A
ceremonies. Other than reducing unnecessary or excessive
65. SSCW, ch.24, p.1926.
66. CHSC, ch.47, pp.3a-3b; SHY, shih-huo 51:46, p.5697.
67. HTC, ch.138, p.3665.
6 8 . Ibid., ch.138, p.3679.
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expenses in matters concerning rituals, it was also the policy of
Hsiao-tsung and his court to decrease expenses incurred by the
military since these constituted the greatest item in the national
69
budget of the dynasty. The large number of soldiers during the 
70
Ch'ien-tao era prompted various proposals for reforms to be 
carried out in the army with the dual purpose of reducing expen­
diture on the one hand and improving upon the quality of the
troops on the other.
For example, in llth/1166 the General for the Palace
Infantry (pu-shuai^  gtj7 ) Ch'en Min carried out reform in
his army by dismissing the old and weak from the ranks, as a result
of which over 2,000 soldiers were retrenched from a total number of 
71
20.000 men. Based upon the estimate that the annual allowances 
of each soldier were 240 min, Ch'en concluded that by retrenching
2.000 men, he was able to save a total amount of 480,000 min for 
the court. He therefore proposed extending such a retrenchment 
scheme to the whole empire, saying that if 10% of the 300,000 
soldiers in the various regions were to be retrenched, expenditure 
would be reduced by 7.2 million min. It was Ch'en*s belief that 
such a reform would not only enrich the empire financially but
69. The stopping of war did not mean relaxation in the state 
defence, and 80% of the state income continued to be alloted 
to the army. See the tomb inscription for Chou Pi-ta in KKC, 
ch.93, p.887.
70. The number of soldiers during the Ch'ien-tao period is said 
to be not fewer than 400,000 men. See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.18, 
pp.4b-5 a.
71. SSCW, ch.24, p.1922.
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would also strengthen it militarily. Hsiao-tsung agreed with
72
Ch'en*s proposal and ordered it to be implemented.
However, a few months later, in 2nd/1167, the Second Privy 
Councillor Chiang Fei put forward another solution to the problem 
of military expenditure. While he agreed with Ch'en1s policy of 
retrenchment, he nevertheless pointed out that the implementation 
of the above reform would give rise to another problem as many of 
the retrenched were holders of official ranks (yu-kuan jen ^
A -  ) and were therefore entitled to receive pensions after 
their retirement. As a result, the expenses incurred would 
effectually remain the same; furthermore, since the vacancies 
left by those retrenched would soon be filled, the expenses might 
even be heavier than before. Chiang said that from his observation, 
there were more than 400 deserters from the army each month, and 
he calculated that if the vacancies left by these deserters were 
frozen for a year or more, several million min could have been 
saved. He also suggested that once the empire was financially 
strong, it could again start recruiting the strong and healthy for 
military training. The emperor was extremely impressed by
Chiang's proposal and remarked that the latter had indeed found
73
the solution to the financial problem of the time.
Hsiao-tsung's desire to reduce expenditure was also 
reflected in his frugality, which had often been commended as one 
of his greatest virtues. The emperor himself claimed that he had
72. SSCW, ch.24, pp.1922-23.
73. Ibid., ch.24, pp.1926-27.
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never spent a single cent extravagantly. He also publicly 
declared his frugality in the following conversation with one of 
his ministers. In 5th/1170, the Collator of the Imperial Library 
(chiao-shu lang ) Hsiao Kuo-liang , in
referring to the reign of Han Wu-ti <r. 140-87 B.C.),
criticized the latter for his extravagance, as a result of which 
the wealth and prosperity previously enjoyed by the state even­
tually gave way to economic decline. To this Hsiao-tsung replied:
It was not only Wu-ti /who failed in this area/.
From times of old the rulers had always observed 
frugality during times of difficulties, but after 
the establishment of peace few had not become 
extravagant. I have no other accomplishment 
apart from frugality.75
Being frugal himself, the emperor therefore did not 
approve of the extravagant practices of the populace, especially 
among the more well-to-do peasants. In 9th/1172 he criticized 
the people for lavish spending during times of good harvests and
76
said that they should be advised to save for times of emergency. 
From the emperor's comments regarding the extravagant tendencies 
among the commoners, it can be deduced that there was growing
74. Hsiao-tsung made this claim in 8th/1168, in response to an 
official's request that taxes should be gradually reduced 
to lessen the people's burden. See CHSC, ch.47, p.5a.
75. Ibid., ch.48, p.6a.
76. The emperor commented, "In recent years it appears that most 
commoners have adopted various extravagant habits. Whenever 
there happens to be a good harvest, they will spend lavishly 
on decorating their houses and on buying new and beautiful 
clothes. Many marriages will take place, with large sums of 
money being spent on the bridal trousseau...." See SSCW, 
ch.25, p.2003.
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prosperity in the country since the people could now afford a more
luxurious living. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the state
had become more wealthy under his rule, Hsiao-tsung still insisted
on living frugally. He set a good example by practising austerity
himself. He was satisfied with the existing buildings in the
palace he inherited from Kao-tsung and did not spend any money
expanding or renovating the premises. It is said that even the
Emperor Emeritus was surprised at the lack of decoration in the
77
palace surroundings when he visited his son in lst/1171. It was
his belief that frugality should start from the palace. In his
personal living Hsiao-tsung was also against Indulging in fanciful
food and in treasures such as jewellery or valuable collections 
78
of art. From his life-style it can be seen that the emperor 
regarded his personal enjoyment as secondary to the interests of 
his state.
< In order to build up a financially strong empire, Hsiao- 
tsung found that he had to continue with the policy of heavy 
taxation. During his reign the ching-tsung-chih ch*ien, the 
supplementary taxes previously introduced by Kao-tsung, continued
77. CHSC, ch.50, p.la.
78. In 8th/1175 Hsiao-tsung announced to his ministers that 
most of the jewellery used in the palace was inherited from 
former emperors and that less than 50,000 min had been 
spent on the purchase of jewels since he took over the 
throne. He further said that in order to eliminate extra­
vagance, one should start from the palace. See ibid. , ch.54, 
pp.21a-21b.
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to contribute greatly to the national income. The heavy tax
burden borne by the people had led to numerous criticism against 
oppressive taxation by prefectural authorities, whose chief concern 
was to meet the tax quota imposed by the central government. For 
example, in 9th/ll69 the Chancellery Imperial Recorder Lin Chi
Pointed out that oppressive taxes were imposed by prefectural 
administrators in order to remit the quota on time. Lin also
certain prefectural authorities in order to gain favour from the
prefectural officials for failing to appreciate his desire to treat
the people with kindness and sympathy. He also declared his
intention to gradually abolish the irregular taxes. On the
question of surplus revenue the emperor commented that the
financial situation of the time did not permit the prefectures to
have any surplus revenue. He thus promised to decline such
81
contributions in future. From Hsiao-tsung's response to Lin's 
criticism, it can be seen that while the emperor regarded revenue
79. In 6th/1167 the Minister of Finance Ts'ai Kuang^f, stated 
that the annual remittance of the ching-tsung-chih ch'ien 
totalled over 14 million strings of cash. See SHY, shih-huo, 
64:103, p.6151. Li Hsin-ch'uan also mentioned that the 
annual income from the ching-tsung-chih ch'ien gathered from 
the south-eastern prefectures amounted to 14.4 million min. 
See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.15, pp.4b-5a. This represented about 
20% of the annual cash income (which according to CYTC, Vol. 
1, ch. 14, p. la, was in the region of 65 million during the 
last year's of Hsiao-tsung's reign) from the south-eastern 
region.
80. HTC, ch.141, p.3762.
denounced the sending of "surplus revenue" (hsien-yii ) by
court.
80
Hsiao-tsung agreed with Lin and reprimanded the
81. Ibid.
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collection as important, he did not forget about the people*s
welfare. However, the problem of oppressive taxes could not be
totally eliminated as long as local authorities were required to
82
deliver their quota.
Although Hsiao-tsung was troubled by the problem of heavy
taxation and frequently expressed his desire to abolish all the
irregular and supplementary taxes, he found that he could not do
away with these taxes because of the extremely heavy military 
83
expenses. However, bearing in mind the suffering of the tax­
payers, Hsiao-tsung attempted to lessen their burden through
84
various measures, such as tax-remission, declination of
"surplus revenue" and prohibition of oppressive taxes. It is 
interesting to note that while Kao-tsung sought to increase the 
national income by introducing many new taxes, Hsiao-tsung, on the
82. The fact that prefectural and local authorities were mainly 
concerned about meeting tax quota w m  also pointed out by 
the Minister of Rites Liu Chang in llth/1170: 
"Administration in the sub-prefectures and villages is marked 
by carelessness nowadays. The authorities are merely 
interested in collecting tax money and as long as the quota 
is remitted, the prefectural administrators and the circuit 
intendants would be happy; they are not worried whether 
justice is being properly carried out in the local govern­
ments." See CHSC, ch.49, p. 13b. Also, in 1174 the Juni.or 
Lord of the Imperial Treasury (t*ai-fu shao-ch'ing iS*
y   ^ Hsiao Chih-min criticized the system of granting 
rewards to those who met the quota for the ching-tsung-chih 
ch* ien and requested that such a system should be abolished.
See WCC, ch.33, p.lib.
83. CHSC, ch.47, pp.lb-2a; ch.54, pp.22b-23a.
84. The remission of taxes was frequently practised throughout 
the reign of Hsiao-tsung, usually as a relief measure to 
areas which had suffered natural calamities. In 1166 he 
expressed his admiration for J e n - t u n g > ? ^ - w h o  remitted taxes 
for one whole year. See Liu K'e-chuang^jj fit , Hou-
ts*un ta ch*uan-chi ^  (SPTKed.), ch. 87, pp. 745-6.
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other hand, emphasized the importance of reducing expenditure in 
order to balance the national income. He also stressed upon proper 
and systematic control as the means to consolidate the national 
finance, as the various measures undertaken to control expenditure 
mentioned earlier would directly contribute towards increasing 
the income of the empire.
Defence Preparations
Despite the conclusion of the peace settlement, defence
preparations constituted a major item in the reconstruct!cm
programme of Hsiao-tsung and his court. The emperor regarded the
recruitment of military personnel as a matter of primary importance.
The issue was first raised in lst/1165 by the Secretariat Imperial
Recorder Wang Ch*i-chung ^  , who pointed out that the
descendants of military officials appeared to be ashamed to keep
up the military tradition of their families. He said that since
the country was then free from disturbances, it was a good time to
recruit military personnel so that the Sung would not be caught
unprepared in case of war. He then proposed selecting from among
the families of former generals those capable of a military career,
and encouraging them to continue the military tradition by awarding
85
them special honours. Hsiao-tsung agreed with his proposal and
said that this should be the urgent task of the day. Thus the
peace settlement by no means slackened the efforts of the emperor 
in the area of defence.
85. SSCW, ch.24, p.1899.
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Hsiao-tsung*s efforts in military preparations also
involved the building of walls in strategic locations. For
instance, wall-repairs were carried out in Chien-k'ang immediately
86
after the war in 1165. Particular attention was paid to the
defence of the northern Yang-tzu region with the rebuilding of
walls taking place in Yang-chou in 1167, Chen-chou and Ho-chou
-H' (modern Li-yang/^ hsien in An-hui) in 1168 and Lu-chou 
87
in 1170. Wall-repair projects were also implemented in Hsiang-
88
yang and Ch'u-chou (Huai-an hsien) in 1169 and 1170 respectively.
However, not all officials appeared to share the emperor's
enthusiasm for such measures. In 5th/1167, the Signatory Official
<  *of the Military Bureau, Wang Yen jp- , commented that in recent
years the scholar-officials appeared to be over-restrained and
timid in their discussion of policies, as shown by their
disapproval of the emperor sending the Commander of the Palace
Guards, Wang Ch’i, to measure the walls in the Huai region (for 
89
repair purposes). The officials' opposition was mainly due to 
their fear that such defence measures might arouse the enemy's 
suspicion and provoke them into renewing hostilities. Hsiao-tsung 
nevertheless did not see any harm in carrying out these defence
86. See SHY, fang-yu 9:13, p.7465.
87. See ibid., fang-yii 9:1-9, pp. 7459-63.
88. HTC, ch.141, p.3758 and p.3768.
89. SSCW, ch.24, p.1930.
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preparations and complained that the scholar-officials were being
Apart from their fear of provoking the enemy, the officials 
may also have opposed certain defence measures because of financial 
considerations. Since the bulk of the national expenditure went to 
defence, the question of how to strike a proper balance between 
strengthening the empire's defences and not over-taxing the people 
was often debated by Hsiao-tsung and his ministers. In 12th/1166, 
the Policy-Critic Ch'en Liang-yu stated the issue clearly:
Nowadays those who are profit-oriented are 
interested in creating more wealth, but this 
will only burden the people, while the 
government fimds become all the more insuffi­
cient.... We should try to reduce the number 
of officials and soldiers, so that 70% of the 
national expenditure can be alloted to keeping 
the soldiers and the officials, and 30% for 
emergency use....91
Hsiao-tsung replied that it had always been his desire to abolish
the irregular taxes so as to relieve the people's burden. Ch'en
Liang-yu commented that such irregular taxes had been introduced
because of the heavy expenses incurred during times of war but
they were not abolished even after the peace settlement had been
concluded. He then assured the emperor that his ambition to
remove all irregular taxes could be achieved if the national
92
expenditures could be reduced. On another occasion, in 3rd/1167,
when Chief Councillor Yeh Yung % requested that the forces
inflexible
90
90. Ibid.
93.. CHSC, ch.29, p.10b.
92. Ibid.
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in Chiang-chou vHj (modern Chiu-chiang hsien in Chi an g-
hsi) be disbanded, Hsiao-tsung agreed with deep regret that there
was no alternative to doing so. He commented, "It is easy to
recruit and train soldiers, but most difficult to provide for
them.... In future, when there is a surplus in revenue, we can
93
still recruit more soldiers."
certain areas in order to cut military expenses, Hsiao-tsung did 
not neglect the defence of strategic locations, as is shown by his 
wall-building efforts in both the Yang-tzu and Huai regions. In 
3rd/1167 he assigned the general Ch'en Min to the defence of Kao-
lining the infantry by retrenching the unfit from the ranks.
Defence of the north-western frontier was also given a high 
priority by the government. After the death of Wu Lin in 4th/1167, 
for example, Hsiao-tsung sent the Administrator of the Military 
Bureau Yii Yiin-wen to take his place as Pacification Commissioner 
of Ssu-ch'uan. After taking up his new post, Yii Yiin-wen 
contributed much in building up the defences of the Ssu-ch'uan and 
Shensi regions. He paid a great deal of attention to the 
recruitment of generals, as is evident from one of his memorials 
in 1167:
Though he was obliged to reduce the number of soldiers in
Huai-tung.
94 Ch'en had earlier been noted for stream-
Since coming to Ssu-ch'uan I have regarded the 
selection of generals as the most urgent 
matter. I have tried to make inquiries from
93. SSCW, ch.24, p.1928.
94. SSCW, ch.24, p.1929.
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all parties and kept records of those who had 
been recommended by others. I even interview 
them and examine their military skills....
He also improved the efficiency of the army by dismissing the weak 
96
and old. Dissatisfied with the performance of certain generals,
he requested that they be replaced with military personnel from
the southeast or even with former generals who had been demoted
97
such as Li Hsien-chung and others.
One of Yii Yiin-wen's outstanding contributions to the
defence of the north-western frontiers was the reorganization of
the local defence corps known as i-shih ^  (righteous men or
98
loyalist soldiers). As a kind of militia, these loyalist 
soldiers provided a means of defending the country without 
incurring heavy expenses. Instead of maintaining a regular army, 
Yii strongly advocated the use of these i-shih, who could be 
trained during the slack season of the farming year in preparation 
for any emergency. In a memorial dated 27/12th/1167 Yii reported 
that at the beginning of the Shao-hsing period, there were 70,000 
i-shih who had been recruited into the Southern Sung army, but 
their numbers had dwindled to a mere 6,000 in 1161. After the
95. SWCT, ch.57, pp.9a-10a.
96. See Yii Yun-wen's memorial dated 1168 in SWCT, ch.57, pp.13a- 
13b; see also CCC, ch.120, p.1070.
97. SWCT, ch.57, pp.l3a-13b. For Yii's efforts in the selection 
of generals see also KKC, ch.120, p.1070.
98. For an account of the i-shih, see WHTK, ch.156, p.1364;
CYTC, Vol.l, ch.18, pp.6b-9b.
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recent recruitment efforts, the number of i-shih who had been
reorganized in the various north-western prefectures of Hsing_
yuan ^u (modern N a n - c h e n g hsien in Shensi) ,
Yang-chou (modem Yang-hsien in Shensi) and Ta-an chun
(modem Ning-chiang hsien in Shensi) totalled over
I u / -----
23,900 men. Although the numbers from the other prefectures had 
yet to be reported, Yii estimated that about 30,000 men could be 
recruited for the purpose of local defence. He concluded by 
saying:
In this way, there is no need to go through 
the trouble of recruiting (regular) soldiers.
We can save yearly expenses by six to seven 
million min while at the same time obtaining 
the services of forty to fifty thousand men.
The advantages are therefore obvious....99
Subsequently, in 3rd/1169, Yii reported that over 26,000 i-shih
from Hsing-yuan fu, Yang-chou, Ta-an chun and Hsing-chou
(modem Liieh-yang hsien in Shensi) had been reorganized
into troops and had received training from the Commandant of the
Li-chou East circuit (Li-chou-tung lu tsung-kuan 'H'j ^
> Huang-fu T i a o ^ ^ ) / { | ^  with encouraging results. He
thus requested for Huang-fu to be stationed at Hsing-yuan for the
sole purpose of training the i-shih for emergency use and the
100emperor willingly complied. The i-shih therefore contributed
in no small way to the consolidation of the Southern Sung defence.
99. SWCT, ch.58, pp.l8b-19a; SHY, ping 1:25, p.6766.
100. SHY, ping 1:28, p.6767; WHTK, ch.156, p.1364.
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The recruitment and training of militia also took place in 
other areas besides Ssu-ch'uan. For example, on 4/llth/1168, an 
imperial edict was issued ordering the prefectural administrators 
of the Liang-Huai region to recruit loyalist soldiers (i-ping).
The recruitment was based on the number of males in each house­
hold —  one from every three males in each family was to be 
registered as i-ping and given military training during the slack 
season from the 10th month to the 1st month. Each soldier would 
be paid allowances during the period of t r a i n i n g . A l s o  in
lst/1168, the recruitment of the militia called the "Righteous
i jf. *
Brave" (i-yung W  ) took place in Ching-nan according
to the proposal of its ex-administrator Wang Yen, who had earlier
reported that over 8,400 men could be recruited into the militia 
102
service. The training of militia was diligently carried out
in different areas, and rewards would be given to the outstanding
103
men among the trainees as an incentive. In order not to
impose too much burden upon the peasants, it was also the court's
policy to assemble the militia for training for a period of one
104
month per year, during which their needs would be provided for.
101. SHY, ping 1:28, p.6767; WHTK, ch.156, p.1364.
102. Wang Yen also greatly emphasized the point that much expenses 
could be saved by using the i-yung militia. See CQgC. ch.47, 
p. la.. For an account of the i-yung militia in the Ching-o
region, see CYTC, Vol.l, ch.18, pp.8b-10a and WHTK, 
ch.156, pp.1365-66.
103. According to the imperial edict of l/6th/1172, during the 
training of militia in the Liang-Huai and Yang-tzu regions, 
outstanding men were to be chosen each year and their names 
submitted to the Military Bureau for the granting of 
rewards. See SHY, ping 1:33, p.6770.
104. See imperial edict of 23/12th/1172 in ibid,, ping 1:36, p.6771.
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Besides the use of local militia, the establishment of
military colonies (t'un-t' ien \$ ) was also regarded as a means
of strengthening defence while saving cost. According to the
t'un-t*ien system, the farms were to be worked upon by the regular
soldiers and the militia who stayed in different sections of the
colony. They would normally engage themselves in farming but take
105
up arms during times of emergency. This appears to be an ideal
way of defending the borders without incurring much cost, since
the soldiers were supposed to be self-supporting. However, the
projects were not always successful because of poor management and
106
other factors such as depopulation. In 2nd/1165 the emperor
assigned various generals, military commanders and circuit
intendants to take charge of the management and administration of
107
the military colonies in different parts of the empire.
Subsequently the scheme was abandoned in certain areas where the
projects were running at a loss, and the land was either leased
108out to the public or used for the settlement of refugees.
105. For an account of the t *un-t*ien of Southern Sung, see 
CYTC, Vol.1, ch.16, pp.lb-3a.
106. For example, in 1163 the Minister of Works Chang Shan 
pointed out the disadvantages of t'un-t'ien in the Ching- 
Hsiang region, saying that it was not because the farms 
could not be worked upon, but there were insufficient men 
to do the farming. Because of this, peasants were forced 
to work for official farms while neglecting their own farms. 
See WHTK, ch.7, p.78.
107. HTC, ch.139, p.3698; SHY, shih-huo 63:52, p.6012.
108. The t'un-t'ien in Hsli-i was abandoned in 2nd/1166 while that 
in Ho-chou and Lu-chou in lst/1170 and 7th/1172 respectively. 
See HTC, ch.139, p.3710; ch.141, p.3769 and ch.143, p.3818.
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In their efforts to build up the Southern Sung army, Hsiao- 
tsung and his court were also faced with the problem of controlling 
the generals. In 7th/1167 the emperor declared that he wished to 
appoint an Assistant Commander (fu tu-t'ung Jyj ) to each
of the military units in the Yang-tzu region. This was not only to 
keep reserves of army commanders for future use, but it was also 
intended to prevent the General Commanders (tu-t'ung fck j )
109
from accumulating too much power. Following this announcement
Kuo Kang pjjg was appointed Assistant Commander of Chen-chiang
?£ 110 
and Chang Jung>j^. 'jfL, that of Chien-kang. Thus in an attempt
to keep effective control over his military personnel, the emperor
resorted to the measure of balancing the power of the chief
commanders with that of the lesser generals.
Hsiao-tsung was also very interested in practical warfare, 
and personally took part in five nation-wide military exercises, 
three of which were carried out during the Ch ’ien-tao period: in 
1166 at Pai-shih / &  , 1168 at Mao-t'ang -^^jj,and 1170 at Pai- 
shih again. On each occasion Hsiao-tsung personally put on armour 
and directed the exercises. It was a grand spectacle and all the 
participants were richly rewarded.111 In addition, Hsiao-tsung
109. CHSC, ch.46, pp.9a-9b; WHTK, ch.59, p.540.
110. WHTK, ch.59, p.540.
111. For an account of the five military inspections carried 
out by Hsiao-tsung, see CYTC, Vol.2,ch. 4, pp.!2a-14b.
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112
practised the military arts of horsemanship and archery. Hsiao-
tsung's enthusiasm for the military arts and the tactical aspects 
113
of war was not, however, shared by his ministers, who feared 
that the emperor might injure himself and felt that His Majesty's 
interest in practical warfare would not contribute much to the 
dynasty's long-range preparations for reconquest. This was 
illustrated in the following episode.
In 6th/1169, Hsiao-tsung was recovering from an eye 
injury received while practising archery and had to hold audience 
with the ministers in the palace instead of attending the usual 
court sessions. He was thus admonished by Chief Councillor Ch'en 
Chun-ch'ing, who said:
Your Majesty has not been attending court for 
a month, and this causes much confusion in 
court.... I have heard that the rulers from 
times of old, once they attained positions of 
wealth and power, would indulge in the various 
pleasures of life ... which prevented them 
from becoming perfect rulers. Your Majesty, 
on the contrary, is diligent and frugal, pure 
and has few desires; you are able to discard 
the various vices possessed by able rulers of 
olden days, but you still cannot forget about 
horsemanship and archery. I know that it is 
not because you find pleasure in doing these, 
but it is because of your great ambition to
112. Hsiao-tsung kept physically fit by carrying a rod made of 
solid iron around the palace; he also kept a wooden horse 
in his chambers and practised archery on horse-back during 
his leisure hours. See Lo Ta-ching /v. , Ho-lin yu-
M i l  (pal-hal M  -Jif ed. )~, ch. 5, ,p. 12b; f a n g
Y u n g - y i n , Sung-pai lei-ch' ao jpg /£?
(Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chii ^  /fj > 1967), ch.l, p. 13b.
113. In the Hsuan-te palace hall Hsiao-tsung had various charts 
of defence strategy or troop movements pinned on the wall
so that he could constantly refer to them. See WCC, ch. 104, 
p . 1 lb.
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achieve reconquest that you practise the military 
arts yourself. . .. 114
He went on to say that if the emperor was able to appoint the right 
men in both the civil and military fields, and raise the morale 
of the soldiers with a fair system of government, his reputation 
would be enough to frighten off the enemy, and it would not be
arguments indicate that he believed in long-term planning to 
achieve the goal of hui-fu, and considered this as more important 
than the practical manouvres of war esteemed by the emperor.
Foreign Relations and Hsiao-tsung*s Ambition to achieve hui-fu
It was not only in the military arts and physical sports 
that the emperor found himself restrained by his ever-camtious 
ministers, but in the area of foreign policy he was also being 
constantly reminded not to act rashly. Indeed, in the early years 
of the Ch'ien-tao period, it had been the policy of the court to 
maintain a low posture in foreign relations with the Jurchen. For 
instance, in llth/1167, during a court debate on reconquest, the 
Co-Administrator of the Military Bureau Liu Kung said that even 
though revenge should be the major concern of the court, he 
believed that the Sung should not make a rash move before they 
had actually carried out internal reforms for the next ten years. 
One of his colleagues asked, "Emperors Kao-tsu Jq X'Q. and Kuang-
wu (founders of the Western and Eastern Han respectively)
necessary for him to engage in fighting them himself.
115
C h 'en's
114. CWC, ch.96, p.1718; SSCW, ch.25, p.1950.
115. Ibid.
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both rose from the status of commoners, but they were able to
conquer the empire within a few years. Why, then,should we
wait for ten years?" Liu Kung replied, "It was simply because
they rose from the status of commoners that Kao-tsu and Kuang-wu
could personally involve themselves with dangerous undertakings
without any cares, but Your Majesty has been entrusted with the
responsibility of an empire of two hundred years. How can we
compare Your Highness with the two (Han) emperors?" He then
called upon Hsiao-tsung to emulate the example of King Hsiian
(Hsiian-wang ‘#  ^  ) of the Chou dynasty, who was able to
116
achieve restoration after a period of internal reform. Liu
Kung's views can be said to represent the general opinion at 
court, since most of the officials were in favour of a period of 
internal consolidation before embarking upon any aggressive 
foreign policy,117
Nevertheless, long before the ten-year period advocated by 
Liu Kung was up, Hsiao-tsung began to show signs of impatience at 
the court's timid attitude towards the enemy. In 7th/1167, when 
told by the Policy Critic Adviser Ch'en Liang-yu that the recent 
repairs of the walls in Yang-chou were not regarded as beneficial
116. For an account of the above court debate on hui-fu, see 
CWC, ch.97, pp,1728-29; CHSC, ch.46, pp.l5a-15b,
117. Besides Ch'en Chun-ch'ing and Liu Kung, many other officials 
had advocated putting their own state in order (tzu-chih) 
before actively considering hui-fu. These include prominent 
scholar-officials such as Chang Shih and Chu Hsi. For 
Chang's views on hui-fu see his tomb inscription in CWC,
ch.89, pp.1578-79, and for Chu's stand on this matter, see 
his sealed memorial dated l/llth/1188 in CWC, ch.11, 
p.178.
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by the officials, the emperor asked, "How can defence preparations 
not be beneficial?" To this Ch'en replied:
Supposing the enemy were to__attack us and we 
failed to defend the city /of Yang-chou/, we 
would have built the walls for them. Now that 
we have sent twenty t£ thirty thousand men 
across the Yang-tzu /for wall-repairs and 
defence of Yang-chou/, fresh hostilities 
could break out if the enemy happened to know 
about it.
Unconvinced, Hsiao-tsung commented, "Such measures should indeed 
not be carried out in the Huai region, but what is the harm of 
doing so in the internal area?" Ch'en still advised the emperor 
to be cautious and concluded by referring to the theme of conso­
lidation, emphasizing that the essential thing in defence was none 
other than selecting military personnel, saving up funds and 
resources, cherishing the people and providing for the soldiers. ^
From the above, it can be seen that the emperor appeared 
to possess more courage and zeal than his ministers in matters 
concerning defence and foreign policy, and he occasionally 
adopted a more militant attitude in foreign relations. This was 
especially noticeable in the later years of the Ch'ien-tao era, 
during which period Hsiao-tsung found a great supporter in YU Yiin- 
wen, who was also in favour of a stronger foreign policy. On 
becoming Right Chief Councillor in 8th/1169, Yu put forward his 
idea of sending envoys to Chin to request for the territory of 
the imperial tombs in Ho-nan. This was strongly opposed by the 
Left Chief Councillor Ch'en Chun-ch'ing on the grounds that such
H 8. SSCW, ch.24, p. 1931.
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action might put the enemy on the alert and even provoke them
into declaring war upon Sung, which was far from ready to fight.
He regarded such a move as abandoning the major to obtain the
minor, arguing that once the goal of hui-fu had been achieved,
the territory of the imperial tombs would naturally be restored to
the Sung, while any attempts to obtain it at the moment would lead
119
to more harm than good. Because of Ch’en's opposition Hsiao-
tsung decided to postpone sending envoys for the above purpose
for the time being, but he finally adopted Yli’s proposal in the
following year. Ch'en then insisted on resigning and was given
a prefectural position as Administrator of Fu-chou X-% in
5th/1170, but before he left, the faithful councillor again
requested the emperor not to dispatch envoys to Chin without
120careful consideration.
Nevertheless, Hsiao-tsung had already made up his mind.
In the summer of 1170, at Yii Yiin-wen's recommendation, the 
Chancellery Imperial Recorder Fan Ch'eng-ta was appointed envoy 
to Chin. Besides his major mission of requesting the territory of 
the imperial tombs, Fan had an additional duty of requesting an 
alteration in the rites for receiving the Chin letter of state by 
the Sung. Since the peace settlement of 1142, it had been the 
practice of the Sung emperor to descend from his throne to receive 
letters of state from the Chin envoy. The same procedure was
119. For Ch’en's arguments against the sending of envoys to 
request for the territory of the imperial tombs, see CWC, 
ch.96, p.1718.
120. CWC, ch.96, p.1719; SSCW, ch.25, p.1965.
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followed after the 1165 treaty, and feeling that such rites were
degrading, it had been Hsiao-tsung's intention for some time to
bring about the change in the ceremony, but he had earlier been
121
discouraged from doing so by Ch'en Chun-ch'ing. Fearing that
such a request might indeed be provocative to the enemy, Hsiao-
tsung did not include it in the state letter, but briefed Fan
122
Ch’eng-ta about it.
Because of the fears of arousing the enemy's suspicion, 
a number of officials voiced their opposition to the mission of 
Fan Ch'eng-ta. The Minister of War, Huang Chung a  , commended 
the emperor for his filial piety in trying to retrieve the tombs 
of his ancestors, but expressed his regrets that the court had
123
not requested the return of the imperial coffin of Ch'in-tsung.
The Minister of Personnel, Ch'en Liang-yu, submitted a more
strongly-worded memorial, protesting that such a mission could
possibly lead to war, and that Sung was in a poor state to face
an enemy invasion. He was also of the opinion that if a mission
should be sent, it would be more appropriate to request for the
coffin of Ch'in-tsung. Hsiao-tsung was offended by his memorial
124
and ordered that Ch'en be dismissed and exiled. The mission
121. SSPM, ch.77, p.824.
122. It is said that Fan Ch'eng-ta suggested to Hsiao-tsung to 
include the second request on the alteration of rites in 
the state letter requesting for the territory of the 
imperial tombs, but the emperor did not want to make the 
second request official. See biography of Fan Ch'eng-ta, 
SS, ch.386, p.11868.
123. CHSC, ch.48, p.14a.
124. SSPM, ch.77, pp.824-5.
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was also opposed by the Chancellery Imperial Recorder Chang Shih;
at an imperial audience, he told the emperor that the internal
weakness of the Sung did not permit it to adopt an aggressive
foreign policy. He further emphasized that a time of internal
consolidation was necessary in order to ensure eventual victory 
125
for the Sung. It can be seen from the above that the general
attitude of the court was one of extreme caution, and any policy 
which might lead to hostilities with the enemy was immediately 
frowned upon. Therefore, Hsiao-tsung did not have the support of 
his court in his attempt to improve the Sung position in foreign 
relations. The only exception appears to have been Yii Yiin-ven, 
who thus became his trusted minister in the ensuing two to three 
years.
Fan Ch'eng-ta returned from Chin in 9th/1170. Although
the second request on the alteration of rites for receiving the
Chin letter of state was not originally included in the Sung state
letter, Fan managed to submit a memorial on this issue to the Chin
126
emperor. The Chin refused to grant the two requests, but the 
initiative shown by Fan in fighting for the Sung cause was deeply
125. CWC, ch.89, pp.1578-79; SSPM, ch.77, pp.824-5.
126. In their reply, the Chin stated that with regard to the 
issue of the imperial tombs, they were only willing to 
bring about a transfer of these tombs; regarding the issue 
on the receiving of Chin letter of state, an alteration in 
the rites would mean a lack of distinction between the 
superior and inferior status of the two states, and would 
reflect badly on the sincerity of the Sung in observing 
the peace agreement. See SSPM, ch.77, p.826.
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appreciated by Hsiao-tsung.
127
Also, despite the failure of Fan's
mission, Hsiao-tsung did not give up trying to influence the Chin 
to grant the two requests. In llth/1170 the Drafting Official of
mission to greet the Chin emperor on his birthday, but he also 
carried with him a letter requesting the alteration in the rites
Chao Hsiung greatly pleased Hsiao-tsung by reporting that the 
people of the Central Plain were daily awaiting the arrival of
however, for at that time the Chin state was actually experiencing
achieve hui-fu, Chao Hsiung seems to have been willing to go to 
the extent of distorting facts in order to gain the emperor's 
favour.
Having failed to bring about further improvement in the 
diplomatic status of the Sung and knowing the difficulties
127. Tomb inscription for Fan Ch'eng-ta, WCC, ch.61, p.18a;
HTC, ch.142, p.3785.
128. HTC, ch.142, p.3789.
129. The Chin emperor sent a messenger to Chao Hsiung, 
questioning why the Sung did not request for the imperial 
coffin of Ch'in-tsung, and saying that since such a request 
had not been made, they would give him a burial in Chin. 
There was not a word about the rites for receiving the 
state letter. See ibid.
130. CYTC, Vol.1, ch.8, p.4b.
131. HTC, ch.142, p.3795.
the Imperial Secretariat Chao
128
for receiving Chin state letter. However, the Sung request was
129
again rejected by the Jurchen. After his return in 3rd/1171,
the Sung army.
130
This appears to have been far from the truth,
peace and prosperity.
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Knowing Hsiao-tsung's ambition to
involved in hui-fu, Hsiao-tsung frequently expressed his regrets 
for the lack of military accomplishment during his own reign. On 
one occasion in 7th/1171, he told the councillors that he had 
often regretted the fact that his accomplishment was not as great 
as that of T'ang T'ai-tsung, and that the country’s wealth was
Your Majesty keeps to the virtue of frugality, after a number of 
years our country’s wealth will not be less than that of Han 
Wen-ti and Ching-ti. In order to be as successful as T'ang T ’ai- 
tsung, it is up to Your Majesty to work hard and daily remind 
yourself of your duty.” To this Hsiao-tsung replied:
I consider none of the three tasks of founding, 
preserving and restoring as easy, that is why 
I work diligently day and night, not daring to 
relax for a single moment. After the day's work 
is over, I will reflect on what I have done in 
case I have accidentally neglected some of my 
duties. I will think over and over for fear of 
making mistakes.... 132
Hsiao-tsung's statement not only testifies that he was a diligent 
and conscientious monarch, but it also reveals the heavy burden 
and responsibilities he had to bear as the consolidator of the 
Southern Sung empire.
During the above conversation, Hsiao-tsung also told his 
ministers that he had pasted on his desk the character "generals” 
(chiang ) in order to constantly remind himself of his duty to
132. For the above conversation between Hsiao-tsung and the 
councillors, see CHSC, ch.50, pp.15b-16a.
not comparable to that during
Ching-ti Thereupon Yii Yiin-wen consoled him, saying, "If
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select military personnel. He further said that it was his chief
concern that after years of continuous searching, he had still
not discovered the right way to recruit generals. He then called
upon the ministers to consider this problem. Yii Yiin-wen again
consoled the emperor, saying that men of ability would only
appear during times of emergency, to which Hsiao-tsung fully 
133
agreed. From the above, it can be seen that for many years,
it had been Hsiao-tsung's ambition to strengthen Sung military 
power through the recruitment of good generals, but was frustrated 
with his own failure to find the right personnel.
Hsiao-tsung's ambition to achieve reconquest became more
apparent during the last years of the Ch'ien-tao era. Following
the mission of Fan Ch'eng-ta many an opportunist fell in line with
imperial wishes by memorailising about hui-fu, and more than ten
were given official positions for having impressed the emperor
134
with their proposals to achieve reconquest. In 9th/1172 the
emperor decided to send Yii Yiin-wen (who had resigned from his 
position of chief councillor) once again to Ssu-ch’uan as its 
Pacification Commissioner. The grand farewell given to Yu 
indicates the importance Hsiao-tsung attached to Yti's assignment.
133. CHSC, ch.50, p.16b.
134. See WCC, ch.61, p.18b.
135. Yii Yiin-wen was allowed to leave with great honour; Hsiao- 
tsung presented him with valuable gifts consisting of 
sacrificial vessels from the imperial temple and personally 
wrote him a poem. It is said that the grand treatment given 
to Yii was unprecedented in the farewell given to any of the 
chief councillors since the beginning of the Southern Sung. 
See CYTC, Vol.2, ch.12, pp.5a-5b.
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It is said that before Yii left for Ssu-ch'uan, the emperor
discussed with him the strategy of advancing the army into the
Central Plain; he even ordered Yii to set a time for joint military
action (between the Ssu-ch'uan army led by Yii and the imperial
136
army led by the emperor himself) in Ho-nan. From his parting
instruction to Yii, it is thus clear that Hsiao-tsung intended to 
play a direct role in the military campaign against the enemy. It 
was indeed Hsiao-tsung's cherished dream to lead his army 
personally to victory, just as T'ang T'ai-tsung had.
During his second term as Pacification Commissioner of
Ssu-ch'uan, Yii Yiin-wen further consolidated the defence in Ssu-
ch'uan by selecting able generals, raising the morale of the
soldiers with higher pay, increasing the supply of horses and
reorganizing the troops for better co-ordination in the event of 
137
war. Hsiao-tsung, however, was unhappy over the fact that
after having been sent to Ssu-ch'uan for more than a year, Yii
still had not set a date for counter-attack. Getting rather
impatient, the emperor is said to have sent confidential messages
to Yii, urging him to get on with his mission of reconquest. Thus
when Yii replied that the army was not ready yet for an offensive
138
campaign, Hsiao-tsung apparently was much displeased.
Consequently, when Yii died the following year, it is said that
136. See HTC, ch.143, p.3821.
137. See CCC, ch.120, pp.1072-73.
138. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.8, p.2b and p.5a; HTC, ch.144, p.3838.
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the emperor refused to grant him any posthumous honours. However,
Hsiao-tsung's prejudice against Yu was finally removed when he
witnessed the high quality of the troops in a subsequent military
exercise, and gave Yu due credit for his painstaking efforts in
139
selecting and training the soldiers.
It is thus seen that in the later part of the Ch'ien-tao 
era, Hsiao-tsung began to adopt a more aggressive posture in 
foreign relations. Apart from his optimism regarding hui-fu, he 
was also more persistent in bargaining for an improvement in the 
status of Sung. The controversy over the rites for receiving 
Chin letter of state in 12th/1173 led to a certain amount of 
tension in early 1174, as we shall see in the following chapter. 
The fact that Hsiao-tsung felt confident enough to adopt a more 
aggressive foreign policy by the end of the Ch'ien-tao period 
could be an indication that in the last decade of reconstruction, 
Southern Sung had consolidated much of its power and could now 
face the enemy with renewed strength and greater confidence.
139. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.8, p.2b; HTC, ch.144, p.3838.
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CHAPTER V
COURT POLITICS DURING THE CH’UN-HSI ERA: 
GROWTH OF ABSOLUTISM 1174-1189
At the beginning of 1174, Hsiao-tsung changed his reign
1 2 
title from Ch’ien-tao to Ch'un-hsi (Unadulterated Splendour).
Even though the Ch'ien-tao period had been one of revival and 
restoration after the 1161-64 war, the emperor apparently was not 
really satisfied with his own accomplishments during the last 
decade. He was constantly troubled by the fact that the Sung 
was comparatively weaker than the Han and T'ang dynasties in the 
military field, and one of his greatest regrets was his inability 
to achieve reconquest during the Ch’ien-tao era. By the end of 
1173 the emperor had clearly adopted a more aggressive stand in 
foreign relations, and it appears to be his intention to achieve 
a more glorious reign in the years to come.
The Ch'un-hsi era, which lasted for sixteen years till 
Hsiao-tsung's retirement in 1189, is noted for the continued 
efforts made by the Sung government in order to improve its
1. The Ch’ien-tao era was deemed to have completed its cycle, 
since the character ch'ien which represents Heaven
(ch’ien-yuanffi)^J ), is symbolised by the number "nine” in 
the art of Chinese divination. So the era was considered to 
have reached its ultimate after a period of nine years. See 
CYTC, Vol.1, ch.3, p.la.
2. The reign title Ch'un-hsi was named after the two reign 
titles of T'ai-tsung: Ch' un-hua y J^'{^//(990-994) and Yung-hsi
(984-987) . See CYTC, Vol.l, ch. 3, pp.lb-2a.
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status vis-a-vis the Chin. Domestically, the state was able to 
enjoy political stability and economic prosperity. The years of 
reconstruction had indeed borne fruit in that the populace could 
now afford to live more comfortably, even indulging in some 
luxury. Moreover, as a result of Hsiao-tsung*s frugality, the 
imperial treasuries were filled to the brim. Politically, the 
emperor remained as the apex of power, exercising his authority 
in a decisive and assertive manner, allowing no one to overshadow 
his position as decision-maker. Prompted by his success in 
domestic politics and feeling ever more confident of himself, 
Hsiao-tsung, who had already revealed certain autocratic 
tendencies during his early years on the throne, portrayed such 
characteristics even more distinctly as he grew older. His 
authoritarian approach could be seen through his control over the 
bureaucracy and his relations with the ministers and other 
personnel. As his grip over the bureaucracy tightened, the 
officials became even more submissive to the emperor*s authority. 
It is noted that most of the chief councillors who served during 
this period were men whose political views seldom differed from 
that of Hsiao-tsung himself and who were more complaisant about 
imperial conduct and court policy. Consequently, court politics 
was less marked by the stormy scenes which prevailed during the 
previous era. The Chrun-hsi period is therefore characterized 
by the growth of absolutism; nevertheless, it should be 
recognised that such absolutism was not necessarily a bad thing 
as it appears to have brought a period of peace and order to the 
domestic scene.
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Foreign Relations since 1174
As was mentioned In the previous chapter, during the last 
years of the Ch'ien-tao era Hsiao-tsung became more persistent in 
bargaining for an improvement in the diplomatic status of the 
Sung. It was towards the end of 1173 and the beginning of 1174 
when the Southern Sung adopted the most aggressive posture in its 
relations with the Chin. This was revealed by the treatment
Wan-yen Chang, who was sent on a New Year Greetings mission to
Sung, was initially prevented from seeing the emperor because of
disagreement over the protocol for receiving the Chin letter of
state. It is clear that Hsiao-tsung, who had all the while been
unhappy about having to descend from his throne in order to
receive the Chin state letter, again attempted to bring about an
alteration in the rites stipulated by the peace treaty of 1165.
The envoy was eventually given an imperial audience after the
intervention of the Emperor Emeritus (Kao-tsung), who persuaded
3
Hsiao-tsung to observe the former rites for the time being.
However, after his return to Chin in 2nd/1174, Wan-yen Chang was
severely punished for having brought dishonour to the Chin
4
government during his last mission. Although the Sung records 
are quite silent about the incident, it can be deduced from the
3. HTC, ch.143, p.3836.
4. Wan-yen Chang was accused of allowing the Chin state letter 
to be taken away in an improper manner and of succumbing to 
the bribery of the Sung. See C£, ch.61, piao jf'/ 3, p. 1453; 
HTC, ch.143, p.3838. ^
given to the Chin 12th/1173.
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Indignation of the Chin that proper rites had not been observed 
during Wan-yen Chang's embassy. The fact that Hsiao-tsung did 
not appear to be worried about the possible consequences of such 
action does indicate his confidence to confront the Chin at this 
time.
As we may recall, it was with great expectation that
Hsiao-tsung appointed Yii Yun-wen Pacification Commissioner of Ssu-
ch'uan in 1172 and assigned him the important mission of
reconquest. The vision of hui-fu appears to have been most
realistic to the emperor at this particular moment for in his
conversation with Yu, he seems to have actually entertained hopes
5
of an imminent reconquest. However, such hopes soon turned to 
frustration when Yli Yun-wen, having been sent to Ssu-ch'uan for 
over a year, did not make any move towards the launching of a 
military campaign. The emperor's loss of patience was also 
reflected by his refusal to follow the former protocol in receiving 
the Chin envoy. Nevertheless, despite his disappointment in Yii, 
Hsiao-tsung must have had sufficient confidence in the military 
strength of the Sung that he had the courage to defy the Chin in 
early 1174.
Following the punishment of Wan-yen Chang, there arose
rumours among Chin officials regarding the renewal of hostilities
6
between the two states. This did not take place however, as 
neither the Chin nor the Sung was keen to go into war once again.
5. See Chapter IV, pp. 187-188,
6. HTC, ch.143, p.3838.
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Nevertheless, in 3rd/1174, the Chin emperor decided to send the
Minister of Punishment Liang Su as Commissioner of Inquiry
to Sung (Sung-kuo hsiang-wen shih ^  to query the
latter for failing to adhere to the stipulated rites during the
previous embassy. When Liang arrived at the Sung court, Hsiao-
tsung, seeing that the Jurchen were really offended, decided to
comply with their wishes by standing up from his throne to receive
7
the Chin letter of state. By so doing Hsiao-tsung thus avoided
the prospect of war. Another factor which might have influenced
the emperor to withdraw from his aggressive posture was the death
8
of Yii Yun-wen in 2nd/1174. The loss of his strongest supporter
in foreign policy at this crucial moment must have been rather 
disheartening to Hsiao-tsung that he decided to give in to the 
Chin. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the emperor was 
willing to drop the issue, for he made several more attempts to 
have the humiliating rites altered. In 4th/1174, it was decided 
to send the Minister of Works Chang Tzu-yen J'fL to Chin in
response to the Chin inquiry, and at the same time to formally 
request for an alteration in the ceremony for the receiving of 
Chin state letter. However, the request was once again turned 
down by the Chin emperor, who insisted that the Sung should
7. Biography of Liang Su, CS, ch.86, pp.1983-84.
8. Yu Yun-wen died of illness less than two years after taking 
up his appointment as Pacification Commissioner of Ssu-ch’uan. 
His untiring devotion to his duties is said to have caused 
his death. See CCC, ch.120, p.1073.
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continue to observe former protocol.
Apart from the issue above, the problem of the Sung 
imperial tombs being in the hands of the enemy continued to disturb 
Hsiao-tsung. Despite the failure of the Fan Ch'eng-ta mission to 
request the territory of the imperial tombs in 1170, Hsiao-tsung 
refused to give up hope entirely. In 8th/1175 he decided to send 
the Left Policy Critic T'ang Pang-yen on a similar mission 
to Chin. T'ang, the man chosen for this difficult task, was a 
protege of Yu Yun-wen. Since his appointment as a censorial 
official in mid-1175, T'ang had been noted for his boldness in 
criticizing various matters and his performance had greatly 
impressed the emperor.^ Unfortunately, T'ang turned out to be 
a great disappointment to Hsiao-tsung for it is said that while he 
was at the Chin court, the envoy so trusted by the emperor failed 
to utter a single word for the Sung c a u s e . T h u s  when T'ang 
returned in 4th/1176, the angry emperor ordered that he be exiled
9. A debate was held in the Chin court regarding the Sung request
for an alteration in ceremony. While some officials contended
that the Sung had already been granted enough concession in 
the peace treaty, others were afraid that refusal might lead 
to hostilities. The Chin emperor, fearing that compliance 
might encourage further demands from the Sung, decided that 
its request should not be granted. See HTC, ch.144, p.3842.
10. See Anonymous, Ching-k'ou ch* i-chiu chuan ^  ^  ^  in
shou-shang-ko ts'ung-shu ti-4 (Taipei: I-wen yin-
s h u ~ k u a n " ^  7 1968), cl?. 8,%. 5a.
11. After his arrival at the Chin capital, T'ang Pang-yen was
not permitted to see the Chin emperor immediately. He was
finally summoned after more than ten days, but on his way 
to court, he saw the path lined up with soldiers carrying 
arms. Consequently, T'ang was so frightened that he did 
not dare to utter a single word. See CHSC, ch.54, p.16a.
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12
for failing to preserve the honour of the Sung state. From then 
on Hsiao-tsung decided to drop the issue of the imperial tombs and 
no more envoys were sent on such missions.
Nevertheless, the emperor did not give up his attempts to
improve the diplomatic status of the Sung. In 12th/1181 the Chin
envoy on a New Year Greetings mission was involved in another
controversy over the rites for receiving the Chin state letter.
Hsiao-tsung once again insisted that he should remain seated on
his throne when the letter was handed over to him. He sent the
General Transmitter of Directives in the Military Bureau, Wang
Pien, a trusted Inner Court attendant, to speak to the Chin envoy
in an attempt to influence the latter to agree to an alteration
in the ceremony concerned. Wang, however, failed in his task to
persuade the Chin envoy into accepting the Sung request, and
instead, gave in to the Chin demand by consenting that the former 
13
rites be followed. The emperor was naturally displeased and 
had Wang dismissed the following month. This was the last 
occasion when the issue of the state letter was raised.
Since the many attempts made by Hsiao-tsung to upgrade 
the international status of the Sung did not lead to any concrete 
results, it is understandable why the emperor should feel rather 
frustrated in the area of foreign relations and frequently 
expressed his regrets for the military weakness of the Sung.
12. T'ang was accused of having received bribes from the Chin. 
See CHSC, ch.54, p.16a.
13. CHSC, ch.56, p.9a; HTC, ch.148, p.3954; biography of Wang 
Pien, SS, ch.470, p.13674.
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For example, in 10th/1176, when he was praised by his ministers 
for practising frugality in the palace, Hsiao-tsung replied, ’"The 
domestic laws in our dynasty are far superior to those of Han
14
and T ’ang; the only thing we lag behind is military achievement.
On another occasion in 6th/1184, in a conversation with Chief 
Councillor Wang H u a i ^  , Hsiao-tsung again commented that the 
military power of the Sung was far below that of Han and T'ang 
and attributed Sung victories in certain battles to Heaven's help. 
Wang agreed, saying that the benevolence of the Sung rulers would 
lead to victories, not through force, but through reason. The 
emperor then consoled himself by referring to the failure of Han 
Wu-ti:
During the reign of Han Wu-ti the military 
power of the empire caused awe and trembling 
thousands of miles away, but what had it 
accomplished? Instead, the losses incurred 
were much too great!15
From Hsiao-tsung's comments in the two conversations above, it is 
clear that even though on the one hand the emperor was unhappy 
about the lack of military accomplishment, on the other hand, he 
was undoubtedly proud of his achievement in domestic affairs.
Also, despite Hsiao-tsung*s personal dissatisfaction, it 
should nevertheless be recognized that during his reign the Sung 
state was in a much stronger position than before. It was during 
this period that the Sung had the best bargaining power vis-a-vis 
the Chin in foreign relations, and this could be attributed
14. CHSC, ch.54, p.23b.
3.5. CHSC, ch.61, p. 7a; HTC, ch . 149 , p. 3988.
198
largely to the consolidation of military power and the constant
defence preparations undertaken by Hsiao-tsung and his court.
During the Ch'un-hsi era two more large-scale military exercises
were held - once in 1177 at Mao-t'ang and the other in 1185 at
Lung-shan (south of modem Hang-hsien in Che-
16
chiang) Military training of archers was frequently held in
the palace and archery contests also took place in conjunction
17
with palace feasts. Furthermore, in order to encourage scholar-
officials to cultivate an interest in the military arts, the
Imperial University students and successful Chin-shih candidates
were also required to take part in archery contests and were
18
rewarded according to their skills.
In spite of the various efforts made during the Ch'ien-
tao era to reduce military expenditure, the very fact that the
army continued to account for over 80% of the national expend!- 
19
ture shows clearly that the absence of war did not mean the lack 
of military preparedness. The number of soldiers in the imperial 
army remained in the region of 400,000 and their maintenance
16. See CYTC, Vol.2, ch.4, p.4b.
17. CHSC, ch.53, p.2b and p.13a.
18. CHSC, ch.59, p.19b; WHTK, ch.32, p.301.
19. In lst/1183 Hsiao-tsung commented that it was expensive to 
keep the army since about 80% of the national expenditure 
went to the military. The Administrator of the Military 
Bureau Chou Pi-ta replied that it was even more than 80%. 
See CHSC, ch.60, p.lb; KKC, ch.93, p.887.
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alone came to 80 million min annually. Besides, the training
of militia, the buying and tending of horses and the management
of military colonies (t'un-t'ien) further increased the expenses
of the government. Military training of both the regular soldiers
and the militia was strongly emphasized by Hsiao-tsung. For
instance, in 8th/1177 imperial orders were issued for the
prefectural administrators to take charge of the training of
militia (min-ping ) for one month during the slack season.^1
Furthermore, the prefectural administrators we>re also responsible
for the training of the imperial army (chin-chun )
22
stationed in their respective territories. Special attention
23
was also given to the tending of horses used for war. For
example, in 5th/1176 the emperor personally cautioned the officials
in charge of tending horses (mu-ma kuan .&Jbt ) to take good
24
care of the horses. While the training of militia and the
20. See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.18, pp.4b-5a. This was based upon the 
calculation that each soldier's annual allowances came to 
about 200 min.
21 . CHSC, ch.55, p.16b.
22. In the imperial edict of 8th/1177 the prefectural adminis­
trators in the different circuits were required to carry out
strict supervision upon the military officials so that the 
latter would be diligent in training the soldiers. The 
court would also send officials to make unexpected inspec­
tions upon these troops and any fall in standards would 
result in the impeachment of the administrators concerned. 
See CHSC, ch.55, pp.l6b-17a.
23. For a brief account of the horse-administjration of the 
Southern Sung, see Chin J*ao-hsiang /jfc , "Nan-Sung ma-
cheng k ' ± in Sung-LdLao-Chin-Yuan Shih
1 un-chi jjj jr jjL (SLCYS) (Hong Hong: Ch'ung-
wen shu-tien J, , 1971), pp.321-330.
24. CHSC, ch.54, p.18b.
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acquisition of horses led to heavy expenses and harlship among the
25 '
populace, these efforts are nevertheless indicative of an
active defence policy. The pursuance of a strong policy in
defence is also shown by the renewed interest in t*un-t*ien in
the later years of the Ch'un-hsi era. In 5th/1183 the t 'un-t*ien
project in Hsiang-yang was reorganized according to the proposal
of the Assistant Commander of 0-chou, Kuo Kao^jp;^- . ^  This
was followed by the reorganization of the military colonies in
27
Ho-chou and Chien-k'ang in 6th/1183.
Because of the vigilance of Hsiao-tsung in matters
concerning defence, it is said that the Jurchen were in fact
afraid that the Sung might one day launch a counter-attack 
28
against them. The various diplomatic attempts of Hsiao-tsung 
to upgrade the Sung position in foreign relations were after all
k
25. For example, in his memorial in 3rd^ll82, the Registrar of 
the Imperial University Yang C h i a ^ ^ ? ^  criticized that the 
militia system caused much hardship and suffering among the 
people of Liang-Huai, and the urgency to acquire horses 
caused the Sung to pay high prices for these. See ibid., 
ch.59, p .19b,
26. SHY, shih-huo 63: 52-53, pp.6012-13. Kuo memorialised about 
the advantages of the t'un-t'ien system and said that after 
experiencing peace for many years, it was time to organize 
the military colonies in a proper manner.
27. SHY, shih-huo 63: 53, p.6013; HTC, ch.148, p.3968.
28. It is said that the Chin emperor, Shih-tsung (r. 1161-1189), 
had frequently reminded his ministers.to accumulate resources 
and take care of border defence, saying that he was afraid 
the peace settlement with the Sung might not last. This 
shows that the Jurchen did not regard Hsiao-tsung lightly.
See annals of Hsiao-tsung, SS, ch.35, p.692.
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not really in vain since these probably had the effect of putting 
the Jurchen an their guard and restraining them from violating 
the terms of the peace treaty. All in all, it can be said that 
although Hsiao-tsung did not achieve his life-long ambition of 
reconquest or hui-fu, the fact that he was able to maintain peace 
and keep the Chin from threatening Sung for the major part of his 
reign was indeed no minor achievement, as pointed out by Kao- 
tsung in the following episode. On 18/3rd/1180 Hsiao-tsung 
invited his parents over to his palace for a family get-together. 
While admiring the beauty in the rock-garden, Hsiao-tsung 
modestly referred to his own lack of virtue, saying that he did 
not deserve to enjoy the fruit of Kao-tsung's labour. To this 
the Emperor Emeritus responded:
My son, your fillality has moved Heaven and 
you have kept the empire in peace for almost 
twenty years. How can you say that you have 
no accomplishment!29
To a pacifist like Kao-tsung, who used to live in great fear of 
his powerful neighbour, continuous peace was indeed most desirable, 
and Hsiao-tsung*s ability to maintain the status quo for over two 
decades was thus truly appreciated by his father.
The Absolute Monarch
(i) Imperial Power Versus Ministerial Power
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hsiao-tsung did 
not allow his chief ministers to stay long in office for fear 
that they might develop a strong following and endanger imperial
29. See WCC, ch.181, p.6a.
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power. Such autocratic behaviour was clearly demonstrated during
the early years of the Ch'un-hsi era, when the emperor ruled
without the assistance of a chief councillor and administered the
bureaucracy largely by himself. This took place following the
dismissal of Chief Councillor Yeh H e n g ^ ^ ^ J  in 9th/1175, as his
position was left vacant while the Second Privy Councillor Kung
Mao-liang , being the most senior member of the bureau-
30cracy then, was assigned the duties of chief councillor. Even 
after Kung's dismissal in 6th/1177, the chief-councillorshlp 
remained vacant until Shih Hao was reappointed to that position 
in 3rd/1178. Thus for almost three years, in the absence of a 
chief councillor, Hsiao-tsung functioned as both political leader 
and chief administrator of his empire. Under such circumstances 
it is not surprising that the emperor's authority was greatly 
enhanced. Although Kung Mao-liang was officially assigned the 
duties of a chief councillor, in practice Hsiao-tsung himself took 
over much of the executive power. This is revealed by the remarks 
of the Compiling Official (pien-hsiu k u a n ^  ) Lii Tsu-ch'ien
^  > who memorialised in 3rd/1177:
Your Majesty feels that the councillors are not 
equal to the duties of their office and thus 
takes over their functions, while the councillors 
personally take charge of the minor details of 
the administration and assumes the functions of
30. Hsii Tsu-ming, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu, ch.18, p.7a. The 
fact that Kung Mao-liang had acted as chief councillor in 
his capacity as Second Privy Councillor for a relatively 
long period (from 9 th/1175 to 6th/1177) has been noted as 
an exceptional case in Chinese institutional history. See 
WHTK , ch. 49, p.451.
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the various departments....
From the above statement it is clear that the emperor's enc^ach-€ 1
ment on the councillors' authority did not escape the attention 
of the officials. However, despite their constant admonition, 
Hsiao-tsung's style of government shows that he demanded everything 
to be placed under his personal command.
The growth of absolutism during this period was also
illustrated by the dismissal of Kung Mao-liang and its aftermath.
Being an efficient administrator who was zealous in performing
his duties, Kung was not afraid to offend other officials and
Inner Court personnel who might have been the emperor's 
32
favourites. This could be one of the reasons why the emperor 
was reluctant to promote him to the position of chief councillor. 
Kung's refusal to ingratiate himself with the Inner Court personnel 
also led to his quarrel with Tseng Ti, who was the direct cause of 
Kung's dismissal in 1177. Since his return to court in 1170,
Tseng was able to enjoy boundless imperial favour and became
31. Lii Tsu-ch' ien 'I# , Lu Tung-lai hsien-sheng wen-chi
(TSCC ed.) » p.15.
32. For example, in 9th/1176 Kung ordered an investigation into 
the accounts, of,^the three General Superintendent Offices
(t s u n g - s s u 5j ) in Huai-tung because of discrepancy in 
the annual expenditure figures. Subsequently it was 
confirmed that there had been misappropriation of army 
funds in Huai-tung. By insisting on carrying out the 
investigation, Kung made himself an enemy of the Comptroller 
(t s u n g - l i n g ) of Huai-tung, Ch'ien Liang-ch 'en 
■fa , and certain palace attendants who had previously
received bribes from Ch'ien. Ch'ien is said to have played 
a part in Kung's downfall later. See CHSC, ch.54, pp.22a-22b.
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increasingly powerful. Confident that the emperor was on his 
side, in 4th/1177 Tseng intended to go against civil service 
regulations on appointment by requesting that his descendants be 
permitted to hold civil (instead of military) ranks. He was how­
ever circumvented by Kung who insisted that all civil and military
officials were only allowed to have their descendants sponsored
34
into the service to which they originally belonged. Soon after
this an angry Tseng sought revenge by instigating officers under
him to show disrespect to Kung by deliberately blocking the way
35
while the latter was leaving court. When ordered by the street 
patrol to move aside, the officers defiantly replied, "How much 
longer can the Second Privy Councillor remain in his position!" 
Thereupon Kung reported the incident to the emperor, saying that 
such an insult did not matter to him personally, but he was afraid 
the honour of the entire court was at stake. Hsiao-tsung then
33. Tseng returned to court with a capital sinecure in 10th/1170. 
In the following year he was promoted to be ch'eng-hsuan shih
for having accompanied the heir-apparent in his 
studies formerly. In 1172 he was sent on a mission to Chin 
and on his return was awarded the title of Military Governor. 
Further honour was heaped upon him in 1174 when he was 
promoted to „the highly prestigious rank of k'ai-fu i-t'ung 
san-ssu >  *] • See biography of Tseng T i , SS,
ch.470, p.13690.
34. See biography of Kung Mao-liang, SS, ch.144, p.11845; HTC, 
ch.145, p.3882.
j A
35. ^.eso officers include Chia Kuang-tsu t Li Ch'u-ho
, and T'ang who were acting as the
mounted couriers of Tseng Ti^on this occasion. Tseng was 
leaving the palace after seeing the emperor and Kung was 
coming from behind. The officers refused to give way to the 
councillor. While most sources claim that Tseng ordered 
the officers to act in this manner, Chou Pi-ta points out 
that it was common for the couriers to create trouble by 
behaving in a disorderly manner. See WCC, ch.181, pp.2b-3a.
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attempted to reconcile the two by asking Tseng to apologise to
Kung. Tseng did so, but was rebuffed by Kung with these words,
"A Second Privy Councillor is a councillor of the court." Seeing
that Kung was still indignant, the emperor warned him against
acting rashly. However, Kung took the matter into his own hands
by issuing an order for the officers involved to be flogged and
dismissed. Hsiao-tsung was displeased that Kung went against his
order and blamed the latter for being too hasty in meting out
36
punishment to the officers concerned.
Kung Mao-liang was soon to suffer the consequence of his
action. Hsiao-tsung apparently did not want to create an impression
that he was taking sides in the above quarrel and he resorted to
using the censorial organ against Kung. In 5th/1177 Hsieh Kuo-
jan '» a *riend of Tseng Ti , was appointed Palace Censor
by a direct order from the palace. The Drafting Official of the
Secretariat, Lin Kuang-ch'ao , who refused to endorse the
appointment, was transferred to another position and eventually 
37
given a sinecure. As soon as he stepped foot into the Censorate,
Hsieh carried out an impeachment on Kung, accusing him of feigning
an imperial order to pass sentence upon the officers under Tseng 
38
Ti. Kung was obliged to resign on plea of illness; another
36. See WCC, ch.181, pp.2b-3a; HTC, ch.145, p.3883; CHSC, 
ch.55, pp.15a-15b.
37. See the tomb inscription for Lin Kuang-ch'ao in WCC, ch.63,
p.2a; HTC, ch.145, p.3883.
38. HTC, ch.145, p.3884.
206
factor which prompted his resignation was his association with
39
Lin Kuang-ch'ao, who came from the same village as himself. In 
6th/1177 Kung was dismissed from the position of Second Privy 
Councillor and appointed Administrator of Chien-k'ang _fu. However, 
Hsieh refused to leave him alone and Kung was removed from his new 
post after having been accused of usurping authority and 
cultivating factions at court. In 7th/1177, as a result of further 
impeachment by Hsieh,^ Kung was exiled to Ying-chou . , where
he died the following year.
Such severe punishment of a high-ranking minister was
indeed rare during Hsiao-tsung's reign. Kung Mao-liang'8 downfall
41
has generally been attributed to the doings of Tseng T i , but it 
should be remembered that had Kung not displeased the emperor, he 
would not have suffered such a tragic fate. Kung's quarrel with 
Tseng Ti would not have annoyed Hsiao-tsung so much if the 
councillor had not acted on his own authority. What really 
offended the emperor was that his advice had not been heeded by 
Kung, and to an absolutist like Hsiao-tsung, such an offence was 
truly unforgivable.
39. WCC, ch.181, p.3b; HTC, ch.145, p.3884.
40. Hsieh Kuo-jan accused Kung of four major crimes which were 
punishable by death, namely, inconsistency in his policy on 
defence; claiming the virtuous acts of the emperor as due 
to his influence; making his own words those of the emperor 
and claiming imperial orders to be his words; and appointing 
his associates to important positions at court. See CHSC, 
ch.55, pp.15b-16a; HTC, ch.145, p.3886.
41. See for example HTC, ch.145, p.3886; CHSC, ch.55, 
pp.15b-16a.
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The emperor's strong reaction to the above incident is seen
in the issuing of an imperial edict immediately after Kung's
dismissal in 6th/1177, which made it imperative for the Three
Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs to resubmit after
court the "imperial orders" (chih ^  ) which they had received for
final confirmation by the emperor before they were permitted to 
42
implement these. This was a direct response to the feigning of 
an imperial order by Kung Mao-liang. It was to make doubly sure 
that all the imperial orders were genuine and that no future 
councillors would be able to act on their own authority by claiming 
that they were acting according to imperial orders. By insisting 
on imperial verification on all matters, Hsiao-tsung saw to it 
that there would not be any loopholes for bureaucratic manipulation 
in future.
Following the above episode, another event which portrayed 
the conflict between emperor and minister took place in the winter 
of 1178, when Hsiao-tsung had a serious quarrel with Chief 
Councillor Shih Hao. After an absence of more than thirteen years, 
Shih was summoned to court and appointed Reader-in-waiting in 
3rd/1177; a year later he was again appointed to the position of 
Right Chief Councillor. As before, the upright and unyielding
42. Formerly, after presenting their memorials at court, the
Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs were
permitted to endorse these straight away as "imperial orders"
to be implemented. After Kung Mao-liang/s dismissal, a
relative of Tseng Ti called Han Yen-ku ^  proposed that
instead of the above procedure, the officials should be made
to resubmit their memorials after court 6o that the emperor
could examine them closely in his palace before endorsing
them. This proposal was gladly accepted by Hsiao-tsung.
See WCC, ch.181, p.4a.
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character of Shih Hao made it difficult for him to serve under 
Hsiao-tsung, who was equally strong-willed and uncompromising. 
Despite the great respect the emperor had for his former tutor, 
he was inclined to reject the latter*s advice when it did not suit 
him, and this made any long-term cooperation between them virtually 
impossible.
The quarrel between Hsiao-tsung and Shih Hao was caused by
the chief councillor's dissatisfaction with the emperor's stand in
the handling of a court case involving a fight between civilians
and palace guardsmen. In 10th/1178 a request was made by the
General Transmitter of Directives in the Military Bureau, Vang
Pien, to recruit 6,000 men to fill the vacancies in the various
military units of the capital. Following this a commander of the
palace guards carried out the recruitment by force. This led to
much commotion in the capital and many potential conscripts
mutilated themselves to avoid being drafted into the army. Those
who resisted were intimidated, and the unruly soldiers even
seized the property of some civilians. Riots broke out and many
arrests were made. In the trial that followed, it was decided to
impose the death sentence on one of the soldiers and a civilian
43
accused of inciting the riot while the others were released.
Feeling strongly that the sentence was unjust, Shih Hao protested 
by sending a memorial to the throne. While agreeing that the 
soldier deserved capital punishment, he nevertheless opposed 
imposing the same sentence on the civilian, arguing that the
43. For an account of this incident, see biography of Shih Hao,
S S , ch.396, pp.12067-68; KKC, ch.93, p.880.
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latter merely acted out of self'-defence. When Hsiao-tsung
disagreed, Shih criticized His Majesty for permitting such grave
injustice because he was reluctant to offend the military. He
also warned the emperor that oppression of the masses would lead
44
to serious consequences. Such severe criticism infuriated 
Hsiao-tsung, but Shih Hao held firmly to his views. Finally, in 
llth/1178 Shih handed in his resignation. Despite their 
disagreement, the emperor treated him with due respect by 
appointing him Junior Tutor and keeping him as Reader-in-waiting.
The above affair not only discloses the behaviour of an
absolute monarch but it also reveals the emperor's indulgence
towards the military. In contrast to Kao-tsung, Hsiao-tsung seems
to have adopted a more favourable attitude towards the military.
For example, in the appointment of prefectural administrators,
Hsiao-tsung was of the opinion that as long as the candidates were
capable, they could be given such appointments, regardless of
45
whether they were civil or military officials. He was also
46
noted for his benevolent treatment of the generals. His 
partiality for the army personnel could be due to the fact that
44. Shih Hao alluded to the story of two peasants who rebelled 
against the Ch'in dynasty because they were unable to report 
on time for conscript labour service, an offence punishable 
by death under Ch'in law. For the allusion see Shih Chiy  
(Peking: Chung-hua, 1972 reprint), ch.48, pp.1949-50.
45. This was stated in an imperial decree (yii-pi) issued in
llth/1176, see CHSC, ch.54, p.26b.
46. See CYTC, Vol.2, ch.2, p.10a.
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he regarded them as more or less belonging to him personally.
Hsiao-tsung kept the armies under his direct command by appointing
the generals himself in consultation with his close attendants.
He also sent confidential orders to the army and employed the
palace attendants as his messengers. The direct control of
military personnel was an imperial prerogative which Hsiao-tsung
47
guarded jealously even against his own ministers.
(ii) Imperial Favourites versus Ideological Authority
Besides his favourtism for the military, Hsiao-tsung's
indulgent attitude towards the Inner Court personnel also led to
frequent criticism by his ministers. By relying on his palace
favourites and using them as a balance against bureaucratic power,
the emperor was obviously augmenting the trend towards absolutism.
Such inclination was even more noticeable during the Ch'un-hsi
era when the "close attendants" of the emperor became increasingly
powerful with the support of the emperor and the reduced opposition
from high-ranking ministers at court. Among the most notorious
±jr $
palace attendants were Tseng T i , Wang Pien and Kan Pieni3 . 
Hsiao-tsung's favouritism to Tseng Ti has already been described 
in the previous incident when Tseng quarreled with Kung Mao-liang. 
Besides Tseng, another palace official who managed to gain the 
favour of the throne was Wang Pien. He started his career as a 
minor clerk in the Bureau of State Letters (kuo-hsin suo )
at the beginning of Hsiao-tsung1 s reign, but was able to capture
47. See the tomb inscription for Chou Pi-ta in KKC, ch.93, 
p.887.
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the emperor’s attention after his successful mission to the Chin
48
camp to negotiate for peace. While serving as Administrator of
the Palace Postern during the Ch'ien-tao era, the emperor sent
him on an important mission to inspect the armies in the Ching-
Hsiang region. During the Ch'un-hsi period he was given a
concurrent appointment as General Transmitter of Directives in
the Military Bureau and it was his proposal to recruit more
49
soldiers in the capital that led to the riot of 10th/1178. The
third imperial favourite was the eunuch Kan Pien, whose powerful
influence was already noted in the capital during the Ch'ien-tao 
50
period. During the late 1170s and early 1180s the trio is said
to have collaborated with one another in misusing their power
while their friendship was sought by some scholar-officials who
51
were without moral integrity.
Such unhealthy development naturally led to the protests 
of the Outer Court officials. Among them was the Staff Author 
Hu Tsin-ch’en , who in 1178 brought to the emperor's
attention the misuse of authority by his close attendants. Hsiao- 
tsung then ordered Second Privy Councillor Chao Hsiung to carry
48. Biography of Wang Pien, SJ3, ch. 470, p. 13696; HTC, ch. 139, 
p. 3694.
49. SS, ch.470, p.13694.
50. See biography of Kan Pien, SS, ch. 469, pp.13672-73; Wang 
Ming-ch'ing, Yu-chao hsin-chih ^-(TSCC ed.) , ch. 4,
p.58. ^  > ‘
51. CHSC, ch.56, p.8b; biography of Kan Pien, SS, ch.469, 
p. 13673 and biography of Tseng Ti , SJ3, ch. 470, p. 13691.
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out an investigation. Fearing to offend Wang Pien and his gang,
Chao is said to have ordered Hu to leave them alone and to submit
the names of a few other less influential palace officials instead 
52
to the emperor. Hu was later dismissed from court for having
spoken against the Inner Court personnel. Apart from Hu, the
Collator of the Imperial Library Cheng C h i e n ^ p ^ ^  and the
Registrar of the Court of Imperial Family Affairs Yuan Shu
had also spoken to Hsiao-tsung regarding the above issue but they
53
were unheeded by the emperor. One of the most open attacks on
Wang Pien came from the Vice-Minister of Rites Chao Ju-yU ^  *
who expressed his concern that the authority over the control of
54
military personnel had been given solely to Wang. Also, in 
9 th/1178, while on his way to take up his new appointment as 
Governor of Chien-k'ang, Ch'en Chlin-ch'ing, who had been noted 
for his vigorous opposition to the Inner Court Personnel during 
the Ch'ien-tao era, was granted an imperial audience during which 
he again protested vehemently against the usurpation of power by 
the palace favourites.
Ch'en Chun-ch'ing first spoke about the selection of 
generals, pointing out that many of the generals obtained their
52. Biography of Wang Pien, SS, ch.470, p.13694.
53. SS, ch.470, p.13694; CHSC, ch.56, p.8b.
54. SS, ch.470, p.13694. Chao Ju-yu also commented that at the 
beginning of Hsiao-tsung's reign, the chief councillors were 
vigilant against the usurpation of power by the emperor's 
close attendants, but in recent years the chief ministers 
were no longer in the habit of fighting the Inner Court 
attendants, and he said this was the reason for the latter’s 
rise in power.
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positions by bribing and befriending the close attendants of the
emperor. Hsiao-tsung denied this, saying that all military
personnel above the rank of comptroller (tsung-ling kuan) were
personally appointed by him. Ch'en nevertheless insisted that
the emperor should pay attention to this problem so that discipline
55
could be maintained within the armies. He then criticized 
Hsiao-tsung for allowing his close attendants to interfere with 
the appointment of personnel:
In the selection and appointment of personnel 
it is only right that Your Majesty should 
distinguish between the good and evil officials, 
and that the appointment should be done through 
the court in accordance with public opinion.
However, I have heard that Tseng Ti and Vang
Pien are guilty of abusing power and receiving
bribes. When they make recommendations for the 
appointment or promotion of officials, these 
are implemented by direct orders from the 
palace.... 56
The emperor again denied such charges, explaining that he might 
have complied with the wishes of his close associates in cases of 
minor appointments, but he would never allow them to interfere
with the appointment of important officials. On the following
day, before leaving for his new post, Ch'en told Hsiao-tsung that 
after having been away from court for the past nine years, he was 
impressed by the peace and prosperity in the capital, but he also
55. Ch'en Chlin-ch'ing pointed out that since the generals
obtained their positions not through their own ability but 
through bribery, they would definitely not be able to 
command the respect of their subordinates and this would 
adversely affect army discipline. See CffC, ch.96, p.1721.
56. Ibid.
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noticed a great change in the public morals of the scholar- 
officlals. He then commented that formerly there were only a 
handful of scholar-officials who Ingratiated themselves with 
Tseng Ti and Wang Pien but the number of officials who openly 
curried favour with Tseng and Wang had largely increased. Finally 
Ch'en warned the emperor that his confidence in these palace
57
favourites would lead to disastrous effects upon the empire. 
Although Hsiao-tsung is said to have appreciated his advice, it 
is clear that he did not take Ch'en*s words seriously, since no 
action was taken against his close attendants.
also drew criticism from others. One of the severest came from 
the renowned scholar-official Chu Hsi. Chu had declined to serve 
in the government until the spring of 1179 when he accepted a
proclamation by submitting a sealed memorial in which he 
criticized Hsiao-tsung for putting his trust in his close asso­
ciates. He alleged that the emperor did not assign the 
councillors, censors and other officials their due responsibi­
lities but instead His Highness only discussed matters with one 
or two of his close associates. According to Chu these few
57. CWC, ch.96, p.1722.
58. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.8, pp.7b-8a. For an account of the 
political life of Chu Hsi, see C.M. Shirokauer, "Chu Hsi's 
Political Career: A Study in Ambivalence" in Confuelan 
Personalities, ed. by A.W. Wright and D.C. Twitchett 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.162-188.
The emperor’s fondness for the Inner Court functionaries
provincial assignment as Administrator
5 8
modern Chiang-hsi). In 4th/1180 Chu
(in
 responded to an imperial
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vicious men were guilty of misleading the emperor, manipulating 
appointments, robbing the emperor of his wealth and usurping 
imperial authority. He even claimed that the emperor was in the
As these people establish their power and 
influence, the whole nation bows before them. 
As a result Your Majesty's decrees and orders, 
promotions and demotions are no longer issued 
from the court but from the private residence 
of these one or two persons. The so-called 
personal decisions of Your Majesty are in fact 
the doing of this handful of men who secretly 
exercise your power of control....59
Hsiao-tsung was enraged by this memorial but was persuaded by
Chief Councillor Chao Hsiung to ignore it and Chu was allowed to
60
remain in his post.
Another reference to the emperor's reliance upon his
close associates was made by the Registrar of the Imperial
presented to the throne in 3rd/1182 Yang commented:
In recent years the powerful favourites /of 
Your Majesty/ have much author!ty_and their 
homes are crowded with visitors /who seek to 
befriend then/. As soon as the imperial 
orders are issued, there would be numerous 
slanders accusing Your Majesty of making 
your close associates your confidants in­
stead of trusing your chief ministers.61
59. CWC, ch.11, pp.167-168.
60. Chao is said to have advised the emperor that any action 
against fame-seekers such as Chu Hsi would only serve to 
enhance the latter's prestige. See SSPM, ch.78, p.831;
HTC. ch.147, p.3933.
hands of these unscr ous sycophants: ip
In a ten-thousand word memorial
61. For Yang Chia’s memorial, see CHSC, ch.59, pp.15a-15b.
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He further stated that half of the civil and military officials 
were personal friends of these powerful favourites, whose clique 
occupied all the important positions in government, while the
62
good and righteous officials despaired and suffered in silence.
From the denunciation of the Inner Court favourites, it
is clear that the officials were indignant that the emperor should
trust his close attendants instead of placing his confidence in
the ministers of the regular bureaucracy. Having obtained their
positions through the civil service examination system, the
scholar-officials regarded themselves as the true representatives
of Confucian ideological authority and therefore demanded that
the monarch should listen to their advice rather than that of the
palace functionaries. In their opinion these palace attendants
did not possess such authority since they were not appointed
through the regular civil service system. They were thus
extremely concerned that the emperor should allow his authority
to be usurped by these favourites and sycophants. Nevertheless,
it should be pointed out that this was not really the case for
although Hsiao-tsung might be indulgent towards his favourites,
63
he never allowed them to get out of control. On the contrary,
62. Ibid.
63. This can be seen from the career of the few imperial 
favourites concerned. For example, Wang Pien was immediately 
demoted in 1182 when he failed to carry out the emperor's 
wish in the diplomatic controversy mentioned earlier. Kan 
Pien was eventually convicted of corruption, his property 
was confiscated and he died in disgrace. Even Tseng Ti did 
not remain forever in the emperor's favour for it is said 
that Hsiao-tsung did admit that Tseng was responsible for 
misleading him in various matters. See their respective 
biography in SS^ , ch.469 and ch.470, pp. 13673-92.
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he was the one to make use of these palace personnel to achieve 
his own purpose. Being his personal attendants and loyal servants, 
the Inner Court functionaries would carry out imperial wishes 
without question whereas the ministers would oppose him if they 
disagreed with his policies or decisions. Since the advice of 
the scholar-officials was frequently unpalatable, it is under­
standable why an autocrat like Hsiao-tsung should prefer consulting 
his attendants to seeking the opinions of his ministers.
(iii) Control Over the Bureaucracy
Indeed, a strong objection frequently voiced by the
officials was the emperor's lack of trust in his ministers and
his refusal to assign them proper responsibilities. In another
memorial addressed to the throne in llth/1181, Chu Hsi stated that
at the beginning of his reign, Hsiao-tsung did make an effort to
appoint capable officials to serve in the government. However,
after failing to get the right men to serve and being apprehensive
of the usurpation of power by influential ministers, the emperor
gave up looking for the good and virtuous and became contented
with appointing the more flexible and easily controlled men to
take up their positions. He pointed out that the emperor's action
was responsible for the declining authority of the chief 
64
councillor. Chu's reference to the decline in the chief 
councillor's power clearly reflects the expansion of imperial 
power during the Ch'un-hsi era. With the exception of Shih Hao,
64. See CWC, ch. 13, p. 191.
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the chief councillors appointed during this period were generally
men of a more passive and conformist character and were less noted
65
for opposing the emperor over matters of policy. This could be
one reason why the chief councillors during this period were able
to serve for comparatively longer terms than their counterparts
66
during the Ch'ien-tao era.
Hsiao-tsung's autocratic approach towards his ministers 
also led to the admonition of the Division Chief in the Ministry 
of Personnel (shang-shu li-pu yiian-wai-lang )
Yang Wan-li In response to an imperial proclamation
for memorials after the occurrence of an earthquake, Yang 
presented a memorial dated 24/5th/1185. In this memorial Yang 
discussed various matters regarding foreign policy, defence, 
personnel appointment etc. which he referred to as the "leaves 
and branches" of the problem. He concluded by pointing out that 
the root of the problem lay with the absolute policy of the 
emperor:
It is said that a ruler should refrain from 
performing all the responsibilities himself 
... for by assuming authority in all matters, 
the ruler is in fact depriving the ministers 
of their duties....®^
65. A good example of this category of ministers is Chao Hsiung. 
For his official biography see SS^ , ch.396, pp. 12073-75.
66. The chief councillor who served for the longest term during 
the entire Hsiao-tsung reign was Wang Huai, whose tenure of 
office lasted for almost seven years from 1181 to 1188. For 
an account of his career, see his hsing-chuang in KKC, ch.87, 
pp.800-810; SS, ch.391, pp.12069-72.
67. For Yang Wan-li's memorial, see CCC, ch.62, pp.500-504.
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It is said that Yang was prompted into making such remarks because
the emperor, having been on his throne for many years, made
decisions on all matters while the councillors merely carried out
his orders; such a development caused widespread concern among 
68
the ministers. It has also been pointed out by Chu Hsi in 1188
that because of the emperor's policy of appointing the timid and
submissive to be councillors and his refusal to entrust them with
important responsibilities, the so-called chief ministers had
actually been reduced to the status of mere functionaries who were
69
expected to obey imperial orders without question. While such 
authoritarian behaviour was regarded as an obvious violation of 
Confucian standards and looked upon with disapproval by the 
ministers, Hsiao-tsung certainly thought otherwise. From his 
point of view, this meant everything in good order, with the 
emperor controlling the bureaucracy as he should.
Political order in the central government was also 
achieved because of the emperor's ability to eliminate factions 
from court. Hsiao-tsung rightly took pride in the fact that 
factionalism was never a problem during his reign. In a conversa­
tion with Chief Councillor Shih Hao in 5th/1178, Hsiao-tsung 
commented that not only should the chief councillors abstain from 
forming factions, but the ruler should also refrain from charging 
his ministers with factionalism for such an accusation would in 
effect force them into joining factions. He further stated that
68. HTC, ch.150, p.4003.
69. See Chu Hsi's memorial dated l/llth/1188, CWC, ch.11, p.173.
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it was his policy to appoint the good officials and dismiss the
bad ones, regardless of whether they had been recommended by
ministers who were later disgraced. Finally Hsiao-tsung
attributed the prevalence of factionalism in previous dynasties to
70
the lack of discernment on the part of the rulers. The
emperor's personnel policy and astute administration thus freed
the court from a major problem which plagued the dynasty during the
reign of Kao-rtsung. The absence of factionalism is also reflected
in the lack of censorial participation in power struggles at
court. Unlike their counterparts during the other periods of the
Southern Sung, the censors dutifully performed their duties as
the "ears and eyes" of the emperor and did not engage in any
political infighting at court. The comparatively quiet role of
the censors during Hsiao-tsung's reign may also be due to the
non-appointment of the chief official to the Censorate for many
years. It is interesting to note that for a period of fourteen
years from 1169 to 1183, Southern Sung was without an Executive 
71
Censor. An obvious implication of this unusual phenomenon is 
that the emperor did not desire the Censorate to become too 
influential and thus took the preventive measure by not giving 
it a head for such a long interval. Such a tactic is similar to 
his approach in controlling the chief councillors. Furthermore, 
the emperor chose to appoint the quiet and upright officials to
70. For the above discussion on factions, see MFML, ch.10, 
pp.5a-9a.
71. CHSC, ch.60, p.lb.
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take over the censorial positions. This policy undoubtedly 
contributed further to the tranquility at court.
Apart from imposing order upon the central bureaucracy,
Hsiao-tsung was also noted for his efforts in extending imperial
control into the provinces and prefectures. The emperor's great
concern for proper administration in the prefectures is shown by
his careful selection of circuit intendants and prefectural 
73
administrators. He made it a point to interview all new
appointees before they took up their positions in the prefectures.
He also set up a screen in his palace, and on this screen was
listed the names of all the circuit intendants and prefectural
74
administrators of the entire realm. This was to enable him to 
keep a constant check upon the many officials assigned to 
different territories of the empire. Hsiao-tsung also sought to 
maintain provincial and prefectural administrations under the 
close supervision of the central government. The administrators 
at the circuit (or provincial) level, namely the provincial
72. See the tomb inscription for Hsieh O ^ J  , WCC, ch.68,
p.15b.
73. For Instance, in a direct decree (yii-pi) in 5th/1182, Hsiao- 
tsung ordered Chief Councillor Wang Huai and his colleagues 
to select with care officials to take up positions of circuit 
intendaikts and prefectural administrators, emphasizing that 
selection should be based upon qualifications and conduct.
See CHSC, ch.59, p.15b. Also in 2nd/1185 the emperor told 
Wang Huai that the whole empire depended entirely upon the 
services of good circuit intendants, and again ordered the 
ministers to pay special attention to their appointment and 
the appointment of prefectural administrators. See CHSC,
ch.62, pp.3a-3b.
74. WCC, ch.104, p.10b; Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yU-lei
(Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chli xf d? £  P* , 1962) , ch.127, 
p. 4962.
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governors (shuai-ch'en ) and circuit intendants were
required to assess the performance of the prefectural adminis­
trators under their control and submit reports to the central 
75
government. The system of merit-evaluation of prefectural
administrators was strictly enforced during the mid Ch ’un-hsi era.
In the intercalary third month of 1181 an imperial decree was
again issued ordering the circuit intendants and provincial
governors to submit annual evaluation reports on the prefectural
76
administrators under their supervision. These circuit autho­
rities were required to make careful investigation before
submitting their reports and those who failed to give just reports
77
on their subordinates would be impeached by the censors.
Subsequently, in 4th/1183 several prefectural officials were
promoted or dismissed according to the reports made by their
administrative superiors. Also in 6th/1185 two circuit intendants
78
were demoted for delay in submitting their evaluation reports.
Even though the merit-evaluation system was not completely without
75. Hsiao-tsung issued such an order in llth/1162 but it was 
not implemented later because of war. See CYTC , Vol.l, 
ch.5, p.lib.
76. Under the merit-evaluation system, the prefectural adminis­
trators would be assessed according to their performance in 
administration and classified into three grades —  good, 
bad and average. See CHSC, ch.59, p.4b.
77. CYTC, Vol.1, ch.5, p.lib; CHSC, ch.59, pp.4b-5a.
78. See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.5, pp.llb-12a.
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abuses, its successful implementation during the Ch'un-hsi era 
nevertheless resulted in an efficient system of provincial 
administration which enabled the central government to exercise 
unprecedented control over the territories of the empire.
The Pragmatic Emperor
(i) Ideology
Apart from being an absolutist, Hsiao-tsung also exhibits 
the qualities of a pragmatic ruler in his ideas concerning 
government and administration and his approach to various problems 
faced by the state. His advocation of pragmatism is frequently 
revealed through his dissatisfaction with the impracticality of 
the Confucian scholar-officials. Even though like most Chinese 
monarchs, Hsiao-tsung acknowledged Confucianism to be the state 
ideology, he had on many occasions demonstrated that he was not 
traditionally Confucianist in inclination.
The following incident not only portrays the autocratic 
tendency of Hsiao-tsung but also discloses his theory on govern­
ment, which was far from Confucian. In 12th/1179 the Monitor of 
the Imperial University (t * ai-hsueh cheng ) Liu Kuang-
tsu was recommended for a post in the Imperial Library
and was required to sit for an examination before taking up his
79. While the system of merit-evaluation resulted in more
efficient administration it was not really perfect as some 
circuit authorities could still be bribed into giving 
favourable reports to their subordinates. It was finally 
abolished in 1199 during the reign of Ning-tsung. See 
CYTC, Vol.l, ch.6, pp.4a-4b.
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new position. In his essay submitted for the examination Liu
expounded his views on government and criticized the emperor for
80
his personnel policy. After reading Liu's paper Hsiao-tsung 
responded by adding these remarks:
The problem with the appointment of personnel 
lies in the fact that the ruler fails to appoint 
the right man to be chief councillor....
Similarly the chief councillor fails to appoint 
the right man to be officials. Whenever an 
official is appointed it is mentioned in his 
favour that he has obtained top grades in the 
examinations and is a good scholar, but the 
ability and conduct of the candidate are never 
taken into consideration.... Since the beginning 
of our /Sun£/ dynasty, the emperors have been 
much too benevolent and generous, and chief 
councillors who mismanage the state and generals 
who suffer defeat in battles are never executed 
.... The essential thing is for the ruler to 
appoint chief councillors with care and the 
latter will certainly be able to appoint the 
right men to the right positions. With the 
granting of rewards on the one hand and the 
imposition of severe punishment on the other, I 
don't believe that men of talents will not 
emerge. ... 83.
From the above it is clear that the emperor did not have high 
regard for the benevolent government advocated by Confucian 
scholars and put into practice by the Sung monarchs. On the other 
hand, he was advocating the application of Legalist principles of 
reward and punishment in government.
Such Gui open denunciation of ConfuciGm values by the 
emperor naturally led to an uproar at court. However, in order
80. For the examination answer of Liu Kuang-tsu, see SWCT, 
ch.68, pp.6a-15a.
81. For Hsiao-tsung's comments, see MFML, ch.10, pp.9a-10a.
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to safeguard the image of the throne, the officials accused Tseng
82
Ti of being responsible for drafting the imperial comments. The 
controversy was finally resolved with the intervention of Shih 
Hao, who was then serving as imperial lecturer. Shih remarked 
that severe punishment was never the practice under the rule of 
sage emperors since ancient times, and that the execution of chief 
ministers was only implemented under the severe laws of the Ch'in 
and Han dynasties. He praised the Sung emperors for their 
benevolent policies and their proper treatment of the ministers.
He also took Hsiao-tsung to task for criticizing the Sung monarchs 
for being too kind and generous:
How can benevolence be at fault.... I am 
afraid that Your Majesty may be accused of 
putting blame_on the ancestors /the early 
Sung emperors/ because of your own desire 
to implement harsh policies. This is some­
thing Your Majesty should consider very 
carefully.... 83
Finally Shih advised the emperor that he should alter certain
phrases if he insisted on making his comments public. Chief
Councillor Chao Hsiung also admonished the emperor, saying that
it was unlikely for a chief councillor like Ssu-ma Kuang ^
(a renowned statesman of the Northern Sung) to be tempted by
84
rewards and threatened by severe punishment. Hsiao-tsung 
finally relented and agreed to alter certain wordings of his 
comments.
82. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.3, p.9a; HTC, ch.147, p.3982.
83. MFML, ch.10, pp.llb-12a.
84. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.3, p.9b; HTC, ch.147, p.3928.
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The emperor's interest in Legalist teaching is also 
demonstrated by his admiration for Han Hsuan-ti (r. 73-
49 B.C.), who was noted for his prejudice against Confucian 
scholars and his preference for using Legalist ideas in governing
exhorted officials throughout the land to play an effective role 
in recommending upright personnel into the civil service so that 
public morals could be upheld. He then referred to the adminis­
tration of Hsuan-ti:
During the reign of Emperor Hsiian of the Han 
dynasty he carried out the administration with 
great efficiency; he ordered the officials 
throughout the empire to recommend righteous 
men into government, and as a result the 
administrative personnel thus appointed were 
able to fulfil their responsibility and the 
people could live in peace. This is something 
which I really admire....86
By emulating the example of Han Hsiian-ti , Hsiao-tsung more or
less declared that he was open to Legalist principles or for that
matter, any other doctrines as long as he found these useful in
achieving a more effective government. His advocacy of strict
laws was put into practice in 1183 when an imperial decree dated
28/6th of that year ordered that corrupt clerks were to be
87
severely punished by exile and confiscation of property.
85. See Hung Mai ^'1^7  ^ Jung-chai san-pi / J ~ ^  ^  , in 
Jung-chai sui-pi •trLitft ^  (Ta-li ch'u-pan-she J
&)W3rU  198D, <^.2%%?. ^
86. SHY, chih-kuan 79:1, p.4210.
his empire.
85
In an imperial decree dated 3/7th/1174 Hsiao-tsung
87. SHY, chih-kuan 79: 4-5, pp.4211-12.
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However, it should be pointed out that despite his support for
strict laws and regulations, the emperor did not actually impose
severe punishment upon the offenders, but instead he appears to
mingle severe laws with lenience. For instance, in lst/1185,
in meting out punishment to a sub-prefectural administrator Tseng
Ch'i for misappropriation of official funds, Hsiao-tsung
substituted for the death sentence permanent removal from office.
He also said that while the circuit intendants deserved to be
punished for failing to report Tseng, he did not wish to punish
them too severely for this might cause other intendants to pick
on any minor faults of their subordinates in order to save their
own skin. Thus the two circuit intendants concerned were merely
88
demoted one rank each. The practicality of the emperor is shown 
by his taking into consideration all aspects and possible 
implication of his action before carrying it out.
The fact that Hsiao-tsung was not strictly Confucianist 
is further revealed in another piece of his writings. In 1181, 
in an article entitled "A Debate on the Original Way" (yiian-tao 
pien ), Hsiao-tsung criticized the use of the term yiian-
tao by the great T ’ang Confucian Han Yii , saying that
originally the three schools of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism 
were not very different from one another in their doctrines and 
that differences were created by ignorant men of later days. He 
concluded by advocating the convergence of the three teachings:
88. CHSC, ch.62, p.2b.
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If Buddhism could be used for the cultivation 
of the mind (hsiu-hsin/ i * ^ ), Taoism for the 
nourishment of the soul (yang-sheng-^ -  ) 
and Confucianism for the government of the 
world (chih-shih 't> ), what is the harm?®®
Having composed this the emperor showed it to Shih Hao, who
objected strongly to His Majesty's criticism of Han Yii and his
proposal to incorporate Buddhist and Taoist teachings into the
90
main stream of Confucianism. Finally, Hsiao-tsung took Shih's 
advice and agreed to alter the title of his essay from yiian-tao 
pien to "A Discussion on the Three Teachings" (san-chiao lun 
> ’ The alteration was obviously made to avoid the 
notion that the essay was directed against Han Yii, who was held 
in high esteem by the scholar-officials of the time. By 
counselling Hsiao-tsung on this matter, Shih clearly intended to 
protect the image of the emperor, so that his non-traditional 
approach to Confucianism would not invite criticism from the 
court.
The incident above again proves the pragmatism of Hsiao- 
tsung in that he did not refrain from advocating doctrines or 
ideas frowned upon by the traditional Confucianists so long as he 
believed these were for the good of his country. However, the
89. For the text of this composition see MFML, ch.10, pp.la-2b;
the incident is also recorded in CYTC, Vol.2, ch.3, pp.8a-8b.
90. Shih Hao argued that all the three aspects mentioned by
the emperor, namely, cultivation of the mind, nourishment
of the soul, and government of the world, could be suffi­
ciently met by Confucianism alone and that it was not 
necessary to make use of the teachings of Buddhism and 
Taoism. See MFML, ch.10, pp.2b-4b.
91. CYTC, Vol.2, ch.3, p.8b.
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emperor's tolerant attitude towards other schools of thought led 
to the objection of the scholar-officials. For example, in a 
sealed memorial presented to the throne on 1/11th/1188, Chu Hsi 
criticised the emperor for his strong interests in Taoism and 
Buddhism and his preference for the utilitarian philosophy of
Chou and Ch'in dynasties) to the teachings of Confucianism. He 
protested that although Hsiao-tsung had referred to the teaching 
of Confucian sages as "common talk and inflexible theories"
learning, it was in fact far superior to the teachings of
From Chu Hsi's comments, it is clear that Hsiao-tsung did 
not have much respect for the Confucian scholars. Indeed, he did 
not make any attempt to conceal his impatience and frustration 
with the impractical Confucian scholar-officials and their 
unrealistic theories. He frequently referred to their ignorance 
and indifferent attitude towards important matters of state. In 
5th/1177, during a conversation with Councillors Wang Huai and 
Chao Hsiung, the emperor commented:
In recent times most scholar-officials are 
ashamed to speak about matters concerning 
agriculture. Agriculture is in fact the 
basis of the state. The scholar-officials 
are fond of lofty talk but are impractical 
93• • « •
Kuan Chung (famous Legalists of the
and regarded it as not worth
Taoism, Buddhism and Legalism.
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92. CWC, ch.11, pp.178-179.
93. CHSC, ch.55, pp.9a-9b; CYTC, Vol.2, ch.3, pp.7a-7b.
Wang Huai agreed and stated that the great Confucian philosopher 
Mencius had frequently emphasized the importance of agriculture. 
Hsiao-tsung then remarked that the scholar-officials appeared to 
be ignorant of the fact that the ancient sages, including 
Confucius himself, all regarded finance as the state's chief 
responsibility. The councillors responded by criticizing scholar- 
officials for rejecting the sayings of ancient sages and following 
the teachings of ignorant men of later days. But they also 
pointed out that the emperor's efforts in administration and 
finance had nevertheless brought about a change in the manner and 
attitude of the scholar-officials. Hsiao-tsung replied that there 
was a slight change, but that was not enough. He then went on to 
criticize the scholar-officials for their indifference towards 
reconquest:
The scholar-officials avoid mentioning the issue 
of hui-fu. If their family happens to own one 
hundred mou of farmland, of which fifty mou has 
been forcibly seized by others, I wonder whether 
they will file a petition in order to claim it 
back. How is it that the scholar-officials are 
quick to attend to affairs of the family but 
are afraid to speak about matters concerning 
the state?94
Finally, the emperor asked his councillors to pass on his words 
to the scholar-officials. Pragmatic as he was, he had no patience 
for their "lofty talk" and their unrealistic approach to the 
major issues confronting the empire. Ylhat he needed were men of 
action who would help him to manage the finance and administrati on
94. CHSC, ch.55, p.9b; CYTC, Vol.2, ch.3, pp.7b-8a.
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of the state and contribute concretely towards long-range planning 
for achieving reconquest.
(ii) Finance and Control over the Treasuries
Hsiao-tsung*s practicality could be observed through his 
prudent financial policy and his management of the state's 
economy. The emperor exercised great prudence in his monetary 
policy, as seen by his strict control over the circulation of 
paper money. During the Southern Sung, paper currencies known by 
different names of hui-tzu » Ch'uan-yin , Huai-chi ao
and Hu-hui>^  ^  were circulated in different parts of 
95
the empire. The main paper money was the hui-tzu, of which the 
circulation was almost nation-wide. It was first introduced 
during the reign of Kao-tsung in 1160, and its convenience was 
widely recognised. However in a few years* time, its value began 
to drop because of over-issue. In 1167, in an attempt to remedy 
the situation, Hsiao-tsung released 2 million taels of silver
from the Imperial Treasury to be sold in the markets for hui-tzu
issue and its great popularity, especially among the business
95. Generally, hui-tzu was used in Liang-che, Fu-chien, Chiang 
tung and Chiang-hsi, Ch'uan-yin in Ssu-ch'uan and Southern
notes which were then destroyed. The strict control on its
pp.56-57.
96. See Hung Mai, op.cit., ch.14, pp.584-585.
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community, led to a shortage in the Liang-Huai region in 1175
97
and more notes had to be issued to meet the demand. Neverthe­
less, the emperor was extremely careful in his management of 
98
hui-tzu. In lst/1183, on seeing the amount of hui-tzu which
had been newly issued, Hsiao-tsung expressed his concern that the
99
increase might lead to its drop in value. Also, in 7th/1185
the emperor once again commented that hui-tzu should not be issued
in large amounts, and that its circulation should be withdrawn
100
once military expenses were reduced. By strictly guarding 
against the over-issue of paper money, Hsiao-tsung was thus able 
to keep inflation in check and this greatly contributed to the 
stabilization of the Southern Sung economy.
It has been noted earlier that a keyword in Hsiao-tsung's 
financial policy was frugality. Indeed, one of the emperor's 
greatest consolation was that through his frugality, he was able 
to accumulate plentiful resources in his treasuries. However, it 
should be pointed out that not all the treasuries in the empire 
were rich. It was the emperor's policy to channel the important 
sources of revenue into certain treasuries which served as his
97. In 3rd/1175, 500,000 kuan"jgT (string) of hui-tzu was 
assigned for circulation in the Liang-Huai region in 
exchange for copper coins. See CHSC, ch.54, pp.lb-2a.
98. In 1185 Hsiao-tsung told Hung Mai that because of hui-tzu, 
he had suffered from insomnia for nearly ten years. See 
Hung Mai, op.cit., ch.14, p.585.
99. CHSC, ch.60, p.lb.
100. CHSC, ch.62, p.8a.
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private purse while the National Treasury often suffered a
deficit. Nevertheless, it can be said that such a policy was
motivated not by Hsiao-tsung*s selfish interest but by his
pragmatism. Seeing the reluctance of the scholar-officials in
achieving hui-fu, the emperor most probably realized that in
attaining the above goal, he had to rely on himself rather than
on his ministers and that it was important to build up his personal
resources so that he would be able to launch a military campaign
when the right moment arrived. It is interesting to note that
the above policy was first implemented during the chief-
.. 102
councillorship of Yu Yun-wen. Yu, as we know, shared the 
emperor's vision of reconquest and thus did not oppose his policy 
of building up a monetary reserve in preparation for any emergency 
in future. While it is clear that Hsiao-tsung*s intention in 
enriching his private purse was closely linked to his ambition to 
achieve hui-fu, his management and control of the empire's 
treasuries also reflects the growth of absolutism during the 
Ch'un-hsi era, as illustrated by the following account.
101. This has been pointed out Chu Hsi, who in his criticism 
of Hsiao-tsung*s financial policy, alleged that a great 
difference existed between the sources of revenue reserved 
for the Imperial Treasury and those designated for the 
National Treasury. While the former obtained its revenue 
from the essential and well-recorded items, the latter 
was left with income from items which were more difficult 
to collect or which might only exist on paper. See Chu- 
tzu yli-lei, ch. Ill, p.6b; see also Ch’u's sealed memorial 
of 12th/1188, CWC, ch.11, p.175.
102. CWC, ch.11, p.175.
234
Traditionally there were two major types of treasuries in 
imperial China: the National Treasury (tso-tsang k'u
which was under the control of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Imperial Treasury (nei-tsang k fu which was situated
in the Inner Court and was a private treasury of the emperor.
The latter became increasingly important during the Sung for it 
not only represented the privy purse of the emperor or performed 
the function of a palace treasury, but it also played a signifi­
cant role in the national finance, in a new political system
103
where the emperor was the apex of power. It served as an organ
for the consolidation of imperial power for the empire's wealth
was stored in it and its contents were kept as confidential as
possible. By the time of the Southern Sung, the Imperial
Treasury acquired greater significance as half of the national
104
revenue was channeled into it. While the National Treasury
was responsible for most of the state's expenditure such as the 
payment of salaries to the civil and military personnel, the
103. For a study on the treasuries of the Sung dynasty, %see. 
Umehara Kaoru » "Sodai no naizTJ to saaso"
Ci L  %  X & L  » Toho gakuh'S £ &  . Vol.42 (Kyoto,
1971), pp. 127-175.
104. According to Li Hsin-ch'uan, during the final years of the 
Shao-hsing era (1127-62) the annual income from the south­
eastern region amounted to over 60 million min and half
of this was alloted to the Imperial Treasury. See CYYL, 
ch.193, p.3240. klso^ in 4th/1162 the Vice-Minister of 
Rites Huang Chungs® m7 commented that with half of the 
national revenue laeing channeled into the Imperial 
Treasury, it was impossible for the Ministry of Finance to 
keep check on its income and expenditure, and he requested 
for the national income to be fully alloted to the National 
Treasury instead. See CYYL, ch.199, p.3355.
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funds from the Imperial Treasury were only withdrawn occasionally 
for military expenses and for emergencies such as national 
calamities.
treasury also developed during the Sung out of the need to spend
large amounts of money on military expenses and the running of
an enlarged bureaucracy. In order to meet these heavy expenses,
funds were sometimes withdrawn from the Imperial Treasury as a
temporary measure to relieve the government of its financial
difficulties. However, as such borrowings became more frequent,
it was necessary to separate out the funds which were being
constantly withdrawn and set up a new treasury for them. Thus
the original two-level system of the empire's treasuries had
105
evolved into a three-level system. The rise of this third
kind of treasury was especially noted during the reign of Hsiao- 
tsung, who was responsible for the establishment of the tso- 
tsang nan-k'u jj (Southern Storehouse of the National
(Storehouse for Reserves of the National Treasury). Even though 
in name they were referred to as parts of the tso-tsang, they 
were in fact very different from the National Treasury which was 
directly controlled by the Ministry of Finance. On the contrary, 
being under the control of the emperor, they were largely similar 
to the Imperial Treasury in both their nature and functions, and
Besides the nei-tsang and the tso-tsang, a third type of
Treasury) and the tso-tsang feng-chuang
105. See Umehara Kaoru, op.cit., p.142.
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during the Southern Sung, the term "Imperial Treasury” appears to
include both the nan-k*u and the feng-chuang k'u most of the 
106
time. However, despite the similarity in functions, they were 
different from the Imperial Treasury as they were located in the 
Outer Court and not in the palace.
The nan-k * u was a special treasury set up for the payment
of military expenses. It was formed in 1162 by transferring one
of the imperial treasuries, namely, the "Imperial Treasury of
Awards" (yu-ch*ien chuang-kuan chi-shang ^  )
to the tso-tsang. The chi-shang k ’u was established in 1134 for
the payment of awards to military personnel. Since the stopping
of war Ch'in Kuei had channelled the important sources of revenue
into it and it had become extremely rich during the last years of 
107
Kao-tsung's reign. When Hsiao-tsung first took over the throne,
£
he received a memorial from the Left Policy Monitor Yuan Fu
who pointed out that formerly most of the national income was
alloted to the Ministry of Finance, but in recent years, it was
shared among the imperial and national treasuries and this
resulted in a deficit in the Ministry. Yuan requested that a
fixed quota of the national income be allocated to the imperial
treasuries and the rest of the empire's revenue be returned to
the Ministry of Finance, so that its accounts would no longer be 
108
in the red. Hsiao-tsung responded to Yuan's request by making
106. Uemhara Kaoru, op.cit., p.141.
107. See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.17, p.3b.
108. For Yiian Fu's memorial see SHY, shih-huo 51:29, p.5689.
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the above transfer and renaming the chi-shang k'u the nan-k'u.
However, even though it was supposed to be attached to the
National Treasury in theory, it was still very much an imperial
treasury in practice. It continued in its former function of
meeting military expenses and derived its revenue from the court
(ch*ao-t*ing ) rather than from the Ministry of Finance.
During the Ch*ien-tao era the nan-k*u was regarded as one of the
110
richest treasuries of the empire. There were occasions when 
it provided loans to the National Treasury when the latter was in 
serious financial difficulties.*'1*’ However, during the Ch'un- 
hsi era, another treasury called the feng-chuang k*u appears to 
overshadow the nan-k * u in importance as it assumed a more signi­
ficant role than the nan-k*u in serving as the emperor's privy 
purse.
The feng-chuang k'u of Hsiao-tsung was established in 
1170 under the specific ruling that no funds should be withdrawn 
from it save for the purpose of paying military expenses and
109. CYTC, Vol.l, ch.17, p.4a.
110. On 3/12/1167 the officer-in-charge of the nan-k'u Chiang 
Hsinjfc.-|^p reported that a tremendous amount of gold, 
silver, copper coins and goods was kept in this treasury. 
See SHY, shih-huo 51: 32, p.5690. Also on 5/2nd/H70, it 
was stated that a large amount of silver was stored in the 
nan-k*u. See SHY, ghih-huo 56:7, p.5776.
111. For example, in 3rd/1171 Hsiao-tsung inquired about the
4 million min borrowed by the Ministry of Finance from the 
nan-k*u. See CHSC, ch.50, pp.9a-9b.
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granting allowances to the ex-emperor and empress dowager. It
was different from the feng-chuang k'u of the Northern Sung, which
113was an imperial treasury. Since its establishment Hsiao-tsung
made it into a real storehouse for the state's reserves and it
was in this particular treasury that the empire's wealth was
accumulated. The date of its creation is of great significance
for it was in 1170 that Yii Yiin-wen was serving as chief councillor
and with his support and encouragement, the emperor was adopting
a more aggressive policy in foreign affairs. It is evident that
the feng-chuang k'u was established for the purpose of achieving
reconquest. The importance of this treasury increased further
during the Ch'un-hsi era, particularly after the reform of 12th/
1175, by which an important section of the nan-k*u was incorporated 
114
into it. As a result, the income of the nan-k 'u was drastically
reduced while the feng-chuang k'u grew rapidly. The latter 
treasury became so rich that in 5th/1179 it was even reported 
that the strings used for tying the cash were rotting after
112. Wang Y i n g - l i n i / ^ , Yii-hai (Taipei: Hua-lien
ch 'u-pan-shejj*-||^j ^  , 1964) , ch. 183, pp,26a-26b.
113. Ibid,, ch.183, pp.l7a-18b,
114. In the reform of 12th/1175, the Upper Division of the nan- 
k'u (nan-shang ) was incorporated into the 
feng-chuang k'u. See CHSC, ch.54, p,13b. Therefore what 
remained as the nan-k'u since 12th/1175 was the Lower 
Division (nan-hsia k ' u ^ ) of the Treasury.
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115
having been kept there for years. In 8th/1183 it was stated
that the total value of goods and cash stored in the feng-chuang
116
k*u amounted to over 30 million min. This was indeed no small
sum, as it represented 50% of the annual income received from 
the south-eastern region.
In 6th/1183 Hsiao-tsung decided to transfer the nan-k*u
back to the National Treasury. According to him this would save
118
him the trouble of having to take care of the treasury himself.
However, it was soon discovered that there were other reasons why
the emperor decided to lift his control over the nan-k*u. The
fact that this treasury was not such an asset after all was
revealed by the Minister of Finance Wang Tso , who pointed
out that because of the deficit incurred by the nan-k*u, the
transfer of its control to the Ministry of Finance would bring
119
more harm than good to the latter. He proposed that the
115. In 5th/1179 the offleer-in-charge of the feng-chuang k*u , 
Yen Ts'ang-shu fgn » reported that out of a total of
5.3 million kuan of cash kept in this treasury, some was 
lost and became unaccountable for because the strings used 
for tying these were broken after so many years. He 
requested for the lost cash to be replaced. See CHSC,
ch.57, p.6a.
116. Ibid., ch.60, p.11a.
117. By the end of the Ch'un-hsi era, the annual revenue from
the southeast is said to be around 65.3 million min. See
CYTC, Vol.l, ch.14, p.la.
118. CHSC, ch.60, p.10a.
119. Yii-hai, ch. 183, p.26a. According to the calculation made 
by Wang Tso, the deficit came to a total of 440,000 min. 
See CYTC, Vol.l, ch.17, p.4a.
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nan-k'u should be incorporated into the feng-chuang k'u instead,
but his proposal was not accepted by Hsiao-tsung. The emperor's
refusal clearly indicates the great importance he attached to the
feng-chuang k'u which functioned as his personal treasure-house
for the rest of his reign. Although it was supposed to store up
reserves for the purpose of emergency, during the final years of
the Ch'un-hsi era, however, funds from this treasury had
frequently been transferred to the imperial treasuries in the
palace under the pretext of rewarding the soldiers or for the
120manufacturing of military equipment. The Ministry of Finance 
was unable to do anything about it. It is evident that by the 
end of Hsiao-tsung's reign, the feng-chuang k'u had evolved into 
an important organ which served to augment the absolute power of 
the throne.
The Abdication of Hsiao-tsung
A turning point in the political career of Hsiao-tsung 
came in 10th/1187 with the death of his father, Kao-tsung.
121
Having served the Emperor Emeritus with the greatest filiality 
for the past twenty-five years, Hsiao-tsung responded to the 
event with great grief. Despite the counsel of his ministers,
120. CYTC. Vol. 1, ch.17, p. 4b; Yii-hai , ch.183, p.26b.
121. Hsiao-tsung's extraordinary devotion to the Emperor 
Emeritus was a dominant feature in his behaviour, both 
within the family and in court politics. He visited his 
father frequently and the monthly stipends for the Te-shou 
palace amounted to 40,000 kuan. See WCC, ch.164, pp.la- 
lb and p.2b.
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he Insisted on observing the mourning rites for three years.
The idea of abdicating must have occurred to him thenf but being 
a responsible emperor, he found it necessary to carry out a period 
of intensive training for the heir-apparent to prepare him for 
the throne.
In llth/1187, Hsiao-tsung issued a decree authorizing the
heir-apparent to participate in the administration of the 
123
empire. He also told the councillors that from then on the 
heir-apparent would discuss state matters with them. The emperor's 
decision caused much concern among the officials, including the 
Reader-in-waiting Yang Wan-li, who warned Hsiao-tsung regarding 
the possible consequence of bestowing political power upon his 
heir:
... a state should not possess two rulers and 
neither should the people owe allegiance to 
two kings. Now with Your Majesty on top and 
the heir-apparent appointed to take part in 
the administration, there are in fact two 
rulers in the state. From times of old there 
has never been a case where a state possessing 
two rulers was not endangered....124
Yang was apprehensive that the above decision would lead to 
political instability. He called upon the emperor to change his
122. After Kao-tsung’s death, Hsiao-tsung told Chief Councillor 
Wang Huai that he intended to observe mourning for a full 
three-year term instead of following the normal practice 
of the court to substitute the years with months. See 
CHSC, ch.63, p.15b.
123. CHSC, ch.63, p.16a.
124. For Yang Wan-li's memorial see CCC, ch.62, pp.509-11.
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mind about the three years1 mourning and to fully resume adminis- 
trative duties himself.
Following Yang's memorial, the heir-apparent was fearful
and declined to take up his newly-assigned responsibility. However,
Hsiao-tsung had already made up his mind to familiarize his son
with governmental matters and therefore did not accept his refusal,
but speeded up the training of his heir. In lst/1188 a new
office called the "Policy Deliberation Hall" (i-shih t'ang ‘-j
‘il ) was set UP in Palace* where the heir-apparent was
to meet the councillors on every alternate day to discuss state 
125
matters. Within the same month the emperor announced to his
ministers that after having participated in pollcy-discussion
for a while, the heir-apparent was becoming we11-acquainted with
affairs of the empire. He also declared his intention to have
the heir in attendance during subsequent court sessions held in 
126the palace.
From the above measures, it is apparent that Hsiao-tsung 
was grooming his heir to take over the throne as soon as possible. 
Nevertheless, the emperor's decision to grant more and more 
responsibility to the heir-apparent again led to anxiety among 
the ministers. In lst/1188 the Junior Lord of the Court of 
Imperial Sacrifices and concurrently Left Chief Adviser
125. SSCW. ch.27, p.2199; see also Chou Pi-ta, Ssu-llng lu
in WCC, ch.172, p.29b.
126. SSCW, ch.27, p.2200; WCC, ch.172, pp.55b-56a.
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J  >/& > i(tso yu-te /£. of the heir-apparent, Yu Mou TlS ,
admonished the prince;
Where power lies, the whole world will strive 
and hasten after it, and this is indeed to be
feared! I hope Your Highness will obtain the
approval of the emperor in all matters before 
implementing them and listen to public 
opinion before making decisions on them....127
He further advised the prince that as heir-apparent, he should by 
right be merely concerned with attending to the daily needs of 
the emperor and not get involved with other matters. Yu finally 
counselled the heir-apparent to decline his public duties after 
the internment of Kao-tsung.
From the protests of officials such as Yu Mou and Yang 
Wan-li, it appears that they were still hoping for the emperor
to return to court to resume his normal functions. Thus successive
requests were put forward by the ministers for the emperor to 
return to his duties at court. Nevertheless, Hsiao-tsung had 
decided to complete the three^-year mourning period and nothing 
was going to make him change his mind. He made this very clear 
by issuing an order in 4th/1188, in which he stated that despite 
his earlier promise to return to court after the internment of 
the t'ai-shang huang, he would, however, have no peace of mind 
if he failed to carry out the rites in full. He thus ordered 
the officials not to send in any more requests regarding the
127. CHSC, ch.64, p.2b; HTC, ch.151, p.4032.
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above matter. It was only after the Imperial pronouncement
that the ministers stopped their requests for fear of offending 
the emperor.
Meanwhile Hsiao-tsung continued to educate his son in the
important affairs of the state and the administration of the
empire. For example, in 9th/1188 he told the heir-apparent that
since matters concerning rituals and ceremony had clearly been
recorded in great details, it was not necessary for him to discuss
these further, but he had yet to go through finance slowly with
the latter. After briefing his heir on various ways to reduce
military expenditure, Hsiao-tsung emphasized that 80% of the
129
national income should be allotted to the army. This clearly
shows that even till the last days of his reign, finance and
defence remained the topmost concern of the emperor. On another
occasion, in llth/1188, Hsiao-tsung cautioned the heir-apparent
against granting imperial favours lavishly (by giving official
titles to family members of the bureaucrats) so as to avoid
130stalling the bureaucracy. It had always been the emperor's
policy to reduce expenditure by cutting down the number of
128. CHSC, ch.64, p.5a; WCC, ch.173, p,24b. The emperor was 
encouraged to make such a proclamation by the Revising 
Officer of the Department of Imperial Edicts (ch'ih-ling- 
suo shang-ting-kuan yjfUuJ ) Shen Ch'ing-ch'en
yil>7^ k » who appears to be the only official who 
supported the emperor's decision to observe mourning for 
three years. See CHSC, ch.64, p.5a.
129. SSCW, ch,27, p.2211.
130. SSCW, ch.27, p.2214.
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supernumerary posts, both in the civil as well as military services 
and he therefore desired his son to follow in his footsteps.
One event which might have hastened Hsiao-tsung to
abdicate was the death of the Chin ruler Shih-tsung in lst/1189.
Shih-tsung was succeeded by his great grandson, who was very much
younger than Hsiao-tsung himself. From Hsiao-tsung’s attitude
towards foreign relations, it would not be surprising if he
regarded it as humiliating for him to address the young Chin ruler
as his "uncle" in accordance with the stipulation of the 1165
treaty, and this may have prompted him to retire in the following 
131
month. Before he finally stepped down, Hsiao-tsung's last
important act was to fill the top positions of the bureaucracy
with men who could assist his son in the running of the government.
In lst/1189, in a series of appointments made by the emperor,
Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng v-&ji-*were appointed Left and Right Chief
Councillor respectively while Wang Lin was given the position of
132Second Privy Councillor, It was only after arranging every­
thing in good order that Hsiao-tsung felt he could retire in 
peace. His great sense of responsibility and his persistent 
industry were shown by the fact that on the eve of his abdication 
in 2nd/1189 he still carried on working and made decisions on the
131, According to one modern historian, Hsiao-tsung, being an 
old man of over 60 years, felt reluctant to address a
21 year-old youngster as his "uncle" and this prompted him 
to abdicate in the following month. See Wang Te-i, "Sung 
Hsiao-tsung chi ch'i shih-tai", p.23.
132. SSCW, ch.27, p.2219.
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appointment of bureaucratic personnel.
Having prepared his heir for taking over the throne and
appointed the various councillors to lead the bureaucracy, Hsiao-
tsung felt that it was time to make a public announcement
regarding his decision to retire. So in lst/1189 the emperor
formally informed Left Chief Councillor Chou Pi-ta and his
colleagues of his intention to abdicate in favour of his son, so
that he could complete the three-year mourning term for Kao- 
134
tsung. The two chief councillors were ordered to draft the
imperial edict announcing his abdication. Before the end of the
month, the Te-shou palace of Kao-tsung was renamed the Ch'ung-
h u a ^ ; ^ '  palace and prepared for Hsiao-tsung’s retirement. In
135
early 2nd/1189, in an abdication ceremony similar to that of 
Kao-tsung in 1162, Hsiao-tsung finally left his throne after 
having reigned for twenty-seven years.
133. SSCW, ch,27, p.2220.
3.34. SSCW, ch.27, p.2220; WCC, ch.173, p.46a.
135. SSCW, ch.27, p.2220; WCC, ch.173, pp.50a-50b.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: HSIAO-TSUNG AND CONSOLIDATION
In his comments on the reign of Hsiao-tsung, the renowned 
Ch'ing author of Sung Lun, Wang Fu-chih, criticizes the emperor 
for his inability to attain reconquest and for his lack of
tsung as a frustrated emperor who did not succeed in accomplishing 
much for his empire after failing in his first attempt to achieve 
hui-fu. Similarly, the well-known Ming commentator on the Sung- 
shih chi-shih pen-mo, Chang P'u q 'JJL/^ J' , also states that at the 
beginning of Hsiao-tsung’s administration, there were ample
means reconquest), but these opportunities were lost because the
2
emperor was unable to make good use of them. Even the compilers 
of the Sung Official History, while recognising Hsiao-tsung as 
the best among the Southern Sung rulers and commending him for 
bringing about an improvement in Sung foreign relations, also 
appear to be apologetic for the emperor's failure to fulfil his
1. SL, ch,11, pp,179^181,
2. SSPM, ch.78, p.172 (The version used for this particular 
footnote is that published by San-min shu-chii ^
Taipei, 1963, as the Peking edition used in the other 
footnotes does not contain the comments of Chang P'u).
fighting spirit after the Sung defeat at Fu-li.* He sees Hsiao-
opportunities for recovery or restoration which also
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military ambition by commenting that it was the will of Heaven
3
that reconquest did not take place.
From the remarks cited above, it is obvious that the 
historians concerned are so taken up by the issue of reconquest 
that they overlook one very important aspect of Hsiao-tsung's 
administration, namely, his continuing consolidation of the 
Southern Sung regime. From our present study of Hsiao-tsung*s 
reign, we find that Wang Fu-chih's criticism is not totally 
accurate as the defeat at Fu-li did not really dampen the 
emperor's enthusiasm to achieve reconquest. In fact, as we have 
seen in Chapters IV and V of this thesis, it was after the 
abortive campaign and the establishment of peace that consolidation 
actually took place. Also, it was the dynastic goal to achieve 
hui-fu that spurred Hsiao-tsung and his court to greater efforts 
in reconstructing and strengthening their empire. In assessing 
the administration of Hsiao-tsung, both Wang Fu-chih and Chang 
P'u fail to point out his outstanding achievements in domestic 
affairs. Contrary to their opinions that the Hsiao-tsung era was 
one without much accomplishment, it has been shown in the preceding 
chapters that during this period, much progress had been attained 
in the various areas of administration, defence, agriculture, 
finance and foreign relations. By effectively consolidating the 
Southern Sung, Hsiao-tsung not only succeeded in preserving the 
war-shaken regime which he had inherited from his father, but he 
also provided it with a strong political order, a sustaining
3. SS, ch.35, p.692.
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economy and a sufficiently solid defence that enabled the dynasty 
to last for another ninety years under increasingly difficult 
circumstances.
If looking back on the reign of Kao-tsung gives us a 
clearer understanding of the tasks confronting Hsiao-tsung at the 
time of his accession, then looking ahead to the conditions of 
thirteenth century China can help us evaluate the great signifi­
cance of Hsiao-tsung*s efforts. In spite of the worsening 
political, economic and military situation faced by the Southern 
Sung during its final decades, the dynasty successfully withstood 
the Mongol invasions for over forty years after the fall of Chin 
in 1234, the longest record in the history of Mongol conquests 
across Eurasia. This remarkable resilience portrayed by the 
Southern Sung in its final years clearly demonstrates the strength 
of Hsiao-tsung's consolidation. Indeed, it can be said that had 
it not been for the exceptional military superiority of the 
Mongols, the Southern Sung could have lasted in consolidation for 
centuries more.
Political Order
It has been mentioned in the Introduction that Hsiao- 
tsung achieved consolidation through the twin measures of 
absolutism and centralization. It has also been suggested that 
in addition to the above principles, the emperor's adherence to 
the politics of accommodation also contributed to his success in 
augmenting imperial power. As we have seen through the study of
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court politics during the Ch'ien-tao and Ch'un-hsi eras, Hsiao- 
tsung' s absolutism was not necessarily bad nor was it oppressive. 
On the other hand, it was through absolutism at court and 
centralized control throughout the empire with an effective 
bureaucracy that the emperor succeeded in establishing a political 
order that endured for the duration of the Southern Sung dynasty.
While it is undeniable that the Southern Sung founder, 
Kao-tsung, had inherited the dynastic traditions of absolute 
government and centralized administration from his Northern Sung 
predecessors, he was nevertheless obliged by the political 
circumstances of the time to delegate extensive power to his
4
chief councillor, Ch'in Euei. However, when it came to the reign 
of Hsiao-tsung, imperial power was greatly strengthened and as a 
result, absolutism not only developed to a great extent but it 
also became the symbol of imperial government from then onwards. 
The absolute power of the monarch was recognised and respected 
by all political elements, including the most powerful and 
dominating chief councillor. The stabilizing effect of this can 
clearly be seen in the political development of the post-Hsiao- 
tsung era. Furthermore, it will also be shown that the politics 
of accommodation, which was initiated by Kao-tsung and carefully 
nurtured by Hsiao-tsung, remained an essential factor in 
integrating the Southern Sung empire until the end of the 
dynasty.
4. See Chapter II, pp.56-69.
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The assertive leadership which characterized imperial 
rule under Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung did not continue into the 
reigns of their successors. In fact, the failure of imperial 
leadership was essentially the reason which led to the emergence 
of powerful ministers and the accompanying evils of factionalism 
and power struggles, which were clearly portrayed in court 
politics under successive rulers. Nevertheless, it should be 
emphasized that despite the general deterioration after Hsiao- 
tsung1 s reign, the political order consolidated by him continued 
to function through various national crises. The first political 
crisis developed when Hsiao-tsung’s successor, Kuang-tsung 7 0  &  
(r. 1189-1194), who was suffering from mental illness, failed to 
perform the funeral rites at the time of Hsiao-tsung's death in 
1194. This scandalous violation of filial piety by the emperor, 
a crisis of confidence in Chinese political culture, led to much 
indignation at court. A group of officials under the leadership
Military Bureau, Chao Ju-yiiyjof the Administrator of the -yu ^
proposed that Prince Chia (the future Ning-tsung) should
succeed to the throne to carry out the mourning rites neglected
by his father. With the help of the Administrator of the Palace
Postern, Han T'o-chou, who was a nephew of Empress Dowager Wu
(Kao-tsung's widow), Chao was able to obtain the approval of the
empress dowager to officiate in the abdication ceremony of 
5
Kuang-tsung.
5. For the events leading to the forced abdication of Kuang- 
tsung, see his annals in SS^ , ch. 36, pp. 709-10 and annals of 
Ning-tsung, SS. ch. 37_, pp.714-5; HTC, ch.153, pp.4108-lj.; 
Yeh S h a o - w e n g - ^ ^ ^  Ssu-ch’ao wen-chien lu '■‘O
(TSCC ed.) , chia-chi ^4 , pp. 10-11 and ting-chi
-JJt , PP. 107-8. 1
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It is interesting to note that the transfer of the throne 
from Kuang-tsung to Ning-tsung (r. 1194-1224) was accomplished 
through the collaboration of the Outer and Inner Courts which, 
despite their differences, were willing to cooperate with each 
other to resolve the national crisis caused by the mental illness 
of the reigning emperor. This was clearly an example of accommo­
dative politics in practice, since both parties saw that mutual 
cooperation was necessary in order to restore political stability. 
It was also an indication that the political institutions of the 
Outer Court and Inner Court, having been placed in their proper 
order during Hsiao-tsung*s reign, were sufficiently stabilized to 
enable such a peaceful succession. As we may recall, it had 
always been Hsiao-tsung's policy to balance the power of the 
Outer Court with that of the Inner Court so that absolutism would 
prevail. The concept of absolutism had been so ingrained in the 
minds of all officials that in spite of the emperor's illness 
which made it impossible for him to rule, nobody, from either the 
bureaucracy or the Inner Court, took advantage of the situation 
to further his own ends by usurping imperial power. Instead, it 
was agreed by all the parties concerned, namely, the Outer Court 
ministers, the Inner Court functionaries as well as members of 
the imperial family that absolute power belonged to the emperor. 
Since the emperor was unable to exercise this power effectively, 
it was appropriate for the officials to restore the monarch to 
his proper function by replacing the incapacitated ruler with his 
son in order to ensure the continued stability of the political 
system.
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Absolutism as a vital element of imperial rule continued 
to play a significant role in maintaining the political order from 
then on. Although Ning-tsung was undoubtedly much more fit than 
his father to assume the position of imperial leader, he neverthe­
less proved to be a weak and ineffectual ruler. For the duration 
of his thirty-year reign, the court was dominated by two 
extremely powerful officials who served the emperor successively. 
The first of these was Han T'o-chou, who had earlier played a 
decisive role in Ning-tsung's accession. As the nephew of the 
empress dowager and the grand uncle of Empress Han, Ning-tsung's 
wife, Han was able to make use of his palace connections to over­
throw Chief Councillor Chao Ju-yii soon after Ning-tsung took
g
over the throne. The downfall of Chao was followed by a purge
of his sympathisers by Han and an attack on Tao-hsueh (also
known as Li-hsueh) , the school of thought to which many of his
associates and Han's critics belonged. The attack culminated in
the proscription of Tao-hsueh in 1196 and the subsequent
persecution of many prominent scholar-officials who were accused
7
of belonging to this school. Although Han was never officially 
designated chief councillor, he effectively functioned as one.
From 1196 to the time of his death in 1207, he was the most 
powerful man at court, given full control of the government by
6 . For an account of the power struggle between Han and Chao, 
See SSPM, ch.82, pp.911-918.
7. For the proscription of Tao-hsueh, see Ch'iao-ch*uan ch'iao- 
sou^^, 7c!?.. (pseu.), Ch'ing-yiian tang-chin &
(SKCPed.); SSPM, ch.80, pp.872-77.
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the emperor. However, because of his high-handed action in
dealing with the officials and his persecution of Tao-hsueh, Han
became extremely unpopular. Probably in an attempt to consolidate
his position, Han initiated a northern campaign against the 
8
Jurchen in 1206. This was a fatal error for the disastrous 
defeat of the Sung eventually led to his assassination by his 
political enemies the following year.
In examining Han T'o-chou's power vis-a-vis that of the 
emperor, it should be noted that although Ning-tsung granted a 
tremendous amount of authority to Han, he was by no means a mere 
puppet in the hands of his favourite minister. It is true that 
being the weak and dependent ruler that he was, he preferred not 
to exercise his ultimate power so long as Han was able to keep 
the situation under control. However, this does not mean that 
absolute authority was no longer held by the emperor. This is 
shown by the fact that after the death of his wife, Ning-tsung 
went against Han's advice by installing someone of his own choice 
as the new empress. This was Empress Yang , who became a 
great enemy of Han and was a major figure involved in the
8. It is said that Han had been advised to make a name for 
himself through the northern campaign so as to consolidate 
his own position at court. See HTC, ch.156, p.4216; S S , 
ch.474, p.13774. Nevertheless, it should also be pointed 
out that he was also prompted by objective considerations 
for the internal disturbances in Chin at this time led to 
widespread belief about its imminent, downfall. See HTC, 
pp. 4216-17 • Lu Ch'eng-hou > "Lun Han T'o-
chou 
(Honan
Shih-hsueh yueh-k'an &  fl t^l 
i, 1958), No.7, pp.14-20. *
255
9
assassination plot against Han in 1207. Also, even though the
emperor was not named among those who plotted the murder of Han,
he was reportedly informed in advance of the intended killing and
10
granted his tacit consent. Han’s tragic downfall shows that 
even the most powerful minister was wholly dependent on imperial 
favour for his political survival. It was mainly due to Hsiao- 
tsung' s success in consolidating the absolute authority of the 
emperor that ever since his reign, imperial power remained far 
above ministerial power, even under the administration of his less 
capable successors.
After the removal of Han T'o-chou, Ning-tsung found a 
substitute to take over the administration, namely, Shih Mi-yuan. 
Shih played an active role in the murder of Han and after the 
latter’s demise, rose rapidly in his career. He served as the 
sole chief councillor for Ning-tsung from 1209 to 1224 and 
continued to do so for Li-tsung until 1233. His twenty-five years 
of consecutive service even surpassed the period of Ch'in Kuei’s 
chief councillorship. While imperial favour was undoubtedly an
9. Empress Yang never forgave Han for advising Ning-tsung 
against her installation and later played a major role in 
his assassination. See HTC, ch.156, p.4204 and ch.158, 
p.4269; SSPM, ch.83, p.933.
10. While most sources claim that Han's assassination was carried 
out without the emperor's knowledge nor consent, there are 
spme which refer to the issuing of a "secret order" (mi-chih 
>lE <3  ^ pertaining to the killing. See HTC, ch. 158, p. 4269;
£>s, ch.38, and ch.474, p.13776; SSPM, ch.83, p.933. Also, 
it is unlikely that the emperor was totally in the dark, 
since those involved in the murder were subsequently not 
punished by him but were rewarded with promotions.
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important factor which led to Shih's rapid rise in power, it
should be recognised that it was his ability to consolidate his
position that enabled him to stay in office for such a long period.
Shih was the son of ex-Chief Councillor Shih Hao, and having come
from a prominent bureaucratic family, he not only had the support
of many bureaucrats but was also familiar with the politics of
his fellow-officials. Unlike his predecessor Han T'o-chou, Shih
took care to accommodate the Tao-hsueh followers, thereby gaining
the approval of this influential group of scholar-officials.11
Furthermore, unlike Han, Shih had few political enemies and
maintained extremely good relations with influential elements in 
12
the palace. Thus by adhering to the principle of accommodation, 
Shih was able to play a much better game than Han in the realm of 
power politics.
Shih Mi-yuan's power grew to such an extent that when 
Ning-tsung died in 1224 without having designated his heir, the 
chief councillor arbitrarily set aside the elder adopted prince 
in favour of the younger adopted prince as the next emperor, 
namely, Li-tsung (r. 1224-1264). His role as "emperor-maker"
11. After coming into power, Shih Mi-yuan revived the Tao-hsueh 
school by granting posthumous honours to several prominent 
figures who had suffered persecution under Han T'o-chou and 
by recalling many of its surviving members to office. See 
HTC, ch.158, pp.4279-82; SS, ch.414, p.12417.
12. Shih maintained close relations with the crown prince, 
Prince Jung,^ 7 , who had studied under him, and with 
Empress Yang; both were his fellow-conspirators in the 
plot to assassinate Han T'o-chou. See HTC, ch.158, p.4269.
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13
and the subsequent death of the older prince greatly damaged
Shih's political standing among the scholar-officials. In order
to repair his own image and the image of the court, Shih resorted
to manipulative politics by appointing to high positions several
14
veteran leaders of the Tao-hsueh school although in actual
fact, they were not given much power nor did they stay long in
office. It is worth mentioning that Shih's image-building was
apparently successful, as shown by the fact that among the four
15
most powerful chief councillors of the Southern Sung, he was 
the only one whose biography in the Official History is not
power because of boundless imperial favours bestowed upon him.
As Ning-tsung before him, Li-tsung in his forty-years' reign 
continued to delegate sweeping authority to his chief councillors 
and favourites. It is intriguing to observe that the young 
emperor quickly learned the tactics of accommodative politics 
from Chief Councillor Shih Mi-yuan and practised these himself. 
While for much of his reign Li-tsung is said to have neglected
13. After the elder prince had been sent away to Hu-chou
an uprising took place there in his name protesting that 
the succession was illegal. In the aftermath of this ill- 
fated uprising, the innocent but implicated prince was 
ordered to commit suicide by the court. See SSPM, ch. 86, 
p.993.
14. HTC, ch.162, pp.4422-24.
included among the "Evil Officials" (chien-ch 'en ).
The reign of Li-tsung saw an even greater rise in Shih's
15. The four powerful chief councillors were, in chronological 
order, Ch'in Kuei, Han T'o-chou, Shih Mi-yuan and Chia 
Ssu-tao •
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the administration of his empire in pursuit of sensual pleasures
he did not forget to cover up his personal weakness and the
abuses of his administration by honouring Tao-hsiieh, which was
proclaimed the state orthodoxy in 1241. Although he hardly went
beyond lip service, his elevation of Tao-hsueh (or Li-hsueh)
earned him the posthumous title of Li-tsung, the emperor who
17
honoured the Li-hsueh school of Confucianism. Li-tsung1s 
exhibition of respect for ideological authority in the form of 
Tao-hsueh also reminds us of Hsiao-tsung's efforts in projecting 
a good Confucian image for himself by accommodating the scholar- 
officials. Thus despite the growth of absolutism, the emperors 
found that it was still necessary to conform to the requirements 
of accommodative politics in order to maintain political 
stability. This was especially so since the^!33Qs, when the 
stability of the Southern Sung empire was increasingly shaken by 
foreign threat and internal disturbances. Externally the 
dynasty began to face a new challenge with the fall of Chin and 
the coming of the Mongols. Internally the court was engaged in 
suppressing the armed forces led by Li Ch'uan 3^  , the
"loyalist army" leader from Shan-tung who first rebelled against 
the Chin but eventually turned against the Sung by surrendering
16. Annals of Li-tsung, S£, ch. 45, p. 889; SJIS , ch.2, p. 91.
17. The compilers of the Sung Official History credit Li-tsung 
for having sanctioned the state orthodoxy and mention that 
although it was not effectively carried out during his 
reign, he nevertheless paved the way for future emperors 
to implement it fully. See SIS, ch. 45, p. 889.
16
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to the Mongols. Although Li was defeated within a few years,
his betrayal led to some amount of tension in the Huai region
and caused a great deal of anxiety to the Sung court. In the
face of the mounting international crisis and internal dangers,
it is not surprising that Li-tsung should all the more resort to
19
using Tao-hsueh to boost the political prestige of his court.
After an extremely lengthy reign, Li-tsung finally died
in 1264 and was succeeded by his son, Tu-tsung/^ ' (r. 1264-
1274), whose administration was not much an improvement upon that
of his predecessor. In fact, Tu-tsung followed the footsteps of
Ning-tsung and Li-tsung by allowing his favourite minister to
take charge of the government and bestowing upon him numerous
favours and privileges. The chief councillor so favoured by Tu-
tsung was Chia Ssu-tao, subsequently labelled the ’’Bad Last
20Minister" of the Southern Sung. He was not actually the last 
minister nor was he as bad as recorded in traditional history.
He was noted for introducing various economic reforms which aimed 
at increasing state income but which alienated many bureaucrats 
(who were also large landowners) against him. It was unfortunate
18. For an account on the rebellion of Li Cb'uan, see SSPM, 
ch.87.
19. By honouring Tao-hsueh the Southern Sung court was in fact 
employing cultural propaganda to boost its political 
prestige. See James T.C. Liu, "... a Neo-Confucian School 
...," p.502.
20. For a scholarly study on Chia Ssu-tao, see Herbert Franke, 
"Chia Ssu-tao (1213-1275): a 'Bad Last Minister'?" in 
Confucian Personalities, pp.217-234.
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that he had to encounter the Mongol invasions and had to bear the
blame for the Sung defeat. Following his dismissal in 1275, he
was sentenced to exile and was murdered while on the way to his
21
place of banishment. His tragic death is reminiscent of that 
of Han T'o-chou earlier, and brings home the point that the 
career of chief ministers, however powerful they might once have 
been, was by no means insured. Besides the factor of imperial 
support, it was also essential for the chief ministers to observe 
the politics of accommodation. Both Chia Ssu-tao and Han T'o- 
chou did not fare as well as Shih Mi-ylian because of their 
alienation of the bureaucrats and their failure in accommodating 
them.
By the time of Chia Ssu-tao's demise in 1275, the Southern 
Sung was on the verge of collapse. Tu-tsung died the previous 
year and was succeeded by a child emperor, with the empress 
dowager acting as regent. It is worth noting that even on the 
eve of the Mongol invasions when many officials fled from the 
court, the empress dowager still followed the principle of 
accommodation by granting promotions to the officials at court
22
so that they might be persuaded to stay on with the government. 
After the fall of Lin-an in early 1276, two other child emperors 
were put on the throne by a court-in-exile headed by a group of 
loyalist ministers. The fugitive court fled from place to place
21. Biography of Chia Ssu-tao, S£, ch.474, p.13787.
22. HTC, ch.181, p.4950.
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through the provinces of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung until it was 
finally destroyed by the Mongols in 1279.
In the final analysis, it can be said that the political 
order consolidated by Hsiao-tsung upon the principles of 
absolutism, centralization and accommodation helped to keep the 
empire integrated until its last days. Despite the decline of 
imperial leadership, the rise of powerful ministers and the 
prevalence of factional struggles, political stability generally 
continued with the emperor being upheld as the symbol of absolute 
authority. It is interesting to note that the ineffectual emperors 
such as Ning-tsung and Li-tsung enjoyed political longevity, just 
as their more competent predecessors had, even though conditions 
grew steadily worse under their administrations. Also, it should 
be emphasized that although the power of certain ministers rose 
to unprecedented heights under the reigns of these ineffectual 
rulers, yet not a single one among the powerful ministers ever 
usurped the throne or even attempted to do so. In spite of their 
failure to act as leaders, the emperors continued to rule as 
absolute monarchs, and the political system continued to function 
through the years of decline, without being disrupted by either 
usurpation or mutinies even during times of imminent danger.
Finally, it is important to observe the moderating effect 
of accommodative politics upon excessive absolutism. Even though 
absolutism in the hands of ineffectual emperors gave rise to many 
abuses, yet the rulers were careful not to go beyond certain 
limits, and the ideological authority of the scholar-officials 
was generally respected, in theory if not in practice, as
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illustrated by the example of Li-tsung. It is clear that both 
the emperors and the ministers had to practise accommodative 
politics in order to safeguard their own interests and the well­
being of the state. This in no small way contributed to the 
strength of the political order in the midst of turmoil and 
stress.
Socio-economic Order
As discussed in earlier chapters, Hsiao-tsung's consoli­
dation programme not only aimed at achieving political stability 
through absolutism and centralization, but it also directed a 
great deal of attention towards improving the social and economic 
welfare of the people through various agrarian and financial 
reforms. In fact, as stated in Chapter II, finance played a 
crucial role in the founding of the Southern Sung and continued 
to function as a most essential factor in the maintenance of a 
viable socio-economic order for the duration of the dynasty. 
Through the many years of peace and guided by the policy of 
frugality, Hsiao-tsung not only succeeded in reviving the 
empire's economy, but also greatly increased its financial
strength, particularly by the accumulation of wealth in the
23
special imperial treasury of feng-chuang k'u. Although it 
cannot be denied that this treasury had become an instrument for 
augmenting imperial power, it should nevertheless be noted that 
the tremendous amount of resources kept there was later used to
23. See Chapter V, pp. 237-39.
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relieve the state of its financial difficulties, especially during 
the mid-thirteenth century.
The political decline in the post-Hsiao-tsung era
discussed in the preceding section was accompanied by general
deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of the country.
The state was increasingly troubled by problems of extremely
heavy expenditure, unequal distribution of land, spiral inflation
and other economic ills, especially towards the end of the 
24
dynasty. However, it is intriguing to note that despite all
these problems, the Southern Sung was still regarded as the
richest and most prosperous country in the world on the eve of
25
the Mongol invasions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the
favourable conditions in the Yang-tzu region and the rapid 
commercialization and economic prosperity of the south-east helped 
to sustain the empire financially. In addition, it should be 
recognised that Hsiao-tsung had contributed in many ways to the 
highly impressive economic advancement of Southern Sung China.
24. For a discussion on the various problems besetting the 
Southern^ Sung .dynasty during its final years, see Chang 
Yin-lin "Nan-Sung wang-kuo-shih pu ^
SSYCC, Vol.2, pp.105-122.
25. See Jacques Gernet, Daily Life In China On The Eve Of The 
Mongol Invasion, 1250-1276 trans. by H.M. Wright (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp.15-16. Late Sung 
writers have also provided us with interesting accounts of 
the empire’s prosperity, especially in the capital area of 
Lin-an. Sep Nai T e - w e n g ^  (pseu.), Tu-ch’eng chi- 
sheng-^3j Z r i k i ; Anonymous, Hsi-hu lao-jen fang-sheng lu 
^ 9  > W .^ T;zu~inu &  £ . Meng-liang-
—  * 611(1 Chou Miff) , Wu-lin chiu-shih
^  Jb  • These Jour books are compiled in Meng Yiian-lao, 
ft.af , &  , Tung-ching meng-hua lu (wai ssu-chung)
A~ *?“  ^ (S^ang^ai: Ku-tien wen-hsiieh 
ch ' u-p&n-she 1957> ‘
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Even though Hsiao-tsung’s administration had been 
criticized by one twelfth century official as "failing to make 
the state wealthy and prosperous" (wu fu-shu chih-hsiao ^
->• n >> 26
^ , 30^ )  because of the heavy military expenditure, we find
that the above statement is not really true. It is undeniable
that military expenses largely sapped the state of its income,
but, on the other hand, the plentiful resources of the south-east
and the prudent financial policy of Hsiao-tsung greatly
strengthened the Southern Sung economy and enabled it to stand the
financial strain caused by the irresponsible policies of later
emperors. A distinct difference in fiscal policy can be seen in
27
the extremely careful management of paper money by Hsiao-tsung,
in contrast to the careless over-printing of notes during the
reigns of his successors. From the time of Ning-tsung onwards,
the cautious approach of Hsiao-tsung in financial management had
been abandoned because of the urgent need to meet the high
military costs incurred. One convenient though short-sighted
measure adopted by the court to solve its financial problem was
28
by issuing more paper money. This resulted in a tremendous 
increase in the amount of paper currency in circulation since the
jc
26. Yuan Hsieh , "Hsing-chuan of Huang Tu ^  ," in
Hsieh-chai chi 7^7 /fH (TSCC ed.), ch. 13, p.212. 
---------------  wf- l*r\
27. See Chapter V, pp. 231-32.
28. For an account of the court's monetary policy which led to 
inflation in late Southern Sung China, see Ch'iian Han-sheng, 
"Sung-mo ti t'ung-huo p'eng-chang chi ch'i tui-yii wu-chia ti 
ying-hsiang", SSYCC, Vol.2, pp.283-325.
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thirteenth century. While during the Ch’ien-tao and Ch'un-hsi 
eras the average amount of paper money in circulation was around 
20 million min, it had increased to 230 million during the later
part of Ning-tsung's reign and rose to 650 million in the
2 9
mid-1240s.
Although initially the issue of paper currency
enabled the state to meet its expenditure, the fact that it was
30
printed in large amounts without proper backing of copper cash
inevitably led to its devaluation. The consequent high prices of
goods and high cost of living undoubtedly had an adverse effect
upon the livelihood of the people, especially among the urban
population. From a study made by Professor Ch'uan Han-sheng, it
is found that the prices of goods had doubled in the period
between Ning-tsung's reign and the first phase of Li-tsung’s
reign (from 1225 to 1239), and even rocketted to ten times their
previous value in the second phase of Li-tsung's reign from 1240 
31
to 1264. On the eve of Li-tsung’s death in 1264, Chief 
Councillor Chi a Ssu-tao, in an attempt to remedy the defects of 
the fiscal system, introduced a new paper currency known as
29. For the figures quoted, see SSYCC, Vol.2, pp.286-7.
30. The decrease in the value of paper money has been attributed 
to the fact that it was not sufficiently backed by copper 
cash. This had often been pointed out by the officials of 
the time. See SHY, h s i n g - f a 3^ 2 : 42- 43; SHY, chih-
kuan 43: 179; Chen Te-hsiu Jjjt- %  , Chen Wen-chung-kung 
wen-chi jj. n£,. (SPTK ed.) , ch.32, p.500.
31. See Ch'uan Han-sheng, "Sung-mo ti t'ung-huo p ’eng-chang...," 
p .306 and p .313.
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chin-yin hsien-ch'ien kuan-tzu ’’gold, silver,
32
cash exchange medium". Instead of checking inflation, however, 
the introduction of this new note caused prices to rise even
33higher and conditions worsened during the reign of Tu-tsung.
In addition to the problem of inflation, the late Southern 
Sung government was also plagued by the problem of concentration 
of land ownership in the hands of the rich and powerful officials. 
Less serious in the early years of the dynasty under the 
administration of Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung, it became worse as 
the influential officials were able to accumulate more land at
34
the expense of the populace, especially during Li-tsung's reign.
The gravity of this problem was an important factor that prompted
Chia Ssu-tao to introduce his agrarian reforms in the 1260s. His
most important measure was the "Public Field Laws" (kung-t * ien-
_fa 'A* ) by which one-third of privately-owned land exceeding
a certain limit was to be bought by the state and converted into
public fields, the income from which would be used to meet
35
military expenditures. It was decided to implement the reform
32. Although the name of this new paper currency sounded 
attractive, it was not convertible into gold or silver or 
cash. See Lien-sheng Yang, Money and Credit in China, p.57.
33. Wu Tzu-mu ^  ^  t Meng-Liang lu, in Meng Yiian-lao 
et.al., Tung-ching meng-hua lu (wai ssu-chung), ch.13, 
p.238; HTC, ch.177, p.4849; biography of Chia Ssu-tao,
S S , ch.474, p.13782.
34. See Chang Yin-lin, op.cit., pp.112-3.
35. HTC, ch.177, p.4831; Herbert Franke, "Chia Ssu-tao...," 
pp.229-230.
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(where the problem of land
concentration was most serious) and to introduce it later to
other parts of the country. However, because of strong opposition
by the landowners, the reform was merely carried out in the Che-
hsi area during the period of its implementation from 1263 to
1275. While the reform succeeded in increasing state income, it
alienated many officials who were large landowners as well. This
had a significant effect upon the last years of the Southern
Sung dynasty, since many who were antagonised by Chia's policy
became less loyal to the Sung and a considerable number of the
officials even surrendered to the Mongols. This was undoubtedly
36a major factor that hastened the downfall of the dynasty. Chia
also caused much hatred among the generals by his enforcement of
a strict audit of army accounts that required the reimbursement
37
of unjustifiable expenditures. It is therefore not surprising
that the generals who had surrendered to the Mongols conveniently
38
put the blame on Chia for their own defection.
it is significant that despite the general socio-economic
36. Herbert Franke, "Chia Ssu-tao...," p.230; Chang Yin-lin, 
op.cit., pp.121-22.
38. After the fall of Lin-an in 1276, the Mongol ruler Kublai
inquired of the Sung generals the reason for their surrender, 
and they replied that it was because of Chia's prejudice 
against the militarv. See HTC. ch.225. n.4958; Suna Lien
Nevertheless, from the fall of the Southern Sung dynasty,
37. HTC, ch.176, p.4812; annals of Li-tsung, SJ3, ch . 45 , p.878.
i uan onin x* -nua, cn.»
268
deterioration that imposed great hardship upon the people, there
were no large-scale peasant uprisings against the government, very
unlike the usual pattern of dynastic cycle experienced by other
39
major Chinese dynasties. In analysing the reasons behind this 
intriguing problem, one comes to the conclusion that the socio­
economic order of the Southern Sung was at least tolerable, if not 
actually solid. As mentioned earlier, Hsiao-tsung’s agrarian and 
financial measures had contributed much to increasing the state's 
wealth and improving the livelihood of the people. In addition, 
there were several other factors which contributed significantly 
to the maintenance of socio-economic stability of the dynasty. 
Among these were the efforts of the Southern Sung government in 
lessening the economic burden of the poor through a more equitable 
system of taxation and services, the maintenance of an effective 
system of famine-relief administration and the functioning of 
the tenancy system.
As mentioned in Chapter II, the ching-chieh-fa represents 
an important effort on the part of the Southern Sung government
39. While major d y n a s t i e s  in Chinese history such as Ch'in,
Han, T ’ang, Ming and Ch'ing were all beset by large-scale 
peasant uprisings and internal rebellions during their last 
years, this did not happen to the Southern Sung. Although 
small-scale uprisings did take place here and there, these 
were usually suppressed before they could pose any danger
Su Chin-ylian and Li Ch’un-pu , Sung-tai
san-tz'u nung-min ch'i-i shih-liao hui-pien ^
\ (Peking, 1963); Kuan Li-gh’ing, £
I t "Lun''Liang-Sung nung-min^ chan-cheng" ^  ffru.
~S h ^en~chiu » No.2 (April 
1962), pp7v6-86; Hua Shan J-T” , "Kan-Sung Shao-ting 
Yuan-p1ing chien ti Chiang-Min-Kuang nung-min ta ch'i-i
i$3 % & ( W .  M. i
Wen-shih che , No. 3 C1956), pp. 41-48.
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to attain more equitable taxes and services among the rural
population. During the time of Hsiao-tsung the government was
also noted for promoting two very important measures which helped
to bring about socio-economic stability in the rural areas, namely,
the Charitable Service system (i-i and the Communal Loan
Granary system (she-ts 1 ang ) • In the Charitable Service
40
system, an endowed estate was set up for reimbursing village
officers called upon to perform local services such as collecting
taxes, maintaining order etc. As the servicemen often had to
bear the costs of local services themselves, many found it a
great burden and some even became bankrupt after serving as
village officers. The i-i emerged as one solution to the problem
of local services and was found to be an effective means of
relieving the financial burden imposed upon the servicemen.
Although it was first established by the people themselves, the
government played an important role in encouraging its adoption
in many parts of the empire. Fan Ch'eng-ta, who served as the
Administrator of Ch'uy^ru'prefecture in Liang-Che in 1169, was
41
especially noted for championing its cause.
Similarly, the Communal Loan Granary system also 
functioned as a relief measure to the agrarian community. Under
40. For studies^on th^ i-i system, see Wang Te-i, "Nan-Sung i-i 
k ' *n Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-chi ^
<TaiPei: Shang-wu, 1968); Sudo Yoshiyuki,^
"Nan-S5 ni
| 'Tu c i j - p c  j .  . o u o u g - u , J - J u o ;  , i ? u u u X u a u i )  ’ ,> >
 okeru Gi-Eki no setsuritsu to unei"\%J
t O s5dai shl
nkv;fP/U£ioT£J ( T o k y o :  T 5 y 5  B u n k o  ’
I
kenkyu
1969)
41. See the tomb inscription for Fan Ch’eng-ta in WCC, ch.61, 
pp.13b-14a.
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this system, grain was granted to the people as relief loans in
summer (before the harvesting season) to be repaid after harvest 
42
in winter. The granary was independently managed at the village
level by village officers and community leaders. In most cases,
the initial capital was granted from government granaries although
in several places, generous officials and the wealthy contributed
grain from their own households. The she-ts'ang fa was introduced
by Chu Hsi in the Ch'ung-an^ prefecture in Fu-chien in 1168.
Upon Chu’s request in 1181, Hsiao-tsung issued an edict encouraging
the adoption of this system in the various prefectures of the 
43
empire.
The communal grain granary was one of the most important 
preventive measures carried out by the government in the area of 
famine-relief administration. Besides the communal loan granary, 
there were many other types of granaries which also played a role 
in famine relief. Apart from the establishment of granaries, the 
government also implemented many other measures in relief 
administration such as the promotion of agriculture, remission
42. A description of the Communal Loan Granary system is found 
in the Yang Lien-sheng, Money and Credit in China, p.76.
43. SS, ch.35, p.677. For the effectiveness of the system in 
relief administration, see the comments of Chen Te-hsiu in 
Chen Wen-chung-kung wen-chi , ch.10, p.190: "Tsou chili •
shih-erh hsien she-ts'ang chuang ^  7*/^ "
(Memorial for the establishment ox Communal loan granaries 
in the twelve prefectures).
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of taxes, provision of state loans etc. It should be pointed
out that the overall effective relief administration of the
Southern Sung was a significant factor for the lack of large-
45
scale peasant rebellions during this period.
The development of the tenancy system in Southern Sung
China also helped to alleviate the suffering of the poor to some
extent. While the increase in population and the problem of land
concentration greatly reduced the size of land owned by the
average farmers and deprived many of their fields, it should
nevertheless be noted that the tenancy system helped to provide
46a means of livelihood to the poverty-stricken peasants. Many 
small farmers or peasants without any land of their own sought 
employment by becoming tenants in the farms owned by the land­
lords or in state-owned lands. Despite the high rental and 
oppression by the landlords, generally peasants with insufficient 
land were able to make a living through the tenancy system. 
Furthermore, the government also played an important role by 
encouraging wealthy landowners to recruit refugees or other
44. For a detailed study on famine-relief administration of the
ti chiu-
Chung-
yuan
1970)
Ibid
46. See
yeh
"Nan-Sung nung-ts'un ti t'u'-tx fen-jj'ei yu tsu-tien chih-
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poverty-stricken peasants as tenants, thus helping to solve the
47
problem or unemployment among the agrarian population.
In considering the factors responsible for stabilizing 
the socio-economic order of the Southern Sung, it is worth noting 
that the system of taxation, though far from satisfactory, also 
helped to preserve the order by preventing it from a total break­
down. As stated in earlier chapters, the Southern Sung government 
was noted for its policy of heavy taxation. Nevertheless, it is 
significant that the new taxes introduced by Kao-tsung and
48
maintained by Hsiao-tsung consisted largely of indirect taxes 
and that the additional tax burdens were usually imposed upon 
commercial activities and in urban areas. This means that the 
imposition of these supplementary taxes did not necessarily cause 
more suffering to the peasants, whose burden was on the whole 
still bearable. Furthermore, it was government policy since 
Hsiao-tsung's time to lessen the burden of the peasants by 
remitting taxes during times of bad harvests. The relatively 
less heavy burden of Southern Sung peasants (in comparison to 
other dynasties) may be an important reason for the lack of large- 
scale peasant rebellions during the final years of the Southern 
Sung. It may also be pointed out that the problem of inflation, 
while causing great hardship to the urban population, did not 
affect the poor peasants as much since they struggled to make a 
living by relying upon natural resources.
47. Ibid.
48. See Chapter II, pp.80-81.
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Finally, as mentioned earlier, Hsiao-tsung's legacy of
the feng-chuang k'u also played a crucial role in the financial
management of the late Southern Sung empire. The importance of
this treasury was increasingly felt from the beginning of the
thirteenth century. In 1204, for example, Han T'o-chou withdrew
10,000 taels of gold from the feng-chuang k'u to finance the 
49
northern campaign. Apart from paying military expenses, the
treasury also helped to provide relief to the poverty-stricken
populace in later years. This was frequently noted during the
1240s and 1250s when the empire was ravaged by natural calamities
and war. The richness of the feng-chuang k'u was clearly revealed
by the fact that despite the many withdrawals made during the
past few decades, it still retained lots of reserves which
helped to finance the defence of the empire during its last 
50
years. In the final analysis, the establishment of the feng- 
chuang k'u by Hsiao-tsung not only contributed to the socio­
economic stability of the empire during times of economic crises 
but also helped to prolong the life of the Southern Sung dynasty 
by providing the enormous sums required for its defence.
49. HTC, ch.156, p.4216.
50. In 12th/1274 Chia Ssu-tao withdrew from the feng-chuang 
k'u 100,000 taels of gold, 500,000 taels of silver and
10 million strings of kuan-tzu for the purpose of defence. 
See HTC, ch.180, pp.4934-35.
274
Foreign Relations and Defence
While the maintenance of a viable socio-economic order 
enabled the Southern Sung to withstand foreign invasions for 
several decades without being in the meantime undermined inter­
nally by any large-scale peasant uprisings, the ability of the 
empire to face up to military challenges from the powerful 
Mongols should, however, be attributed to the strength of its 
defence. Although as mentioned in the Introduction, the Sung 
dynasty from beginning to end was constantly plagued by the 
problem of foreign invasions, the factor of foreign threat, on 
the other hand, obliged the Southern Sung regime to build up a 
solid defence. This was especially noted during Hsiao-tsung's 
reign, when defence preparations were carefully carried out with 
the objective of hui-fu being constantly upheld. Hsiao-tsung's 
foreign policy and his consolidation of the empire’s defence 
during the Ch'ien-tao and Ch’un-hsi eras undoubtedly contributed 
to the military strength of the Southern Sung, which enabled it 
to resist Mongol attacks for more than forty years.
In his criticism of Hsiao-tsung’s foreign policy, Wang
Fu-chih attributes the adoption of the peace policy by both the
Sung and Chin states to their lack of ability to fight each other
and claims that because of this, they were forced to maintain
the status quo. He also laments the military weakness and the
complacency of these two states, which he says were the reasons
51
why they fell easily to the Mongols. However, a look at
51. SL, ch.11, pp.210-213.
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Southern Sung history shows that the Mongol conquest of South 
China was by no means easy. While it took the Mongols over two 
decades to conquer North China from the Jurchen, they were 
countered with stiff Sung resistance for forty-five years after 
the fall of Chin. This shows that the maintenance of status quo 
did not actually lead to complacency, as claimed by Wang Fu-chih. 
On the other hand, as we have studied in earlier chapters, the 
establishment of peace in 1165 did not result in the slackening 
of defence preparations during the Hsiao-tsung era. Furthermore, 
following the peace settlement concluded by Hsiao-tsung, the 
tranquility along the Sung-Chin border lasted for the rest of the 
twelfth century, enabling the state to enjoy economic prosperity 
and political stability. It also enabled the government to focus 
its efforts on fortifying the defences of the empire, as illus­
trated by the various military measures implemented by Hsiao- 
tsung .
Nevertheless, the relative stability in foreign relations
that characterized the last half of the twelfth century was
altered to one of international tension since the beginning of
the thirteenth century. Hostilities between Sung and Chin flared
up once again in 1206-08 with the launching of the northern
52
campaign by Han T ’o-chou. The war was eventually doomed to 
failure and in the peace agreement of 1208, the Sung conceded to 
an increase in its annual payment to the Chin, a lowering in its 
status vis-a-vis the Chin, and the payment of a substantial
52. For an account of the war, see SSPM, ch.83, pp.925-34.
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amount as war indemnity. The most humiliating term of the treaty
was the deliverance of Han T'o-chou's head to the enemy,
considered by some as degrading and an insult to the integrity 
53
of the Sung. Thus as a result of Han's inept policy, the
Southern Sung suffered a major setback in foreign relations since
the time Hsiao-tsung upgraded Sung diplomatic status in the 1165 
54
treaty. The disastrous consequences of Han's blunder also
proves the wisdom of Hsiao-tsung and his advisers in maintaining
the status quo despite great temptation to launch the campaign of
55
reconquest, especially in the early 1170s. The ability of the 
Chin to counter-attack the Sung in spite of the many reports 
concerning its imminent dissolution shows that its military 
strength was indeed something to be reckoned with.
Apart from the renewal of Sung-Chin hostilities, the 
intrusion of the Mongols into the international scene since the 
early thirteenth century also made the situation more complicated 
for the Sung. The Mongol assault upon the Chin empire since 
1211 forced the Jurchen to move southwards, transferring their 
capital from Peking to K'ai-feng in 1214. Further
pressure from the Mongols led them to attack the Sung in 1217 and
53. Among those who protested against this humiliating terms 
was the Minister of War, Ni Ss u '^t^^L* , and the Imperial 
University Instructor, Chen Te-hsiu. See HTC, ch.158,
pp.4275-76 and p.4281; see also their respective biography 
in S£, ch.398, p.12115 and ch.437, p.12957.
54. See Chapter III, pp.129-131.
55. See Chapter IV, pp. 187-89 and Chapter V, pp. 192-93.
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fighting continued until 1223. During these years Sung foreign
policy under the administration of Shih Mi-yuan remained largely
56
passive and defensive. Even as the Mongol-Jurchen war raged on
in the next decade, the Sung still held on firmly to the policy
of non-intervention. It was not until 1233 that the Sung modified
this policy by agreeing to a joint Mongol-Sung attack upon the 
57
Jurchen. Shih’s overall non-aggressive approach was very much
similar to that of his father, Shih Hao, the major peace prota-
58
gonist during the early years of Hsiao-tsung's reign. Although 
there was much criticism against Shih Mi-yuan for his timidity, 
it should nevertheless be pointed out that by pursuing a policy 
of non-involvement, he allowed the empire to enjoy sustained 
political and economic stability in the face of growing inter­
national conflict.
However, immediately following the fall of Chin in 1234,
the Sung adopted an aggressive posture under Shih Mi-yuan's
successor, Cheng Ch'ing-chih ?7J ^  . The Sung troops which
had helped to defeat the Jurchen earlier were ordered to advance
further north to recapture the old capitals of k'ai-feng and Lo- 
59
yang \ . This turned out to be another great blunder for
56. For example, after the Mongols began their assault on the 
Chin empire in 1211, Shih Mi-yuan went no further than 
ordering the border officials to fortify their defences. See 
HTC, ch. 159, p.4305.
57. For an account of the joint Sung-Mongol military action 
against the Chin, see SSPM, ch.91.
58. See Chapter III, pp.93-103.
59. HTC, ch.167, p.4563; SSPM, ch.92.
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not only did the Sung fail to hold the area but its action 
provoked hostilities from the Mongols. Thus the Sung was plunged 
into another war that ensued for the next few decades. Neverthe­
less, during this long period of warfare, the Sung had successfully 
resisted Mongol invasions by denying them a foothold in South 
China. Besides the factor of a strong Sung defence, it should be 
pointed out that the Mongol advance was also hindered by their 
difficulty in obtaining supplies for their troops and their 
preoccupation with a large number of domestic problems, particu­
larly during the 12 30s and 1240s. Meanwhile, Sung foreign policy
alternated between war and peace under the leadership of different 
60
chief councillors. As a result of its wavering policy, the 
Sung failed to prepare itself fully for the inevitable showdown 
with the Mongols. Neither had it succeeded in concluding an 
agreement with the Mongols that might have guaranteed peace for 
some time, similar to former treaties with the Chin. By the late 
1250s hostilities along the border began to intensify and in the 
late 1260s the enemy planned their final onslaught upon Sung.
After the fall of Hsiang-yang in 1273, Mongol forces rapidly moved 
eastwards and it was only a matter of time before the empire 
collapsed. In analysing Sung foreign relations in the thirteenth 
century, it can be said that the relatively strong position of
60. In 1136 Chief Councillor Cheng Ch’ing-chih who had adopted 
a firm stand against the Mongols wj^ s replaced by the 
moderate Ch’iao Hsing-chien^T , who followed a more
conciliatory policy. Ch’iao was succeeded by Shih Sung-
chih __ who was also anti-war. The anti-pacifists
again tooL over in 1247 with the reinstallation of Cheng 
Ch'ing-chih.
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the Sung in international relations ended with the reign of Hsiao- 
tsung and was replaced by a generally weak and dependent posture 
as the dynasty approached its end.
Nevertheless, despite the many weaknesses in its foreign 
policy, the Southern Sung government did tolerably well in the 
area of defence. Although the lack of a coherent policy on 
foreign relations greatly hampered decisive actions that might be 
advantageous to the Sung position, the importance of defence 
against foreign invasions was unanimously agreed to by all parties 
and emphasized upon at all times. The solidity of the Southern 
Sung defence was indeed crucial to the continued existence of the 
dynasty after the fall of North China. In this respect, Hsiao- 
tsung’ s efforts in consolidating the empire's defence should be 
duly recognised.
Even under peaceful conditions during the reign of Hsiao-
tsung, the government was obliged to maintain an army of 400,000 
61
men. Because of the necessity to be in a state of constant 
military preparedness, it was extremely difficult to reduce the 
number of soldiers and impossible to decrease military expenditure, 
as we have seen in the preceding chapters. The frequency of 
wars in the thirteenth century and the Mongol invasions towards 
the end of the dynasty made it necessary to maintain a much larger 
army. The number of soldiers in late Southern Sung China has been
61. See Chapter V, p. 198.
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estimated to be around one million men. However, in spite of
the great number of men in its army, the vastness of the empire
and the wide extent of its borders meant that there were still
63
not enough soldiers to cope effectively with border defence.
Furthermore, the quality of the troops which had been strictly
maintained by Hsiao-tsung formerly also deteriorated after his 
64
reign. Yet the emphasis of Hsiao-tsung on the importance of
the army was closely adhered to by his successors. Also, even
though no outstanding generals emerged during Hsiao-tsung’s time,
several capable military leaders did appear during the thirteenth
century. Among them were Meng KungJg^?^ and Yu Chieh ,
who had both contributed greatly to the defence of late Southern 
65
Sung China. Ihus in a way it can be said that Hsiao-tsung’s
>  £62. See Chia Ssu-tao’s memorial in SS, ch.194, ping-chih .o'*
7, p.4822.
63. The insufficiency in the number of Southern Sung soldiers had 
been pointed out by the Chin-shih candidate, Wen T'ien- 
hsiang in 1256: "Since the building of walls in
Tung-hai^ and the transfer of the Huai troops to guard
the coastal area, there were not enough soldiers in the Huai 
region.... After sending soldiers from Ching^J to fortify 
the Hsiang region, there were not enough soldiers in the
Ching-hu^'j region...." See Wen T ’ien-hsiang, Wen-shan
ch’uan-chi ^  UJ (SPTK ed. ) , ch. 3, pp. 55-56. For a
discussion on this issue, see also Chang Yin-lin, op.cit.,
p p . 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 .
64. The lack of discipline in the army and the deterioration in 
morale among the troops had been vividly described by Chen 
Te-hsiu in a memorial dated 1214. See Chen Te-hsiu, op.cit., 
ch.3, p.91.
65. For the career of Meng Hung, see his tomb inscription in Liu 
k'e-chuang, Hou-ts’un hsien-sheng ta-ch’iian chi, ch. 143,
pp. 1252-58. For a scholarly study on Yli Chieh, s^ ee Yao Ts’ung- 
* "Yii Chleh P ' t n g - c h u a n / ^ ^ f ^ / J S  ” , SSYCC.
Vol.4 (1969), pp.95-158. See also their respective biography 
in SS, ch. 412, pp.12369-80 and ch.416, pp.12468-73.
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life-long search for military personnel had been posthumously 
realized. His favourable treatment of military personnel and lack 
of prejudice against them, in contrast to the general dynastic 
tradition of civilian supremacy over the military, undoubtedly 
helped to promote the military cause in a civilian-dominated 
society.
As related in Chapter IV, the reign of Hsiao-tsung saw
the fortification of defences in strategic locations in the
Yang-tzu, Huai, Hsiang-yang and Ssu-ch'uan regions. Although the
Sung was restricted by treaty regulations to have no active
66
defence policy in the Huai region, it had however been Hsiao- 
tsung' s policy to strengthen the defence of both the Yang-tzu and 
Huai regions, and to fortify both the inner or core area as well 
as the outlying territories of the empire. While Hsiao-tsimg's 
active defence policy led to criticism by certain officials, 
especially the more cautious and timid among them, his efforts 
in defence preparations were nevertheless greatly appreciated 
by posterity, and advocates of a strong Huai defence in
67
succeeding generations were also inspired by his example. It is 
significant that in its final campaign to conquer South China, 
the Mongol army moved eastward from Ssu-ch’uan and Hsiang-yang
6 6 . Chen Te-hsiu mentioned that after the establishment of
peace with the Jurchen (in 1142), the treaty restricted the 
Sung from pursuing an active defence of the Huai region.
See Chen Te-hsiu, op.cit., ch.3, p.92.
67. Ibid.
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to the core region rather than southward from the Huai to the 
Yang-tzu, which testifies the military strength of the Huai and 
Yang-tzu areas. Sung resilience was also shown by the gallant 
defence put up by Hsiang-yang, which resisted Mongol invasions on 
several occasions and was able to survive the final Mongol siege 
for more than five years.
Equally remarkable was the strong defence in Ssu-ch'uan.
As illustrated in Chapter IV, the consolidation of defence in Ssu-
ch'uan and the north-western borders had been largely accomplished
during Hsiao-tsung's reign, particularly through the efforts of
Yii Yiin-wen. Successive emperors continued to place great
importance on the defence of Ssu-ch’uan. It is worth mentioning
that in the 1240s the general Yu Chieh played a decisive role in
defending Ssu-ch’uan, especially by the building of strong forts
68
in the strategically important mountain ranges. Because of its
strong fortifications, the Mongols faced great difficulties in
their attempts to conquer Ssu-ch’uan, and one of their rulers
even died in battle there in 1259. This event was indeed crucial
to the fate of the late Southern Sung as it helped to prolong the
69
life of the dynasty for another twenty years. While the Mongol 
defeat in this battle should be largely attributed to the wall-
68. HTC, ch.171, pp.4650-51.
69. The Mongol ruler who died in Ssu-ch’uan in 1259 was Mongke. 
The Mongol defeat has been attributed to the efforts of Yu 
Chieh in fortifying Ssu-ch'uan earlier. See Yao Ts'ung-wu, 
"Sung Yji Chieh she-fang shan-ch'eng tui Meng-ku ju-ch'in ti
ta-chi^fr^rfS ft ^  *■*%$}%. -S > - #  ^  4* •"
SSYCC. Vol.l, pp.215-226. S
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building efforts of Yu Chieh, the solidity of the Ssu-ch'uan 
defence could ultimately be traced back to the military 
preparations under Hsiao-tsung's reign.
defence measure implemented by Hsiao-tsung was the establishment 
of military colonies or t*un-t'ien. As mentioned in Chapter V, 
there was an intensification in the implementation of t 'un-t'ien 
projects in the Hsiang-yang and Huai areas towards the last years 
of Hsiao-tsung's reign. The importance of military colonies as 
an effective means of defending the empire was increasingly 
realized during times of war in the thirteenth century. The 
government had at different times instructed the local adminis­
trators to implement the t 'un-t'ien scheme in various places, 
especially in strategically important areas, For example, in 
1227 the Prefectural Vice-Administrator of Hsiang-yang, Shih 
Sung-chih » successfully reorganised the military
colonies in this area by transforming the formerly unprofitable 
farms into a remunerative undertaking. This resulted in his 
concurrent appointment as Subprefect and Military Consultant for
Hsiang-yang. There also Shih's implementation of t'un-t * ien
colonies as a defence measure is clearly seen by the proclamation 
of an imperial order in 12th/1240 whereby all Defence Commissioners
70. Biography of Shih Sung-chih, SS^ , ch,414, p. 12423; annals 
of Ning-tsung, S£, ch.41, p,792.
It has been seen in earlier chapters that an important
another strategically vital area east of
proved to be effective.
70
The court's emphasis on military
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(chih-chih shih W i - i  t  ) were to be given concurrent assignments
as Commissioners of Military Colonies (t'un-t'ien shih
71
in their respective territories. Subsequently, as Defence
Commssioner of Ssu-ch’uan, Meng Kung and Yu Chieh successively
took charge of the management of t ’un-t'ien in this region. Their
effective administration of the military farms undoubtedly
contributed further to the strong defence of Ssu-ch'uan. The
success of the t'un-t'ien scheme was also reported in the Yang-
72
tzu region in 1243.
Besides the successful implementation of military colonies,
the effectiveness of the militia was also a major factor that
contributed to the strength of Southern Sung defence. As related
in Chapters IV and V, the reign of Hsiao-tsung was noted for its
efforts in the reorganisation and training of militia forces.
Their importance was clearly seen during times of war, as
testified by the comments of Li-tsung in 1229 that the majority
of the Sung success in battles should be attributed to the 
73
militia. Indeed, the training of militia and the management 
of t'un-t'ien were looked upon as the urgent tasks of the day by 
Li-tsung and his court. The militia continued to grow in 
importance towards the last years of the dynasty. It is 
interesting to note that of the half-million soldiers who
71. HTC, ch.170, p.4629.
72. HTC, ch.171, p.4651.
73. HTC, ch.164, p.4478.
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accompanied the fugitive court in 1276, 170,000 men belonged to
74
the regular troops while 300,000 men derived from the militia.
This is a clear indication of the crucial role played by the 
militia in the defence of the late Southern Sung empire.
Final Remarks
From the preceding sections in the chapter, we can see 
clearly how various political, socio-economic and military factors 
interacted to keep the Southern Sung empire going until its final 
days. As emphasized earlier, the dynasty had demonstrated an 
astonishing power of survival in a tumultuous age. In the final 
analysis, this amazing stability amid increasing strain and stress 
can be attributed to the maintenance of a lasting political, 
socio-economic order and a durable defence system which were all 
effectively consolidated during the reign of Hsiao-tsung. 
Externally, stabilization of the northern frontier took place 
since the early years of Hsiao-tsung's reign with the borders 
being consolidated from the Huai River westward to northern Ssu- 
ch'uan. Internally, political consolidation was thoroughly 
achieved by Hsiao-tsung through absolutism and centralization, 
while his financial and agricultural policies contributed to the 
socio-economic well-being of the populace and added to the 
splendours of his regime.
74. HTC, ch.183, p.4995,
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Admittedly Hsiao-tsung had various faults such as being 
over-indulgent at times in personnel management, manipulative in 
dealing with his ministers and employing accommodative tactics 
in administration, but he managed to construct a dynasty of long 
duration. He not only established an age of peace and order 
during his twenty-seven years on the throne but he also left 
behind a politically stable, economically viable and militarily 
solid empire that lasted until the Mongol onslaught. As illus­
trated earlier, Hsiao-tsung's efforts in consolidation had far- 
reaching impact upon the Southern Sung dynasty as these helped 
to hold the empire firmly together in the ensuing nine decades. 
Because of the lasting contributions made by this capable, 
assertive and efficient emperor, Hsiao-tsung truly deserved to 
be called the "Consolidator of Southern Sung China",
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